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This thesis aims to bring into sharp focus a contradiction that seems to persist in 
actuarial and financial practice. Specifically, how efforts to manage the uncertain and 
potentially catastrophic future, via actuarial and financial calculative modeling, fail 
precisely where they succeed. The purpose is to disclose that the problem with such 
efforts is not that they are not yet scientifically sophisticated enough, nor that they 
frequently lack the intuitive judgement which experienced practitioners can bring. 
Rather, it is that our certainties, which may have either a technical or judgmental origin, 
are always and already permeated by uncertainties, and vice versa. Thus, what this 
thesis aims to show is the radical and inescapable entanglement of certainty with 
uncertainty, or of the technical with the social, which is not simply complementary or 
oppositional, but in a more fundamental way, aporetic. This aporetic entanglement is 
conceptualized within the thesis as an ongoing play of difference. Specifically, a play 
that is ontological and central to what sustains actuarial practice exactly as that. 
The thesis consists of three papers. The first one focuses on the financial markets and 
aims to disclose, following a Heideggerian analysis, how investing is ontologically 
dependent on a prior understanding that dictates what counts as significant, or not. In 
this respect, financial markets are conditioned not just by the social/technical 
entanglement, but also by a further entanglement among different styles of 
understanding. 
The second paper focuses on the liability side of insurance companies and argues that 
the so-called financialization of insurance liabilities (i.e., the requirement for a market-
consistent valuation of them) does not uncritically expand financial economics (i.e., 
practices oriented towards the market with a dominant technicalizing aspect) at the 
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expense of actuarial logics (i.e., practices oriented towards the underlying liabilities 
with an effective contextualizing aspect). Rather, a Derridean autoimmunity process is 
revealed – one that “auto-deconstructs” the financial sovereign of the market-consistent 
valuation into its actuarial “other”. 
The third paper focuses on Solvency II, the new regulatory framework for EU insurers 
since 2016. By taking a close look at the quantitative and qualitative requirements of 
the new framework, the paper claims that the regulatory text and its accompanying 
algorithm can never be made unambiguous, or free from fundamental paradoxes. 
However, instead of adding confusion, this paradoxical quasi-structure ultimately 
increases the possibilities for understanding the subtleties of the insurance business and 
its solvency issues. In this context, the paper reconsiders performativity as a play of 
differences – a rethinking that focuses more decisively on not knowing, rather than on 
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The purpose of this introductory chapter is to cover the background and context of the 
thesis and demonstrate the common research question and theoretical concerns that run 
through the three research papers: (1) Heidegger and Modern Finance; (2) Folding the 
Actuarial: The Aporetic Financialization of Risk Liabilities; (3) Pricing (In)Solvency: 
Performativity as a Play of Differences. 
An important context that sheds light on the approach and focus of the research 
presented here is the experiential and professional background of the researcher. The 
concerns and issues discussed in these papers were not based on data that were gathered, 
selected, organized, analyzed and presented based on a third-person perspective, as 
would be typical for a doctoral student studying the practices of others by means of an 
ethnographic methodology, for example.  Rather, the researcher has practiced 
professionally as an actuarial and financial consultant for the last 15 years. In his 
capacity as Chief Actuary and Chief Risk Officer, he was given the opportunity to 
consider – carefully and sometimes painfully – the theoretical and practical questions 
of risk and uncertainty, to assess (and be assessed on) claims of valuations and to 
construct, use, defend and go beyond models and modeling practices. In short, to 
experience firsthand the social and technical entanglements such issues produce and 
witnessed “from the inside” the so-called financialization trend that emerged and 
continues to dominate some of these practices. 
In this respect, much of what is included within the three papers comes from the need 
to make sense of and theorize these experiences in order to grasp the practical, 
theoretical and philosophical significance of such and other changes for the financial 
profession and for the field of actuarial science more generally. This immersion in 
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professional practice, and attempts to make sense of it, revealed what Joyce famously 
termed, its “chaosmic” infrastructure1. In-situ actuarial and financial practices are far 
from an “anything goes” chaos, but they are equally far from consisting of a benevolent, 
unifying totality or an undisrupted cosmic set of rational choices which undeniably 
maximize utility. If they are neither this nor that, then it is tempting to claim that they 
are instead something in-between, or, assuming a more radical vocabulary, something 
beyond, “in excess”. However, for reasons we hope we show within the three papers, 
we feel that both such claims either fall short or go too far. Instead, we want to assert 
that all that can be said, is that they are what they are and not anything else.  
Such a tautological claim may seem too poor, informationally – especially in the current 
age of the revolution of information. And rightly so, if we equate understanding with 
practices that simply aim at the acquisition of more information, of more (big) data. 
However, Heidegger, the subject of our first paper, was fond of tautologies because, 
unlike explanations that reduce the phenomenon in question to something else, such as 
defining heat as motion, or market efficiency as an arbitrage-free state, tautologies force 
our attention onto the phenomenon, the whole phenomenon, and nothing but the 
phenomenon (Braver, 2012a: 195). By saying that, the intention in the three papers is 
not to somehow limit ourselves to a pure, Husserlian transcendental account. Rather, 
this thesis wishes instead to explore the possibility that if we are entirely of this world, 
if the laws of the financial reality are not but a set of empty tautologies without any 
solid reference that breaks through outside the cave, then we can still name the 
relationships among the pieces of our financial practices that actually do and say 
something. As this thesis will argue, a common approach that runs throughout all three 
                                                          
1 The term “infrastructure” is used to precisely deflate any “hardness” implied by the plain term 
“structure”. Infrastructure points to the Derridean “quasi-structure”.  
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contributions is the view of the phenomenon of our financial practices (theoretical or 
empirical) as a “play” – a play might be self-referential, but it simultaneously defers 
such self-referentiality in that it comes along with real consequences. In the words of 
Joseph Campbell, a soap opera, yes, but a soap opera that hurts (Campbell & Moyers, 
1988). 
In that respect, the driving force – and, one might say, the overarching research question 
– behind this thesis is to bring into sharp focus a tension or contradiction that seems to 
adhere in actuarial and financial practice – something all good actuaries know, but do 
not often articulate.  That is, on the one hand, there are the efforts of finance and 
actuarial practice to anticipate future, potentially catastrophic events in order to tame 
and govern uncertainty – in other words, to deliver the promise of managing uncertainty 
and making an indeterminate and unknowable future knowable and calculable. On the 
other, such efforts seem to contain in themselves a contradiction: where they succeed 
precisely, they also simultaneously seem to fail. The traditional response to this 
contradiction – as will be argued and shown below – is either to say, “our models are 
not yet sophisticated or scientific enough”, or to argue that they are too scientific or 
technical and lack the intuitive and nuanced judgement that experienced practitioners 
can bring. That is, either argue that the hard and the soft should complement each other 
or that they are fundamentally oppositional to each other.  This thesis will suggest, – 
through the three papers, – that this response is inadequate. It would suggest that it is 
not a matter of uncertainty that is mitigated by certainty, i.e., it is not “uncertainty-
towards-certainty” thanks to our powerful financial and actuarial scientific tools nor, 
turning the terms around, is it that our certainties are temporarily disturbed by 
uncertainties that will eventually yield into settlement in due time. Rather, it is that our 
certainties are always and already permeated by uncertainties, and vice versa. Thus, 
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what this thesis aims to show is the radical and inescapable entanglement of certainty 
with uncertainty, or of the technical with the social, which is not simply complementary 
or oppositional, but in a more fundamental way, it is aporetic: that is, simultaneously 
oppositional and complementary. What is termed in other words, within the thesis, as 
an ongoing play – a play that is ontological and central to what sustains actuarial 
practice exactly as that. 
As a practitioner, immersed in practice, the researcher is used to working in both the 
asset and liability sides of an institution. This reality was mirrored in the development 
of the three papers. The first one, Heidegger and Modern Finance, focuses on the asset 
side: the financial markets. What does it mean to invest? How are we to make sense of 
an asset market transaction? What makes an asset strategy legitimate, and thus 
developed and followed? The second paper, Folding the Actuarial: The Aporetic 
Financialization of Risk Liabilities, turns towards the liability side: what does it mean 
to value a liability? If the first paper explores how it is possible to assess the value of 
the ownership of a stream of claims, i.e., the value of an asset, the second paper explores 
the possibility of making sense of the value of the ownership of a stream of liabilities, 
especially in the light of the contemporary trends of financialization which demands a 
market-consistent assessment between asset and liabilities. The third paper, Pricing 
(In)Solvency: Performativity as a Play of Differences, makes a further step and focuses 
on the uncertainty which accommodates every asset and liability valuation: if the first 
and second paper emphasize the valuation processes to arrive at a valuation point (a 
value), the third paper focuses on the riskiness that surrounds such valuation points and 
how such risks are measured and managed by financial firms – in our particular case 
study, insurance companies.  In that respect, the three papers of the thesis comprise a 
holistic approach to the sense-making practices (through, e.g., valuation modeling) that 
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run across contemporary financial institutions, such as insurance companies.2 In this 
regard, the thesis  can be read as an attempt to unearth the richness of relationships, 
theoretical aspirations, empirical limitations, understandings and misunderstandings, 
framings and enframings, formations and deformations that run through an institution’s 
life to make sense of itself. Following Ingold (2011) and Introna (2018), the purpose of 
the three papers is an attempt to unearth the flow of the financial life along lines, 
indivisible lines with no definitive origin, as such – the way meanings interpenetrate 
along the line of flow, supporting and deconstructing each other. As Introna writes, 
“All of these lines of flow mesh together – what Ingold (2011, p. 63) calls the 
meshwork – to condition the ongoing flow and unfolding of the conversation 
[practice], exactly as a conversation [practice], rather than a sequence of 
interacting utterances [doings].” (Introna, 2018:8). 
The three papers also draw upon and speak to existing bodies of literature3; therefore, 
they both owe a debt to and also make a contribution to such literature. The theoretical 
framework that covers the three papers were designed to follow a specific pattern. The 
first paper assumes a more general and wide approach, which serves to locate the 
research of the thesis within the existing literature in the mainstream of finance and the 
Social Studies of Finance (SSF). Thus, it focuses on the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH), which is one of the most renowned, and equally contested, part of the Modern 
Portfolio Theory.  In focusing on the EMH, the paper introduces the main tenets of its 
rival theory: of Behavioral Finance (Dawes, 2001; Forbes, 2009; Howard, 2004; 
Kahneman, 2011; Klein, 2009; Krozner & Shiller, 2011). Beyond discussing the widely 
                                                          
2 Our focus remains on insurance companies, although many of the same could be said for other 
institutions, as well (especially pension funds). 
3 In what follows, the discussion restricts itself to those references included within the three papers. 
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assumed rivalry between the mainstream orthodoxy and behavioral finance, the paper 
also makes a passing reference to the field of Economic Sociology (Akerlof, 1984; 
Granovetter, 1985, 1995; Smelser & Swedberg, 2005; Zelizer, 1988) in order to 
eventually focus on the literature of the Social Studies of Finance, – which complement, 
rather than displace such sociological tradition. The field of the SSF extends into a vast 
area of multiple and diverse directions. The thesis is located mainly in the literature on 
performativity. That is, it is oriented towards the epistemological question of the 
relation between “reality” and “theory” that goes beyond the traditional idea of 
economics describing, more or less adequately, some supposedly “real” processes 
(Boldyrev et al., 2016:2). The thesis is particularly interested in the performativity of 
models within the financial (first paper) and the actuarial (second and third papers) 
fields of practice. Whereas the first paper takes a more general or “ontological” stance 
towards performativity,  – attempting to unearth its commitments (as exemplified 
mainly in the works of Callon, 1998, 2005; Callon & Law, 2005; Callon & Muniesa, 
2002) and assess them relative to the Heideggerian ontology,  – the second and third 
papers assume a more empirical stance relative to performativity, as they both focus on 
how the link between theory and reality works in specific empirical cases: the market-
consistent valuation of insurance liabilities (second paper) and the solvency capital 
requirements of insurance firms (third paper). Thus, the second and third papers follow 
the more general shift of the performativity literature towards performative practices 
(Beunza & Stark, 2009; MacKenzie, 2006, 2009, 2011; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003; 
Millo & MacKenzie, 2009; Muniesa, 2014; Muniesa et al., 2007; Svetlova, 2012), 
oriented towards perspectives that are considerably under-studied: the valuation of 
insurance liabilities and the modeling of solvency for insurance companies. 
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The focus on the performative practices of the market-consistent valuation of insurance 
liabilities also allows the research in the second paper to be positioned relative to the 
vast literature on financialization (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009; Epstein, 2015; 
Jarzabkowski, 2017). The paper is interested in what is widely perceived as the intrusion 
of financial economics in the traditional actuarial practices through the requirement to 
value insurance liabilities in a market-consistent way (Turnbull, 2017). To that end, the 
paper offers a critical reading of the work of Jarzabkowski (2017). Her seminal 
ethnographic work, – located within the SSF literature, – attempts to show how financial 
markets actually work – specifically, how, in global reinsurance practices, such 
practices are impacted by the growing trends of “marketization”.  By analyzing the 
requirement of market-consistent valuation, this paper also positions itself relative to 
the vast accounting literature on Fair Value (Penman, 2007; Power, 2010; Towers 
Perrin, 2014; Zimmerman, 2007; Zyla, 2012). However, this is done from the point of 
view of the liability side, which is considerably less explored than from the asset side. 
In focusing on the performative practices of modeling solvency for insurance 
companies, the research in the third paper is also linked to the recent growing literature 
on preemptive and forward-looking risk technologies (Amoore, 2013; Aradau & Van 
Munster, 2011; Anderson, 2010; De Goede, 2012; Grusin, 2010) since the solvency 
model can be seen as precisely a novel, preemptive risk technology. The paper is also 
linked to the accounting-in-practice literature; specifically, the thesis is interested in 
how such risk technologies alter the traditional accounting modality of the insurance 
institutions (Power, 2015; Young, 2011). Such connections, in their turn, lead the 
research to be associated with the growing recognition in the philosophy of science 
(Douglas, 2000, 2009; Svetlova, 2013, 2014; Laudan, 2004) that it is not possible to 
have a clear separation between theory (science), as exemplified in a model, and its 
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application, – that is, the translation of the model (theory) into the messy field of its 
application. In other words, to the growing recognition that the deeper we move into the 
“tails of the future”, that is, into a world that is getting more complex, more 
interconnected, and thus more potentially destructive and disruptive, then, “the 
relationships between science, expertise, and decision are radically rearticulated so that 
distinctions between ‘science’ and ‘non-science’ become more malleable” (Amoore, 
2013:9). The paper also does a critical reading of Lockwood (2015), a work positioned 
within the performativity literature, which attempts to uncover how technocratic 
calculative modeling such as Value-at-Risk, which shares the same ontological 
architecture with the solvency model, crowds-out alternative ways to imagine the 
“unimagined”. The paper draws significantly on the performativity literature that 
studies the limits of performativity (Brisset, 2016; Henriksen, 2013; Svetlova, 2012) by 
rethinking performativity as a play of differences. As such, it also assumes a critical 
orientation towards the search for the constitutive conditions of performativity (Brisset, 
2016).  
One might then ask what the distinctive point of view of this thesis, which underlies all 
this theoretical work, is. Or perhaps, what are the intellectual tools that allow the thesis 
to draw upon, and speak to, this body of literature and theory?  To do this intellectual 
work, the first paper draws on the work of Heidegger, and the second and third papers 
on that of Derrida. In other words, the intention of the thesis is to deploy philosophical 
ideas, Heideggerian and Derridean, to situate finance and actuarial practice within a 
broader context of the human endeavor, in order to see it in a new light. In that respect, 
all three papers are further connected with direct readings from works by Heidegger 
(1946, 1960, 1962, 1966, 1977, 1991, 1994, 2001) and Derrida (1973, 1986, 1988, 1990, 
1992, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2008). Since Heidegger and Derrida did not write specifically 
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about finance, the research makes use of more recent theoretical works that re-read 
Heidegger and Derrida and extend their insights in many directions. We use their 
analyses and interpretations to build upon our specific cases (for example, referring to 
Heidegger: Braver, 2009, 2012a, 2012b; Caputo, 1993; Dreyfus, 1980, 1995; Dreyfus 
& Kelly, 2011; Dreyfus & Spinosa, 1997; Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005; Harman, 2002, 
2005; Malpas, 2008; Richardson, 1963; Spinosa, 2001, 2005; Spinosa et al., 1999; 
Thomson, 2005; Young, 2002, 2006. Referring to Derrida: Burke, 2002; Caputo, 1999, 
2000; Cooper, 1989; Hill, 2010; Naas, 2008; Royle, 2008; Wortham, 2010). 
Heidegger is used in the first paper as an initial starting point to probe and reconsider 
the current theoretical developments “from the inside” of the field of finance, as well as 
to reveal the commitments and tendencies of the much more differentiated and 
sophisticated literature in the SSF, to which the research subsequently turns4. Although 
the differences between Heidegger and the EMH, as well as Behavioral Finance, are 
easier to show, many of the Heideggerian insights are in fact already, to some degree, 
accounted for in the literature on performativity – for example, issues such as the 
blurring of the financial world, the public world, with the world of a model, a private 
world. As such, one of the intentions of the thesis is to uncover the more subtle 
differentiations between Heidegger and this contemporary body of theory. To that end, 
the focus of the thesis is more on the later Heidegger and his views on technology as an 
onto-historical phenomenon. In the words of Thomas Bay,  
“While [SSF] take a more Heideggerian position regarding finance, their 
prescriptions regarding markets reflect more immediate instrumentality than 
                                                          
4 As exemplified mainly in Callon, 1998, 2005. See our earlier discussion. 
Page 17 
 
the philosopher would support. Rather, Heidegger would emphasize how 
finance is a part of a longer-term historical process.” (Bay, 2018: 2). 
By allowing the thesis to be informed by Heidegger, it is claimed that Heidegger is able 
to think not only in terms of the technologically stimulating play between contexts that 
reconfigure and refine, as Callon (1998, 2005) seems to do, but also, in a more radical 
way, in terms of the play of the play: that play we did not initiate, yet a “play in which 
[our] essence is at stake.” (Heidegger, 1991:113). It is the contention of the thesis that 
such a play (a play already given) informs our financial practices in a “gentle” – in that 
it does not force but always and already allows for the possibility to be broken – yet 
decisive way. 
As both the second and third papers shift their approach towards performative practices, 
we also divert our philosophical gaze and allow ourselves to be informed by Derridean 
concepts such as autoimmunity and aporia to account for the processes involved in the 
fair valuing of insurance liabilities and the assessments of solvency. The second and 
third papers have a common background, that of Solvency II (S2), – which is the new 
regulatory framework for EU insurers after 2016. In the context of S2, the valuation of 
insurance liabilities is dramatically altered relative to existing actuarial practices, and a 
new model to assess the solvency of each insurer is constructed and put into circulation. 
The focus here is on modeling and its promise to provide accurate prices on insurance 
liabilities and (in)solvency risks, to technically determine and manage the indeterminate 
uncertainty that threatens an insurance company. Such technocratic modeling ambitions 
are widely perceived as resulting in crowding out alternative practices such as expert 
judgements and the application of traditional actuarial prudence. Derrida’s notions of 
autoimmunity, deconstruction, and aporia allow the thesis to differentiate itself from 
many of the claims that can be found in the extant literature (for example, in 
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Jarzabkowski, 2017; Lockwood, 2015; Power, 2004) and realize that it is not only 
impossible to defend such polarities  –  a point already shared by many in the 
performativity literature  –  but also that each of the opposing principles is constituted 
via the other  –  that is, how, in other words, conditions of possibilities transform, always 
and already, into conditions of impossibilities. In this respect, the thesis takes a critical 
stance towards efforts to use performativity as a resource to inform our practices in 
order to improve them or make them more intelligent. Instead, performativity is 
rethought as a play of differences that may both extend or limit the performativity of 
the model, in an undecidable way. The point, then, is not how to remain solvent – that 
is, control the play and regulate our financial destinies – but rather to be drawn into and 
lose oneself in this play, i.e., to become “with” this event (Bay & Schinckus, 2012: 4). 
Given this general and high-level overview of the common context and background that 
informs the three papers and their theoretical position relative to the extant theorizing 
body, we will now proceed to a more detailed presentation of each of the three papers 
in order to elaborate some of these issues more specifically. The final chapter of the 
thesis will summarize the implications and contributions of the overall research project. 
It will also provide an account of the limitations of the research and the potential 
avenues for future work.   
1.1. Heidegger and Modern Finance 
As already indicated, the paper takes a close look at the financial markets and what it 
means to invest in them. It looks, for example, at the ways investors reach decisions 
about investments and how more generally, financial market is conceptualized. In that 
respect, it is necessary to explore initially the way finance itself, “from the inside”, 
makes sense of itself – that is, how the theory of financial economics envisages investors 
to reach investment decisions.  
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For that reason, the paper begins by introducing the two main views within modern 
financial economics that largely reign the academic and the professional fields: the 
orthodox view under the label of Modern Portfolio Theory which includes, among 
others, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), and Behavioral Finance which contests 
the EMH and is considered its main rival. 
In its broad outlines, EMH’s central idea is that a stock’s price incorporates all the 
available knowledge about the value of the company and the best predictions about the 
future of the stock (Kahneman, 2011:213-5). This essentially means that all assets in a 
market are correctly priced since, in such a picture, investors are considered to be 
rational, profit maximisers who compete with each other while trying to predict future 
market values of individual securities by processing important current information 
which is almost freely available to all of them. 
The rival theory, Behavioral Finance, seeks instead to discover cognitive, emotional or 
behavioral reasons behind the economic decisions of the financial participants. In the 
face of well-documented empirical cases, its central hypothesis is that market 
participants are beings with inherent biases that corrupt their judgments and decisions, 
and thus have thinking processes that are flawed, inaccurate and unreliable. One of the 
most emblematic examples is the wide use of heuristics – that is, experience strategies, 
not rational nor evidence-based, – that people commonly use in thinking. In short, 
contrary to the EMH’s beliefs, market participants are decision makers of questionable 
efficacy. 
Such “from the inside” views are usually set in opposition to “outside” efforts, such as 
Economic Sociology, which attempt to apply a sociological perspective to economic 
phenomena. What mainly changes with Economic Sociology is the concept of the actor: 
where in both the EMH and Behavioral Finance, the analytic starting point is the 
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individual, for Economic Sociology, it is typically groups, institutions and society. 
Thus, the actor is seen as a socially constructed entity and the social structural levels as 
phenomena sui generis, without reference to the individual actor (Smelser & Swedberg, 
2005:4). In that respect, whereas the EMH and Behavioral Finance simply consider an 
economic action to either succeed or fail to ascend to the status of economically rational 
action by, for example, identifying it with the efficient or inefficient allocation of risk 
and return, Economic Sociology gives room to traditional (habitual) economic action 
(Akerlof, 1984; Smelser & Swedberg, 2005:4) that goes beyond what are mere habits 
and rules of thumb for the orthodox, and obvious elements of irrationality for the 
behaviorist. In that way, Economic Sociology turns what constitutes the main resource 
of the orthodox view, rationality as an assumption, to a topic in need of investigation: 
rationality as a phenomenon to be explained, not assumed. 
SSF extend such sociological tradition: investors are not only embedded in networks of 
personal connections but are also inextricably and simultaneously embedded in systems 
of technologies, cognitive frameworks, simplifying concepts and calculative 
mechanisms (MacKenzie, 2009:180). Therefore, such studies acknowledge that all 
markets “are combinations of human beings and physical objects” and that equipment 
or materiality matters since “it changes the nature of the economic agent, of economic 
action and of markets.” (MacKenzie, 2009:13). In that context, SSF explore the 
hypothesis that financial economics’ success is in part “performative” and not simply a 
descriptive or analytical success (MacKenzie, 2009:30). Whereas, in other words, the 
orthodox discerns a twostep process whereby a subject initially observes the bare 
financial reality out-there and then attempts to bridge what is perceived a knowledge 
gap by constructing an (in)accurate representation (model) of what stands out there, 
SSF leave open the possibility that reality itself can change by the widespread use of 
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the model itself. In other words, there are no two primary fixed poles of independent 
agents, a subject and an object, but an endpoint of agencements (MacKenzie, 2009:19-
25), which are socio-technical arrangements that co-produce stability. 
At this point, the research turns towards Heidegger in order to problematize and 
reconsider both the inside views of financial economics, and the outside views of the 
SSF. The point is not to use Heidegger as an external referee in order to decide which 
view best describes what is considered “investor’s rationality” and how it is constructed 
in the midst of the financial markets, but to make an attempt and see through the 
Heideggerian lens the financial phenomenon of investing. With this attempt, it will be 
possible to problematize both the inside mainstream views and the outside more 
marginal perspective, and contribute to the relevant literature by uncovering a more 
neglected aspect of finance, one that does not rest on the a priori rational (EMH) or 
biased (Behavioral Finance) nature of investors, but neither on the a posteriori technical 
and social entanglements they construct. 
Heidegger’s philosophical attitude takes its departure from lived experience. For him, 
humans’ most fundamental features cannot be discovered through a rational, evidence-
based, scientific-type analysis, nor even a linguistic inquiry since all of them presuppose 
our unreflective involvement and pre-propositional way of comporting in the world. 
From such a starting point, he tries to walk a fine line between realism and 
constructivism about truths and the status of scientific entities (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 
2005:9-10). He thus focuses on the notion of being, “that on the basis of which beings 
are already understood” (Heidegger, 1962:25-6). A culture’s understanding of being, 
i.e., the style of life manifest in the way its everyday practices are coordinated, allows 
people and things to show up as something – that is, the shared practices into which we 
are socialized provide a background understanding of what counts as things, as human 
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beings and what it makes sense to do. Such a central insight allows Heidegger to 
assume, in his later works, a historicist perspective since he acknowledges that the 
history of the West consists of a series of “epochs” of different understandings of being, 
where the “unconcealment” (truth, or better yet, what grounds truth) of beings varies 
according to such background understandings. In that respect, each epoch (pre-Socratic, 
ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary/technological) has its own understanding 
of being which determines its “beingness,” or how all beings are in that age, including 
man. Heidegger calls these understandings “sendings” from being, in an obvious 
attempt to indicate that they are not the results of our conscious choice or transcendental 
faculties (Braver, 2012a:190-1). Such historical sendings of being give him a 
perspective on the basis of which it is possible to understand the emergence of 
modernity that culminates in the (postmodern) technological understanding of being. 
In terms of the financial economics field, this historicist perspective implies that the 
emergence of the modern financial economics of the EMH and Behavioral Finance is a 
historical phenomenon that has simply transformed markets into epistemology-centered 
arenas where the fundamental problem is how to develop a system of justified true 
propositions that can support, and subsequently trigger, the appropriate economic 
actions. Just as a valid argument produces only true conclusions from true premises, the 
idea is that a properly built, e.g., risk management system insulates the circulation of 
financial truth throughout its entirety (Braver, 2012a:173). Both the EMH and 
Behavioral Finance, in their ontology, treat all financial propositions as epistemic and 
hence as subject to tests of truth and responsible belief; therefore, we need to conduct 
epistemological “stress tests”, like Socratic elenchus or Cartesian doubt, maintaining 
only those which pass the tribunal of reason (Braver, 2012a:130). 
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In that respect, Behavioral Finance simply raises the stakes by imposing an extra set of 
required filtrations to render observations and inferences as impersonal and as much 
divested of any local, temperamental or psychological biases as possible, of the kind 
identified in the experimental work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979); other than that, 
it remains like the EMH, framed in an ontological picture of investors as subjects or 
knowers and the investment world as an object of knowledge.  
Based on the Heideggerian concept of understanding of being that creates a clearing 
where things show up as what they are, the thesis attempts to reconsider financial 
markets in a way that goes beyond epistemology-centered arenas, as the EMH and 
Behavioral Finance suggest. Financial markets are thus rethought as a clearing that 
organizes and preserves dissonance, generated by dissimilar participating investment 
styles that clash and meet each other, where the place of meeting is the transaction price. 
Every market calculation that bestows a value, and thus every market transaction, - can 
only take place on the basis of local investment communities that disclose a way of 
being in the world that matters most to us. In such a way of being in the world, an 
insistence on the salience of certain possibilities takes place, through the use of a 
particular kind of mots justes, that excludes or presents other possibilities as irrelevant. 
Therefore, the act of a simple market transaction is not only or exclusively stimulated 
by epistemological motivations (of a modern imperative) that may degenerate into mere 
algorithmic signals (in a technological universe); rather, it is an agent’s act of situating 
herself in such a way within the investment universe that attempts to bring out, at its 
best, the style of her investment community. The portfolio builder does not simply 
understand and construct her portfolio in objective or subjective terms; rather, she 
comes to see the entire world through her portfolio.  
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Such Heideggerian rethinking of financial markets allows the thesis to resolve a puzzle 
brought forth by the Nobel laureate and Behavioral Finance guru, Daniel Kahneman. 
For Kahneman, a simple market transaction looks like an almost insurmountable 
contradiction: what makes a person buy and the other sell given that they share the same 
information? Such a question is indeed puzzling if regarded from an epistemic point of 
view: obviously, one of the parties fails to rationally interpret the objective financial 
evidence. One of them is right, and the other is wrong – at best. At worst, both parties 
are wrong. Thus, Behavioral Finance’s condition of the possibility for a simple market 
transaction rests on a mistake resulting from defective judgment, deficient knowledge, 
or carelessness in the face of the given, transparent financial information: in short, from 
some sort of biases. Of course, equally perplexing is the EMH’s perspective according 
to which there should only be market transactions that solely gain exposure to the 
Market Portfolio – nothing more nor less. 
However, from a Heideggerian point of view, Kahneman fails to entertain one more 
possibility: both parties could equally be right. From an analytic point of view, this 
possibility is a plain contradiction, but – it is not if reason itself is not universally but 
locally emergent on the basis of a prior inexplicit or unthematic understanding of the 
way the world opens up. Within her local investment community, the investor simply 
attempts to bring out the style of her investing understanding, at its best; in such an 
attempt, she may succeed or fail (so both parties of the transaction may be right or 
wrong) regardless of the actual payoff: money (“return” in the financial parlance) can 
only support or force the collapse of the particular’s style investing practices, and 
further release new possibilities in such practices.  
After this first critical assessment of the views “from the inside” of finance, the research 
turns to examine a more sophisticated perspective, which is certainly closer to 
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Heidegger, as articulated in the SSF body of literature. What is pointed out is that in 
Callon’s (1998) analysis, an economic actor is not an individual human being, nor even 
a human being embedded in institutions, conventions etc., but is “made up of human 
bodies but also of prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms etc.” 
(Callon, 2005:4). 
In this respect, the field of SSF is excellent in capturing this anti-essentialist play on 
how, for example, the financial calculator can render an agent both more (as predicted 
by the neo-enlightenment project of the mainstream financial theories) and less 
sophisticated than initially acknowledged. This is accomplished by focusing on the 
particular technological devices, their materiality, algorithmic configurations and so on, 
which uncovers what a “computer solution” is in practice: nothing but a chain of further 
problems, a cascade of updates, an endless interplay of framing and overflowing. For 
Callon (1998:18), “overflowing” denotes the impossibility of total framing: 
technologies may allow the framing and stabilization of actions, yet they simultaneously 
provide an opening onto other complexes, thus constituting unexpected leakage points 
where overflowing occurs. Therefore, for Callon, an asymmetry is created as long as 
the probability of gain is on the side of the agency with the greatest powers of 
calculation, i.e., the one whose tools enable it to perform, make visible and take into 
account the greatest number or relations and entities (Callon, 1998:45). 
According to Heidegger’s perspective, there is no doubt that within styles of investing, 
calculative practices are mixed with humanizing attributes in a hybrid way that creates 
surprises which are transformative, thus enriching and refining understanding. There is 
no doubt that practices become “more refined, richer, delving into the complexity of 
relationships”, and indeed, practices do tend to gather; gathering is Heidegger’s name 
for how a new way of doing something brings all the disparate aspects of the matter or 
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activity together (Spinosa, 2005:492). However, such practices have a kind of telos for 
Heidegger; this telos depends upon the rest of the practices in the investment 
community, the kinds of identities the community supports, and the kinds of traditions 
and uses the community is familiar with and holds valuable (Spinosa, 2001:218). For 
Heidegger, the entirety of the agent's financial life is felt as directed towards that telos, 
which of course, may take on a new look and collect all the already built-in sophisticated 
skills to shine in a new way. All investing styles (e.g. value investing, momentum 
trading, asset/liability matching, risk-return optimization, quant-type arbitrage) are 
made possible on the basis of our Western historical destiny that matters most to us. 
The multiplicity of meanings is always something historical for Heidegger (1991:96), 
and this historical multiplicity of value or meaning attribution is well preserved and 
displayed within the public sphere of financial markets which open up and preserve 
fields of historical solicitations. Such solicitations create a market reality exactly at that 
point where irreconcilable understandings rash against all others, challenging and 
shattering all others’ way of understanding and organizing experience. The density of 
this “othering” results in a market reality that is transgressive, not dialectic nor 
synthetic, as the EMH and Behavioral Finance would imply in that sooner or later, a 
rational or irrational equilibrium would prevail. It would also neither be simply 
asymmetric, as SSF would imply, in that the party with the more sophisticated 
agencements or prosthetic powers will always retain a higher probability of gain 
through the created asymmetries. 
In that respect, if a market reality is transgressive rather than asymmetric, then the 
“other”, i.e., what remains outside the understanding (style) that shelters and secures 
valuation, the excluded, is not waste; instead, it is what enables market reality. Every 
valuation creates a deficit that is filled by the other, and thus a transaction (the simple 
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product of disparate valuation practices) can be said to be a common project between 
two parties that effectively share nothing in common, making the market a potential 
community without commons.  
Based on this Heideggerian re-framing of the financial market, the thesis is allowed to 
extend SSF’s classical argument about the entanglement of the technical and the social: 
financial markets are conditioned by a further (unsuspected by SSF) entanglement, that 
among styles, which rise out of the concrete inheritance of understandings of being.  
In its rest, the paper probes deeper into Heidegger’s views about the technological 
understanding of being and brings into focus a neglected aspect of the financial 
practices, being the fact that we make sense of them in terms of “bulls and bears”, in 
order to further support and sharpen the point of the analysis. This point can be stated 
as follows: if we nullify the distinction between styles, the same way SSF nullify the 
distinction between the technical and the social, then what remains is this ongoing play 
of the “sendings” of being which plays without “why”: the mysterious withdrawing and 
sheltering of the different styles that are granted, linger for a while, only to go in the 
margins again. This simple, plain waxing and waning of the multiple sendings of being, 
that do not persist in their presence but moderate (i.e., economize) themselves – such 
may be the Heideggerian workings of financial markets. A play though, that is beyond 
SSF’s technologically stimulating play between contexts that reconfigure and refine. 
1.2. Folding the Actuarial: The Aporetic Financialization of Risk Liabilities  
The second paper focuses on the actuarial practices of the valuation of insurance 
liabilities. Insurance liabilities have traditionally been considered complex and 
technical, “a countryside to explore on foot and not by fast cars.” (Kennedy et al., 
1976:46). This is why trading insurance contracts, which would provide a market value, 
is generally not seen as possible. Such natural distaste against standardized market 
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valuation has traditionally given ample space to actuarial practices that tended to 
estimate reserves in close relation to their underlying subtleties and over their full 
lifetime – what is usually called “run-off”. However, such run-off approaches are 
orthogonal to modern financial economics’ conceptualizations which are market-
oriented, and simply ask for the replication of the liability cashflows through a current 
portfolio of assets as closely as possible (Hibbert & Turnbull, 2003:726). 
After 2016, Solvency II (S2), the new regulatory framework for EU insurers, explicitly 
demands a market-consistent way of valuing both assets and liabilities. Such a shift 
towards market-consistent (economic) valuations is widely perceived as requiring the 
technically obscured actuarial valuation expertise to be reduced to the mere mechanical 
plugging in of the market's latest bond prices (Turnbull, 2017:268). However, this 
seems almost impossible given the technical minutiae of every liability portfolio. 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that financial markets are specialized in exactly this: 
how to derivate a price (Preda, 2007), often in the absence of any standardization, or 
even an underlying entity to price (Aspers, 2009). After all, the basic tenet of 
marketization is that risk can be managed and transferred via market mechanisms 
(Çalışkan and Callon, 2009), whatever the case at hand. 
Traditional actuarial practices are closer to what Jarzabkowski (2017) describes as the 
blending of technicalizing and contextualizing understandings. Actuarial valuation is 
generated at the nexus of these two practical understandings (Jarzabkowski, 2017:84). 
Technicalizing refers to the initial use of actuarial probabilistic models, which, after 
being loaded with the relevant empirical data, have the ability to generate a set of 
technical values via appropriate actuarial reconstructions of past events. Such technical 
outputs, however, do not comprise the endpoint of the valuation process.  On the 
contrary, they serve as anchors that provide structure for the valuation process and a 
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point of departure for “qualitative overlays” (Svetlova, 2012:430). The latter are based 
on actuarial and management expertise relative to the particular contextual features of 
the underlying liabilities and to the well-known limitations of the models. Such effective 
contextualizing practices compare and amend the generated set of technical values to 
arrive at a final valuation figure (usually called “selected”) that is considered relevant 
and appropriate. In that way, actuarial valuations remain meaningful (contextualizing), 
even as significant statistical, actuarial abstractions are achieved (technicalizing). 
Such an approach differs from existing research into the role of models in calculation 
and the performativity of markets (MacKenzie, 2006, 2003; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003, 
Millo & MacKenzie, 2009; Muniesa et al., 2007). Performativity theory, in its strong 
form, implies that the model unambiguously shapes or conditions how, for example, 
option traders make decisions and behave – a hard structure from which everyone 
obtains similar results (Svetlova, 2012:419). In other words, the technicalizing force of 
the model is considered dominant in the (strong form of) performativity literature. Such 
a dominant technicalizing aspect is clearly mitigated in the insurance sector by the 
blending of contextualizing practices since such practices allow for ad hoc changes, 
deviations and selections from the purely technical outputs of the actuarial models. In 
that respect, contextualizing practices feed in counter-performativity in the process of 
valuation. However, the point is that the financialization pressures and demands for 
market-consistent valuation of liabilities tilts the balance towards the technicalizing 
aspects of the process; contextualizing practices, which feed in counter-performativity, 
are consequently marginalized. 
This is because in market-consistent valuation, models are no longer oriented towards 
the liability itself; rather, they are calibrated to the market. Of course, the absence of 
market transactions (as with insurance liabilities) is a problem, in that prices cannot be 
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extracted directly from the market.  In such a case where the direct use of quoted market 
prices is not available, a model which extracts an “implied” fair value by reconstructing 
a hypothetical transaction given current, generally available market data should be 
employed. Therefore, if meaningful valuations were traditionally generated at the nexus 
of technicalizing and contextualizing, then Jarzabkowski is right to ask worryingly what 
might happen if contextualizing becomes a skill of the past (Jarzabkowski, 2017:180). 
The demand for market-consistent valuation seems to strain traditional actuarial 
modalities which tended to temper models’ technicalizing tendencies by requiring 
contextualizing expert knowledge, potentially increasing the performativity aspect of 
the valuation models. 
However, by researching closer the way in which financialization of insurance liabilities 
is materialized, the paper’s approach departs from Jarzabkowski’s blended two-stream 
schema. By zooming in on what is considered an invasion of short-termism into long-
termism, i.e., market prices into actuarial values, an aporia emerges that dictates how 
the further technicalizing is accentuated, the further it requires contextualizing; that is, 
the further we stretch to attain a purely market, short-term view, the further we find 
ourselves entangling with long-term actuarial views. The thesis of the paper is thus 
closer to that of Muniesa (2007) who, in his analysis of the automation of Paris Bourse’s 
closing auction, uses a culinary metaphor to describe how automation can retain a social 
component: according to him, just as cocoa powder has to be carefully “folded” into 
fresh cream to preserve the qualities of the cream, the social aspects of a live trading 
floor need to be understood and then adapted into algorithms to preserve the social 
component of a market (Pardo-Guerra et al., 2010).  
In that respect, the contribution of the paper is twofold. Firstly, it suggests, as per 
Jarzabkowski’s two-stream schema, that the financialization of insurance liabilities 
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does not uncritically expand financial economics (practices oriented to the market with 
a dominant technicalizing aspect) at the expense of actuarial logics (practices oriented 
to the underlying liabilities with an effective contextualizing aspect). Instead, it 
becomes possible to preserve the actuarial component of the insurance business, as long 
as the actuarial aspects are recognized and then adapted into market-consistent 
valuations. Secondly, in close relation to the first contribution, that if this holds, then 
this suggestion is theoretically supported and anticipated from a Derridean perspective 
which detects within our practices, including the modeling valuation practices, an 
“autoimmunity” process. This process turns something, e.g., the financial sovereignty 
of the valuation, against its own defenses – it is a process inevitably at work at the heart 
of every sovereign identity. Such autoimmunity tension that inheres in the midst of the 
financialization project, simultaneously constituting and de-constituting the financial 
sovereign and thus the modeling valuation practices themselves, has been neglected 
from the current performativity literature. For example, Muniesa (2007)’s 
aforementioned folding position implies a mild preservation process for that component 
(in our case, the actuarial component) which is in danger of extinction – a mildness that 
is far from the “aporetic” strain and restlessness which accompany Derrida’s 
autoimmunity concept. MacKenzie (2006), on the other hand, takes an empirical stance 
and simply sees models as subtle sovereignties that may empirically perform or counter-
perform the markets, without any further theorizing ado about the constitutive elements 
of the phenomenon. Svetlova (2012) who, although rightly so, sees models as departure 
points from their technical sovereignty, her perspective seems to trail a practical 
instillation “from the outside” of a fresher and more invigorating “qualitative” layer into 
the technical surface of the model – she does not entertain the possibility that the 
sovereignty of the technical itself solicits its qualitative deconstruction precisely “from 
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the inside”. In that respect, the second contribution of the paper is to extend this part of 
the performativity literature towards the recognition that an autoimmunity process is at 
work within the modeling valuation practices of insurance liabilities, which 
simultaneously constitutes and de-constitutes the financial and actuarial aspirations of 
the valuation process. 
To that end, the research in the paper begins by identifying the key points involved in 
the process of modeling valuation practices before and after S2. Before S2, the point of 
the valuation process was to come up with adequate reserves5 – that is, to secure today, 
with a high level of confidence, that level of funding which would meet the uncertain 
liabilities of unpaid claims as they evolve in the future (Tunbull, 2017:221). In that 
respect, actuaries did not hesitate to overcome technical specificities and inject 
significant margins of prudence within their actuarial valuation models. Such prudence 
margins were (and still are) a substantial steering (and competitive) tool in the hands of 
the management, as long as they can be accurately budgeted via actuarial techniques 
and thus piled or released throughout the peaks and valleys of the market risk-cycle6, in 
effect operating as a stabilizing factor against the swings of the economic environment 
and the wider claims experience and competition. 
In contrast, market-consistent valuation as dictated by S2 requires the reconstruction of 
a hypothetical fair market transaction via a valuation model that breaks up into two 
explicit pieces: a best estimate and a risk margin. Best estimate approaches may build 
                                                          
5 Reserves or Technical Provisions, i.e., the value of what is usually referred to simply as “insurance 
liabilities”, is perhaps the most distinctive feature of the insurance business. Granting insurance 
automatically involves creating technical provisions to meet promises of future compensations 
(under)written by the insurer. In simple terms, reserving is about identifying that amount of money 
which needs to be set aside today to account for liabilities as they fall due in the long-term or for claims 
that have not yet been settled. 
6 The market risk-cycle shifts between hard and soft markets on the basis of the cost of capital available 
in the market (Jarzabkowski, 2017:205).  
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on existing actuarial technicalizing and contextualizing practices, but they 
simultaneously include a shift from a more contextually tilted “adequate estimate” to a 
more technically tilted “expected or mean value”. Risk margin, on the other hand, is 
intended to represent the amount to be transferred to a third party in order for that third 
party to cover the expected cost of future regulatory capital on the transferred business; 
what is relevant to the research, though, is that it is not a (prudent) margin on the 
reserves. 
Before S2, reserves and the prudence margins that did (or did not) accompany them 
were the major lever that determined an insurer’s success or failure along the market 
risk-cycle. Capital7 was still there, but as it was calculated in a rigid rules-based way, 
and it stayed more in the background as a typical regulatory obligation. It was the 
reserves, and the wise use of their periodical accumulation and de-accumulation 
(release), that allowed the insurer to survive the perils of the market risk-cycle. In fact, 
a good actuary was recognized by her contribution to the injection and consumption of 
the prudence margins in the face of the risk-cycle's uncertainties. 
In the current, post-S2 financialization era, such a schema is considered too opaque and 
inward-looking. That’s why it is significantly changed to reflect a new set of 
sensitivities which is closer to the capital markets. Reserves lose much of their 
prominence and become a simple number, extracted either by the market or by a 
technical exercise, which makes maximum use of generally available market data and 
cannot be overlaid by qualitative judgments or contextual business needs. Reserves are 
there to cover anticipated risks, i.e., the mean of the distribution – nothing more, nothing 
less.  The rising star now becomes capital. Its purpose is to cover for the unexpected 
                                                          
7 The statutory minimum capital which an insurer must have available (beyond reserves) to ensure that 
it will remain solvent even if extreme risks materialize. 
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part of liabilities, or in other words, to provide a buffer to absorb extreme movements, 
usually referred to as the “tails” of the risk distribution. Capital under S2 is risk-based, 
meaning analogous to the risk assumed by the insurer. It is risk-sensitive, based on the 
simple idea that the riskier the assets and/or liabilities, the more capital needs to be 
committed. Such risk-sensitive capital now becomes the new lever for insurers to 
survive the market risk-cycle. In hard times, the insurer may pull it downward and de-
risk herself. In good times, she may push it upwards to assume greater levels of risks. 
Everything thus boils down to the new capital lever. How is it going to fare relative to 
the old, reserve lever? Is Jarzabkowski right to claim that the new capital lever is 
privileging the technicalizing aspects of the business at the expense of the 
contextualizing ones, or, stated differently, that it is raising performativity and model 
risk to the highest?  
The paper suggests that even in the financial economics paradigm, the actuarially driven 
practices are recognized, re-packaged and folded (Muniesa, 2007) into the newly 
engineered market-consistent envelope. For example, take the matter of reserving: 
although it has been transformed into a technical exercise to estimate the mean value 
and does not allow for any prudential (or aggressive) margin, S2 still requires the insurer 
to allow for all possible outcomes in setting its reserves and not just the reasonably 
foreseeable or some other subset. In other words, an additional amount needs to be 
included in the best estimate to ensure that the best estimate is a “true” best estimate 
(mean) of all possible outcomes, as opposed to something less, such as a best estimate 
of all reasonably foreseeable outcomes (IFA, 2013:45). Such an amount provides for 
the very low probability but very high severity events that tend to be ignored since they 
are not contained in the data and are often referred to as Events Not In Data (ENID). 
The allowance of ENID is a new and obviously very subjective element of calculations 
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(IFA, 2013:82). It disrupts the technical, market-consistent calculation of reserves and 
requires a form of calibration with something that is beyond data and markets 
themselves. Such a calibration ends up with a loading that is very difficult to validate, 
i.e., to assess in terms of its inadequacy or excessiveness. In that respect, the allowance 
for ENID provides actuaries with one more lever, beyond the capital one. It allows for 
a countercyclical management of prudence that may better match the insurer’s business 
and market cycle’s contextual reality. It legitimizes, in other words, pre-S2 actuarial 
sensibilities that encouraged contextualizing practices. In that respect, the 
financialization project recognized, and thus folded within its sovereignty, levers that 
are orthogonal to the logic of its own capital lever. This means that it allows for the 
possibility of the capital valuation model to counter-perform in normal times (since 
more capital is required due to the ENID loadings) and to perform in non-normal times, 
contrary to the initial technical tendencies of the capital lever. 
The conclusion of the paper’s research can be summarized as follows: the more 
exclusive a market-consistent and thus short-term and technical (i.e., reliable) view 
becomes, the more the insurance company will be forced to betray its long-term 
commitments and stop following an insurance business model. This is because an 
insurance business model can be as such so long as it can exploit an arbitrage 
opportunity of ignoring short-term market pressures by precisely appropriating its 
liabilities. On the other hand, the more exclusive an actuarial and thus long-term and 
contextual (i.e., relevant to its liabilities profile) a view becomes, the more the company 
may not get to the “long-term” because it will be declared insolvent before it gets there 
(Merz & Wüthrich, 2008:545). 
From a Derridean point of view, the research analysis reveals an “autoimmune process” 
in which the financial sovereignty of short-termism produces, precisely in order to be 
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sustained, the very actuarial long-termism that threatens to undermine it (and vice 
versa). In precisely such an autoimmunization process, the financialization of insurance 
liabilities creates its own sovereign capital lever that can only have a future if it allows 
itself to be de-leveraged by its “other” – that is, an actuarial one that produces surprises 
in normal times so as to disrupt technical complacency and prompt accumulation of 
capital in the face of the imminent non-normal times. 
To simply account for the blending of technicalizing and contextualizing, as well as the 
inherent tension which exists between them, as Jarzabkowski (2017) does, falls short of 
Derrida’s autoimmunity concept. For Derrida, the relation between the technicalizing 
and the contextualizing is always already aporetic, meaning that it suggests an 
absolutely impassable situation which cannot be resolved through rational analysis or 
dialectical thought (Wortham, 2010:15) due to a “constitutive autoimmunity” that 
simultaneously threatens both of them and allows them to be perpetually rethought and 
re-inscribed (Naas, 2008:124). If this is the case, then a model, as the site of 
technicalizing and contextualizing practices, may perform or counter-perform the 
market, but such performativity issues arise in the first place because the model is 
always already disrupted by the inscription of an autoimmune impossible possibility: 
impossible, due to its autoimmune transgressions that keep it open and unsettled, and 
possible because it is perhaps the only one worth its name (Wortham, 2010:15) since a 
“possible” possibility would fail to open up a possibility beyond that already enveloped 
or prescribed within the various levers. 
The paper concludes with a more general comment on the act of valuation that is in line 
with the research conducted. The uncovered-by-the-research impossible possibility of 
the act of valuation cannot be resolved by more sophisticated technical analyses nor 
through the availability of more big data and neither by becoming all the way native 
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(i.e., increasingly allowing itself to be immersed in the context). The aporia inscribed 
makes value self-deferring, always left unsaid and always to-come. Valuation calls for 
reevaluation, not because more data is at hand and/or a better calibration is possible, but 
precisely because valuation itself relinquishes its sovereignty and self-identity. It thus 
comes to denote not some past, present or future valuation regime but a field of 
possibilities in which all valuation regimes might arrive or appear, and as that field of 
possibilities, it would be irreducible to any of these regimes (Naas, 2008:41). Such a 
field is full of cracks, i.e., full of borderline areas, mixtures and marginal spaces, but it 
is also what gives sense to the whole actuarial and financial economic valuation 
infrastructure. In that respect, there is no answer in the question of valuation of 
insurance liabilities; the attempt at answering is the only actual answer. 
1.3. Pricing (In)Solvency: Performativity as a Play of Differences 
The third paper takes as its research object Solvency II (S2), the new regulatory 
framework for EU insurers that has come into effect after January 1st, 2016. S2 is a 
market-consistent, risk-based regulatory standard. This means it requires a market-
consistent valuation of the insurer’s assets and liabilities, and it determines, by adopting 
a risk-based approach, the appropriate amount of capital that each EU insurer must hold 
as a buffer to reduce its risk of insolvency. In the second paper, the focus was on S2’s 
requirement for market-consistent valuation of the insurance liabilities. In that 
framework, there was an inevitable discussion regarding what was termed the “capital 
lever”, i.e., the capital requirements as determined by the S2 risk-based model. The 
“capital lever” was introduced to precisely juxtapose it with the “reserve lever” that 
dominated the actuarial landscape in the pre-S2 era. In the third paper, the focus is 
exclusively on the S2 risk-based algorithm (the “capital lever” of the second paper) that 
allows the determination of the appropriate capital requirements for each insurer based 
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on the specific risks the insurer assumes8. In that respect, the third paper focuses on the 
efforts of the S2 risk-based model of pricing risks and investigates the S2 standards 
(more generally) and the S2 risk-based algorithm (more specifically) as a tool that is 
used by insurers for efficient risk management purposes. 
What is more, while the second paper theorized its research findings in the modeling 
practices of insurance liabilities’ market-consistent valuation with the help of the 
Derridean notion of autoimmunity, the third paper further extends this Derridean 
approach and proposes to go as far as to rethink the concept of performativity itself as 
a play of differences. This is because the research conducted in the third paper uncovers 
a peculiar combination of circumstances with regard to the existing body of 
performativity theory: on the one hand, performativity literature reveals that economic 
ideas and models change, shape and construct reality, rather than simply describe it.  In 
that respect, the wide use of a risk management tool, like the S2 model, changes reality 
in ways that might reinforce or undermine the model’s initial aspirations. The 
performativity commitment, therefore, is about the entanglement of knowledge (theory) 
and practice (Boldyrev et al., 2016:7); it cannot be about evaluating what is “better” or 
what “succeeds” from a privileged knowledge viewpoint that can safely guide practice. 
However, on the other hand, as long as the performative spillover effects are detected 
and disclosed in the literature, a tendency can be noticed that seems to underlie part of 
the performative analysis conducted, and that is the use of performativity as a resource 
to provide a more informed and more nuanced response to the “what might be done?” 
question. A telling example can be found in Michael Power (2004) who, after providing 
a convincing and thorough diagnosis of the first- (primary) and second-order 
(performative) risks of the risk management practices, finds himself in a privileged 
                                                          
8 This is why the approach is termed “risk-based”. 
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position to conclude with a few suggestions on how to secure an “intelligent” risk 
management approach. Such intelligent suggestions obviously address both primary 
risks and performative effects in ways that current organizational practices most 
probably fail to do9. 
Another example, but in a slightly differentiated way, is Lockwood (2015). Lockwood 
is keen to clarify that her goal “is not to advocate specific financial regulatory reforms”, 
but she hopes instead “to create space for alternative or additional ways to acknowledge, 
act in, and respond to a world of risk, uncertainty, and reflexivity.” (Lockwood, 
2015:749). Such a space can be opened up as long as we follow her criticism about how 
the apolitical and technocratic technology of the Value-at-Risk modeling (a structure 
eventually adopted by the S2 algorithm itself) is not only inherently unable to predict 
the unpredictable, but also renders the unpredictable unimagined by crowding out 
alternative anticipating responses such as subjective judgment and systemic financial 
regulation (Lockwood, 2015:743). 
In other words, whereas Power (2004) uses performativity to enhance our intelligence 
in designing risk management systems, Lockwood (2015) uses performativity to show 
how intelligent risk management systems are in need of something alternative to the 
technocratic nature of the Value-at-Risk models, i.e., something precisely crowded out 
by the extensive use of such models.  In both of these cases, performativity is used as a 
resource to restore and set right something which is (rightly) felt as deficient. The 
research point of the third paper is obviously not to delegitimize the performativity 
perspective; however, it closely follows Introna (2018), when he suggests that 
                                                          
9 Although the third paper does not mention it, another telling example (which also reveals the inner 
connections between the three papers) can be found at the end of the first paper, where Beunza (2009), 
one of the most prominent researchers in the SSF literature, is quoted to talk about initiating a 
“performativity hedge fund” – that is, using the performativity concept as a central resource to design 
more informed and intelligent investment strategies that can make money. 
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“…scholars want the world to always add up”, and in our case, it is performativity 
scholars who want the world to always add up: we tend to suggest that if we had done 
this or that, then our risk management practices would have been “intelligent” and the 
failure (in our case, insolvency) would have been avoided (Introna, 2018:17). In that 
respect, understanding performativity and why, for example, one theory can affect the 
world while another cannot (Brisset, 2016) becomes a crucial resource in our efforts to 
decide “this” rather than “that”, thereby designing and implement an intelligent risk 
management system that can stave off insolvency. 
By taking as its case study the S2 standards and the S2 risk-based model, the research 
in the third paper proposes rethinking performativity as a play of differences. Such 
rethinking allows researchers to see that performativity is both extended and limited in 
an undecidable way; therefore, it does not render itself to be used consistently and 
unambiguously as a resource to restore or optimize. Performativity as a play of 
differences focuses on not knowing, which leaves the issue at hand, e.g., the prices on 
risk as produced by the S2 model and therefore the issue of solvency itself, as an open 
and unsettled issue – perhaps for another, different round of modeling efforts to initiate, 
in their turn, their own deconstruction. Under this view, models are not constituted 
within an oppositional field: their technicality (idealization) does not undermine 
subjective judgments (de-idealization); they are also not dialectical: they do not ascend 
the staircase of the dialectic by going through the lower opposites to attain the higher 
(Olthuis, 2002:84) since, in the differential play, what is lower can never be left behind, 
and there is no ascending staircase involved. Models as constituted effects of the 
differential play of traces are instead always and already “deconstructable” and aporetic.  
Even if we were able to identify the conditions that need to be fulfilled for a theory to 
be performative, as Brisset (2016) seems to do, such conditions can only remain 
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necessary, but they can never be sufficient. That is, they can only explain, but they 
cannot determine. In that respect, the third paper extends the existing literature on 
performativity by recognizing that if performativity is simply an effect of the 
differential play of the model traces (i.e., the differences it introduces and instantiates) 
and thus, following Derrida, is undecidable and non-formalizable, then the point cannot 
be about our ability to keep our head in the midst of the play and rationally exploit the 
decoded performativity mechanisms as a resource to regulate solvency or, in the 
framework of a more general noble cause, the financial cycles of booms and busts10. 
The point is not to safeguard our entities (an insurance entity, in our case) from the 
dispersal, but to disperse such entities into the play. 
To that end, the third paper begins its research project by disclosing the basic theoretical 
idea that drives risk-based capital: the riskier the assets and liabilities are, the more 
capital an insurer has to hold. In that respect, a risk-based capital approach conveys a 
very clear message: should insurers expose themselves to more risk, they are required 
to hold a larger amount of capital to operate as a buffer in the event of adverse 
developments. Should they expose themselves to less risk, then a lower amount of 
capital is required. In such a context, it makes perfect sense for insurers to decide, a 
priori, the level of risk they feel comfortable with, i.e., to define their risk profile or risk 
appetite, and then navigate (risk-manage) themselves accordingly so as not to breach 
the risk tolerance limits that effectively quantify their risk appetite, or, in case of a 
breach, have a proper plan in place for re-alignment. In that respect, such a simple idea 
turns itself into a powerful governance tool of risk management which redefines 
insurers’ activities (relative to the pre-S2 era). 
                                                          
10 As, for example, seems to be the concern for Beunza (2010), as noticed at the end of the first paper. 
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However, the core problem of risk-based capital is how to define and technically 
measure individual and enterprise-wide risk, i.e., how to put a price on risk. It is not that 
we can somehow stick some sort of “risk-o-meter” deep into the financial and insurance 
system to get an accurate measurement of the risk of complex financial instruments and 
insurance liabilities (Danielsson et al., 2015). This is because risk is an elusive entity 
with both technical and social aspects. In fact, it seems less of an entity with clear 
boundaries and more of a vague horizon on the basis of which specific entities, like 
equities, show up as threatening. Thus, the technical quantification of risk seems quite 
ambiguous right from the start; nevertheless, for risk-based capital, such measurement 
is of necessity since, in the absence of sound and accurate risk measurements, risk-based 
capital is, at best, meaningless and, at worst, dangerous (Danielsson et al., 2015). To 
that end, S2 follows finance theory and defines risk as a matter of volatility in expected 
outcomes (Power, 2004:14). Such a definition allows capital requirements to exhibit 
risk sensitivity by adopting a scenario-based approach. Key parameters surrounding the 
scenarios have been calibrated, thanks to the technical analysis carried out by the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), which is, by 
definition, an independent advisory technical body that assists the European 
Commission in the design of S2. Calibration and relevance are thought to be secured by 
the use of current and historical market and industry data in line with the inherent 
characteristics of each individual risk submodule. All of this ensures that the solvency 
assertions, which “imagine” and prepare for the unpredictable, of the S2 model enjoy a 
scientific and technical calibration with a confidence level of 99.5%. 
Such a technical calculation by the S2 algorithm does not just make possible the 
assessment and management of the current solvency status, but opens up a further, more 
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radical possibility, in that it makes possible the separate examination of solvency capital 
requirements with respect to future risk emergence over a longer time horizon. 
By requiring solvency to be assessed both in current and in forward-looking terms, S2 
manages to integrate the traditional accounting modality with practices of 
organizational governance, like enterprise risk management (Young, 2011), in a 
radically new way. Indeed, the traditional, prevailing accounting modality has been that 
of the point-in-time balance sheet in which the static presentation of history has been 
regarded as more reliable than the uncertain projected future (Power, 2015:51). 
However, as our temporal frames of the future shift increasingly towards an “emergency 
imagina[tion]” of a potentially catastrophic future (Opitz & Tellmann, 2015), static 
presentation of history becomes less and less relevant. What matters now is how such a 
radically uncertain future can be rendered technically visible and acted upon in order 
not to be lived, but precisely to be survived (Elmer & Opel, 2006). The S2 current and 
future risk assessments dynamically link the balance sheet as a point-in-time statement 
of assets, liabilities and own funds with all current and emerging risks that are 
technically imagined to be faced by the organization and their management. Doing so 
effectively removes traditional balance sheets’ foothold on history and resets it towards 
the unexpected, embodying the principle that, in the face of a radically uncertain future, 
history is a poor predictor of future outcomes (Power, 2015). 
Next, the research shifts its attention to disclosing the counter-performative effects of 
S2’s algorithmic technology. Two counter-performative effects are examined: 
procyclicality (in both the asset and liability sides) and gaming of the model. The first 
is generated due to the fact that all insurers are obliged to use a model with the same 
ontological architecture, i.e., a model that technically dictates a uniform response; for 
example, in falling markets, that response would be “de-risking” by selling. What is 
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more, the research reveals that the philosophy of risk-sensitive capital charges cannot 
so naturally extend in the field of insurance risk. This is because, in the insurance S2 
framework, high reserves result in higher capital charges, but this is counterintuitive in 
that, traditionally, a high reserve ratio relative to premia was considered a healthy 
indicator for the insurer. 
The complexity of the relations within the S2 model and its vast informational and input 
needs also make the model vulnerable to gaming. In that respect, S2 should not be seen 
as an algorithmic chain that transparently binds raw data with prices of risk which 
accurately represent the level of risk absorbed by the insurer from the world out there. 
Rather, it is more accurately described as a modeling “swarm” (Bennet, 2010:32) of 
flows that participate in a particular ontological choreography (Introna, 2016:25; 
Thompson, 2007), in which each member can potentially determine the output in a more 
or less significant way. 
Having disclosed both the novel set of possibilities that are opened by the S2 model and 
its potential counter-performative effects which undermine the initial inspirations of 
ensuring solvency and policyholder protection, the paper is in a position to state the 
inherent aporia detected within the S2 project itself (an aspect of a more general aporia 
in the concept of solvency itself): the more technocratic risk is managed, i.e.,  the more 
insurers strive to implement and use the S2 model in an efficient self-disciplinary way, 
the more the insurer herself, due to efficient gaming, and/or her macro environment, 
due to procyclical effects, turn unstable, endangering solvency and policyholder 
protection. In the face of such an aporia, the research assumes a critical stance against 
Lockwood (2015) in that her appeal to a “soft” rationality, capable of policing, 
delimiting, substituting - “hard” modeling, cannot restore its deficiencies in the fight 
against uncertainty. The argument of the paper is in fact closer to Svetlova (2012)’s 
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view, that we simply cannot know whether a model may perform, even if widely 
adopted, since models are always and already open to soft adjustments to assume 
relevance in the “meshwork” (Ingold, 2011) and complexities of the market life 
happening (Introna, 2018:8). In a similar vein, counter-performance alternatives such 
as subjective judgments and macroprudential regulation (the ones Lockwood appeals 
to) may simply fail, even if widely adopted, since such soft imperatives are always and 
already open to hard adjustments in order to assume reliability and allow for responsible 
decision-making.   
In fact, S2, despite its commonly recognized scientificly-based, technical and hard 
structure, is surprisingly keen to provide a wide range of “soft” alternatives to manage 
its own potential model performativity. For example, despite S2’s commitment to 
market consistency (that is, to fairness and transparency), calls for prudence (which is 
subjective and opaque) are central within its standards; in fact, demands for market 
consistency and prudence (as if their co-existence is unproblematic or natural) go 
together in the valuation of insurance liabilities. Further demands for soft qualitative 
overlays such as proportionality, simplifications and the “four eyes principle” are 
scattered throughout the S2 directive. What is more, a surprisingly extended range of 
tools and measures is provided to manage the tendency of market consistency to beget 
procyclicality, and these measures have the perverse effect of deferring market 
consistency in many circumstances. 
Beyond such “explicit” soft transgressions which blur the scientific application of the 
standards, the paper, by researching deeper within the calibration of the equity risk 
submodule, reveals that S2 incorporates in its application an inexplicit, and thus more 
radical, play between the technical and the prudential, i.e., the scientific and non-
scientific. Its algorithmic code, by its own standards, is found to be “skewed” from a 
Page 46 
 
“scientifically true” 99.5% calibration in order to precisely account for an inherent 
aporia that disrupts the solvency project. Specifically, an economically pure calibration 
at such a high level of 99.5% renders capital requirements so burdensome for the 
industry that it will necessarily end up reducing its diversity by allowing only larger, 
and thus fewer, insurers to achieve solvency by S2 standards, which by itself implies an 
increase of the insurance systemic risk – precisely what is to be avoided in the first 
place. On the other hand, a looser, non-economic calibration may preserve the 
industry’s diversity by allowing more and smaller insurers to achieve solvency by S2 
standards; however, it would open up the possibility for a higher rate of future 
insolvencies, eventually increasing the insurance systemic risk. Therefore, in the case 
of S2 calibration and application, it seems that it is impossible to draw the lines between 
the economic and non-economic, and the scientific and non-scientific. The only way to 
achieve a scientific/economic solvency calibration is by precisely breaching the 
economic and evidence-based conditions that make it possible and allow for non-
economic, political and expert judgments (its “other”) to be heard.  
In other words, the research discloses that, for the S2 model to preserve its ideal 
technical character which legitimizes solvency capital calculations and its self-
governance capabilities, it needs to be “de-idealized” (Svetlova, 2013) to account 
precisely for the aporetic structure of its raison d’être (i.e., solvency). In that respect, 
the deeper we move into the “tails of the future”, that is, into a world which is getting 
more complex, more interconnected and thus more potentially destructive and 
disruptive, the more, “the relationships between science, expertise, and decision are 
radically rearticulated so that distinctions between ‘science’ and ‘non-science’ become 
more malleable.” (Amoore, 2013:9). 
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Derrida’s aporia is a useful insight that allows the research to go beyond notions of 
“controversies” that can presumably be ironed out in later, more sophisticated versions, 
as Power (2004) seems to imply, or notions of “alternatives”, as in Lockwood’s (2015) 
version. The point is not to simply “create space for alternative or additional ways” 
(Lockwood, 2015:749) in the fight against uncertainty (insolvency), but to denote how 
every space that gathers a meaning is always and already fragmented, constantly 
transgressed so that the thing itself (market consistency or prudence and solvency or 
insolvency) slips away (Derrida, 1973:104). This is why the research lets itself be 
informed by Derrida: for him, the text, i.e., any discourse, whether political, social, 
philosophical, and in the research case, regulative in the form of technical standards, is 
the field of operation of deconstruction which harbors within itself that which 
transgresses it (Cooper, 1989). In the research case of the S2 market-consistent and risk-
based capital model, we come to appreciate how S2’s own technical standards, the 
written text upon which solvency comes into being, harbors in itself a double bind: the 
possibility of performation and its negation. The text itself both extends and limits 
performativity of the model in an undecidable way. 
For Derrida, any effect-producing system produces its effects by a kind of “spacing”, 
producing marks or traces which make nominal unities called concepts or meaning in 
terms of the differential relationship – the space – between the signifiers (Caputo, 
2000:96). In that respect, models are differential: they produce nominal and conceptual 
unities as effects of the differential play (spacing) opened up between their marks or 
traces. What is more with this Derridean approach is that difference reestablishes 
reference in a way beyond the traditional confrontation between constructivism (as 
implied by performativity) and “reality checks” (Felin & Foss, 2009; Ferraro et al. 2005, 
2009). Following Derrida, the capacity of the text of a model to differentiate enables 
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signification: the more differential, the more fine-grained it can be. In this way, the 
power of reference increases exponentially with the complexity and richness of the 
differential economy of the model. In that respect, the research is enabled to make a 
provocative claim: what is being perceived within the solvency text as an inconsistent 
differentiation between, e.g., the principle of market values and the introduction of 
market-deference measures, or between the paradoxical demand for market consistency 
and prudence, increases, rather than obfuscates, the understanding of the subtleties of 
the insurance business and its solvency issues. However, if reference thickens through 
differentiation, performativity becomes precisely more undecidable because, on the one 
hand, the increase in reference has the potential to enable the model’s performativity 
while on the other, the increase in differentiation makes available more strategies and 
reasons to resist or adjust the model’s recommendations. 
This is precisely what the research project of the third paper proposes rethinking: 
performativity as an effect of the play of differences. A differential play that, as Derrida 
crucially adds, cannot be enclosed or regulated – the circle of the play cannot be closed. 
In the next three chapters, each of the three papers is presented. The thesis concludes 
with the final chapter, where the contributions and limitations of the whole of the 





2. Heidegger And Modern Finance 
Financial Economics is typically considered to constitute a branch of economics that 
focuses on what Nobelist Robert Merton calls “the allocation and deployment of 
economic resources, both spatially and across time, in an uncertain environment” 
(Nobel Lecture, Dec 9, 1997). It deals with the valuation of assets and the assessment 
of their riskiness (individually or collectively) and focuses on the places (i.e. financial 
markets) where such valuations and risks are traded and thus allocated between different 
actors (individual or institutional). A significant part of this process is driven by 
stipulating theories and building models that can derive testable results and 
implications. 
We can readily distinguish two main views within modern financial economics that 
largely dominate both the academic and the professional field: an hegemonic orthodox 
one, that systematically shapes financial education, practice and regulation (that is, the 
three stages of theorizing, executing and monitoring) and an ascending challenger that 
calls into question critical components of the orthodox view, offering either mild 
alternatives that can be smoothly assimilated by the standard theory or radical ones that 
are considered simply incompatible. The orthodox view, based on neoclassical 
economics (Forbes, 2009:1), consists of several waves of theories packed under the 
label Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT): the emergence of Capital Asset Pricing Model 
in the 50s, the Random Walk hypothesis, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory and the development of Passive Investment since the early 
70s, have progressively reinforced MPT, giving it an esteemed status within and way 
outside the field. Behavioral Finance on the other hand, already from the early 70s, 
began to make inroads mainly in the academic field (since many professional 
practitioners seem to equally disregard both the orthodox and the alternative views as 
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intellectual vehicles that simply keep academics busy in circulation) by not only 
thoroughly contesting EMH but by crucially providing researchers with a new 
promising agenda of empirical fieldwork. 
The claims of the mainstream theory extend and cover a wide range of issues – in what 
follows, we will mainly focus on EMH, because it is the most renowned and equally 
the most contested part of the collective bundle of MPT. In its broad outlines, EMH's 
central idea is that a stock’s price incorporates all the available knowledge about the 
value of the company and the best predictions about the future of the stock (Kahneman, 
2011:213-5). This essentially means that all assets in a market are correctly priced, since 
in such a picture, investors are considered to be rational, profit maximizers who compete 
each other trying to predict future market values of individual securities, processing 
important current information which is almost freely available to all of them. What 
emerges is an efficient market and this suggests, it is impossible to outperform the 
overall market through expert stock selection or market timing, so long as assets are 
correctly priced i.e., equal to their “intrinsic” value. In other words, perfect rational 
prices leave no scope for skillfulness, but they also protect uninformed or simply fool 
investors form their own inadequacy. That is, there may be no room for expert investors, 
i.e., investors who systematically beat the markets, but there is also no room for “fool” 
investors, i.e., investors who systematically lose: what there is, is a prevailing net of 
collective rationality (the grand total of individual ratiocinations) which puts a 
maximum cap and a minimum floor in skilled investing. 
The rival theory of Behavioral Finance is not content with the explanatory premise of 
rationality, but instead seeks to discover cognitive, emotional or behavioral reasons 
behind the economic decisions of the financial participants, since the explanandum 
itself changes. In the face of well documented empirical inquiries that trace, for 
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example, systematic mean reversion, long run trends, herding amongst security analysts 
etc., it cannot anymore be the postulated efficiency of the markets. Rather, what now 
needs to be explained is precisely such enduring departures from traditionally postulated 
efficiency. In terms of financial skillfulness, it too acknowledges that there is a 
maximum cap, i.e. there can be no expertise in for example stock selecting, but claims 
instead that there can be no minimum floor, that is, it does not think there are no 
unsophisticated or even fool investors and thus neither any minimum floor that can 
prevent a potential race to the bottom – which explains the existence of stock market 
crashes and their opposite, the emergence of financial bubbles11. It holds that many 
investors lose consistently, an achievement that a dart-throwing chimp could not match. 
The central hypothesis is that market participants are beings with inherent biases that 
corrupt their judgments and decisions and thus, with thinking processes that are flawed, 
inaccurate and unreliable. One of the most emblematic examples is heuristics, that is, 
experience – not rational-and-evidence-based – strategies that people commonly use in 
thinking. In short, market participants are of questionable efficacy decision-makers. 
It is worth noticing how such heuristics-and-biases paradigm offered a new body of 
possibilities for empirical work in the field and thus caught on quickly. The psychologist 
Gary Klein notices (Klein, 2009:54-5) that researchers have added more and more kinds 
of biases and so, as many as 60 biases have been identified in the research literature (as 
of 2009). The concept of decision biases is now firmly embedded in the fields of 
psychology, economics, and business and it has been described in a number of books 
for a general audience with provocative titles and juicy references to “pseudo-scientists, 
lunatics and the rest of us”, who “systematically fail to think rationally” due to the 
                                                          
11 Where the orthodox views a “permanently high plateau” having been reached by stock prices, 
behavioral finance recognizes the emergence of a mere financial bubble.   
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“irresistible pull of irrational behavior”12. It is worth noting what Yale University 
professor and Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller mentions, that the bestselling book about 
the financial crisis currently is “House of Cards” by investigative newspaper reporter 
William D.Cohan, with the subtitle “A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Excess on Wall 
Street” (Kroszner & Shiller, 2011:15). 
Behavioral Finance’s core tenets have managed to secure a wide and extended agenda: 
from the existence of the current economic and financial crisis (it’s the result of people’s 
biased nature and over-reliance on rational/mathematical models), the inexistence of 
expertise (there is only an illusion of financial skill), to the way historical practices 
unfold (our narrative fallacy to see a “march of history” against what “really” goes on: 
pure drifting).  
Although the general sentiment is that Behavioral Finance has not yet achieved to fully 
supplant orthodoxy, let alone provide effective guidance on how to deal with the 
growing number of documented biases other than the empty imperative of “effectively 
manage your (inevitable) biases”13, leaving radical views aside – for example, Taleb’s 
notorious dismissal of the whole industry of producing financial predictions (Taleb, 
2007) – many argue that a process of assimilation of the behavioral perspective into the 
traditional corpus of theory has for long been underway (Forbes, 2009:1). A most recent 
example “to bridge the divide between modern portfolio theory and Behavioral 
                                                          
12 See for example, “Sway: The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior” by Brafman and Brafman (2008), 
“Blind Spots: Why Smart People Do Dumb Things” by Van Hecke (2007), “Predictably Irrational: The 
Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions” by Ariely (2008), Russo and Schoemaker’s (1989) “Decision 
Traps: The Ten Barriers to Brilliant Decision Making”, and Dawes’s (2001) “Everyday Irrationality: How 
Pseudo-Scientists, Lunatics, and the Rest of Us Systematically Fail to Think Rationally”.  
13 Here we hit what we may call ‘the infinite regress of biases’: assuming that someone does provide 
such effective guidance (in fact, the typical literature is flashed with suggestions), what indubitable 
(meta)reasons do we have to believe these are biased-free?  
Page 53 
 
Finance” is Howard’s popular Behavioral Portfolio Management14. In his methodology 
for portfolio management, Professor Howard acknowledges that, 
“in spite of the fact that behavioral is in the name [i.e. instead of “modern”], 
behavioral portfolio management’s recommendations are based on thorough 
statistical analyses. If it cannot be objectively measured and confirmed by 
large, long time period studies, then it is not used. At my core, I am an 
empiricist, and so if I do not see it in the data, then I do not believe in it for 
investing purposes.” (Howard, 2014) 
In such efforts, the core vocabulary of the MPT is preserved (such as “expected” and 
“alpha” returns, “volatility” etc.) but is simultaneously extended to include either pure 
behavioral insights (such as “emotions”, “price distortions” etc.) or hybrid (that is, part 
traditional, part alternative) concepts (as for instance, “the emotional impact of 
volatility”). Under such a view and despite Professor Howard’s claims about how 
“[o]nce you reject MPT and accept behavioral portfolio management, everything 
changes”, the assimilation of the behavioral perspective can be seen as succeeding in 
injecting a more empirical flavor into the traditional, rationally assumed posit of the 
efficiency of the markets. In such a way, it is possible to avoid the two dubious extremes 
of the orthodox and the alternative outlook of modern financial economics: the ultimate 
rationality and irrationality of the market participants. However, such gay assimilation 
does not seem possible with each of the two disciplines that, alongside EMH and 
Behavioral Finance, have also attempted to examine the economic and financial 
phenomena: Economic Sociology and the Social Studies of Finance.  
                                                          
14 Howard’s paper on behavioral portfolio management was one of the most downloaded papers on 
the Social Science Research Network (Voss, 2012). 
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Economic Sociology, usually opposed against the mainstream classical and neoclassical 
economics, attempts to apply the sociological perspective to economic phenomena 
(Smelser & Swedberg, 2005:3). Given recent developments, such sociological 
perspective does not only include personal interaction, groups, social structures 
(institutions) and social controls (e.g. sanctions, norms and values) but also social 
networks, gender and cultural context (e.g. Granovetter 1985, 1995; Zelizer 1988). 
What mainly changes with Economic Sociology is the concept of the actor: where in 
both EMH and Behavioral Finance the analytic starting point is the individual, for 
Economic Sociology it is typically groups, institutions and society. Thus, the actor is 
seen as a socially constructed entity and the social structural levels as phenomena sui 
generis, without reference to the individual actor (Smelser & Swedberg, 2005:4). Such 
a starting point leads to a different and broader view of what constitutes economically 
skillful action: whereas EMH and Behavioral Finance simply considers an economic 
action to either succeed or fail to ascend to the status of economically rational action 
(by, for example, identifying it with the efficient or inefficient allocation of risk and 
return), Economic Sociology gives room to a form of action that goes beyond what for 
the orthodox constitutes mere habits and rules of thumbs, and for the behaviorist 
obvious elements of irrationality: to traditional (habitual) economic action which, 
arguably, constitutes its most common form (Akerlof 1984; Smelser & Swedberg, 
2005:4). In that way, Economic Sociology turns what constitutes the main resource of 
the orthodox view, rationality as an assumption, to a topic in need of investigation: that 
is, rationality as a phenomenon to be explained, not assumed. In that line, the central 
tradition of recent Economic Sociology attempts to explore the consequences for 
economic action of the embedding of actors in networks of interpersonal connections 
(Granovetter 1973, 1985, 1992; MacKenzie, 2009:180). 
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According to MacKenzie, the Social Studies of Finance (SSF) complement rather than 
displace such sociological tradition: apart from the networks of personal connections, 
human beings are inextricably and simultaneously embedded in systems of 
technologies, cognitive frameworks, simplifying concepts and calculative mechanisms 
(MacKenzie, 2009:180). The essence of SSF is precisely to study and disclose such a 
complement that results from “the application to financial markets of social science 
disciplines beyond economics (and also wider than those approaches to ‘Behavioral 
Finance’…), such as anthropology, gender studies, human geography, political science, 
and sociology.” This new and alternative approach displays a unique concern with the 
materiality of markets: their physicality, corporeality, technicality (MacKenzie, 
2009:2). As MacKenzie points out, such emphasis on materiality goes beyond simply 
indicating the importance of objects and technologies (i.e. things): it signifies that 
“human actors who make up markets are not disembodied agents or abstract information 
processors” as both EMH and Behavioral Finance assume, but “embodied human 
beings, and bodies are material entities. The capacities and limitations of these material 
entities (including those of human brains) are hugely important to how markets are 
constructed.” (MacKenzie, 2009:3). Therefore, it should be acknowledged that all 
markets “are combinations of human beings and physical objects” and that equipment 
matters, since “it changes the nature of the economic agent, of economic action and of 
markets.” (MacKenzie, 2009:13). Therefore, SSF explore the hypothesis that financial 
economics’ success is in part ‘performative’, that is, not simply a descriptive or 
analytical success (MacKenzie, 2009:30). Where the orthodox discerns a twostep 
process that consists initially of a subject that observes the bare perceptual matter of the 
market (i.e. the financial reality out-there), and secondarily, of her attempt to bridge the 
knowledge gap (between the observer and the observed) by constructing a 
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(un)successful model, that is, an (in)accurate representation of what stands out there, 
SSF leave open the possibility that reality itself can change by the widespread use of 
the model itself. In other words, there are no two primary fixed poles of independent 
agents (a subject and an object) but an endpoint of agencements (MacKenzie, 2009:19-
25), that is, socio-technical arrangements that co-produce stability. 
Until now, we have only attempted to provide an admittedly very brief and sketchy 
review of the deeply variant narratives on the financial economics' phenomenon. EMH 
and Behavioral Finance, products of a modern imperative, have indeed worked under a 
modernist ontology that turns financial things (assets, prices, technologies) into objects 
that need to be rationally and efficiently handled by informed agents/subjects such as 
investors, analysts, regulators. Economic Sociology's literature has not been reluctant 
to start fuzzing such a clear dichotomy by subsuming the latter variety in social 
networks (to which most of the time you are simply found thrown into), whereas SSF 
seem to complete such an endeavor by dissolving both of them, in the face of techno-
sciences, into sociotechnical hybrids. It is exactly at this point that we want to take what 
seems at first glance, and indeed rightly so, a peculiar turn, and introduce the German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger. We are forced to since after all, as the title of the essay 
suggests, this is a piece that tries to link Heidegger with finance. Now, trying to link 
Heidegger with finance is like trying to connect two of the most opposite poles: you 
hardly need to be an expert on Heidegger to be familiar with his notorious repulsion 
towards the devastating financialization of our era and his affection for such marginal 
practices like poeticizing and thinking. Heidegger himself is explicit about it:  
“The humanity of humans and the thingness of things is dissolved, within the 
self-assertion of producing, to the calculation of the market value of a market 
that is not only a global market spanning the earth but that also,…, markets in 
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the essence of being and so brings all beings into the business of calculation, 
which dominates most fiercely precisely where numbers are not needed.” 
(Heidegger, 1946:219) 
 But does that mean that a Heideggerian can only philosophize and poeticize? What if, 
by preserving the possibility of the impossible, we allow for a moment a Heideggerian 
to breath, live and dwell within such a financial world? What if we imagine of a 
Heideggerian dwelling amidst financial things? Now, when you attempt to connect two 
of the opposite poles of an electric circuit, you end up with what is called a short-circuit 
that can potentially result in an explosion. When attempting to connect Heidegger with 
finance, I am not so interested in finding out how such a short-circuit explosion may 
hurt Heidegger (in fact, in the face of so many scholars defending Heideggerian purity, 
I don't think I can even suggest causing any damage to Heidegger's “correct” reading) 
– rather, I am interested in examining how such an explosive Gestalt switch transforms 
finance as finance from the inside, by allowing a Heideggerian to contribute to the 
phenomenon, after having being transported inside the phenomenon. And it seems that 
the more someone allows for that, the more the connections which were previously 
unthought, keep multiplying. Thus, it is impossible to adequately defend a priori and 
from the outside a Heideggerian approach to finance: although I could invoke other 
similar efforts that endeavour to explore economics via philosophy and hermeneutics15, 
I will simply ask the tolerant reader to patiently bear with me on this and defer her 
judgment until the end. In that spirit, in what follows, we are not going to provide a 
philosophical commentary that deals with the outside form of finance, but a substantive 
attempt to explore a Heideggerian approach relative, first, to the two mainstream views 
(EMH and Behavioral Finance) of modern financial economics, and second, to the 
                                                          
15 See for example Lavoie (1990). 
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currently more marginal SSF standpoint, which, following MacKenzie, seems to 
constitute a more sophisticated and deeply enriched position from that of the Economic 
Sociology. 
2.1. EMH, Behavioral Finance and Heidegger 
Heidegger’s philosophical attitude takes its departure from lived experience. For him, 
human’s most fundamental features cannot be discovered through a rational-and-
evidence-based scientific-type analysis nor even a linguistic inquiry, since all of them 
presuppose our unreflective involvement and pre-propositional way of comporting in 
the world. From such a starting point he tries to walk a fine line between realism and 
constructivism about truths and the status of scientific entities (Dreyfus & Wrathall 
2005:9-10). He thus focuses on the notion of being, which he realizes cannot be a 
substance (modernity) or a process (postmodernity), but instead, “that on the basis of 
which beings are already understood” (Heidegger, 1962:25-6). A culture’s 
understanding of being (the style of life manifest in the way its everyday practices are 
coordinated) allows people and things to show up as something – that is, the shared 
practices into which we are socialized provide a background understanding of what 
counts as things, as human beings and what it makes sense to do on the basis of which 
we can direct our actions towards particular things and people. Such a central insight 
allows Heidegger to take his famous turning (Kehre) and assume, in his later works, an 
historicist perspective since he acknowledges that the history of the West consists of a 
series of “epochs” of different total understanding of being, where the unconcealment 
(i.e. truth or better, what grounds truth) of beings varies according to such background 
understanding. Instead of Being and Time’s single set of modes of being (readiness-to-
hand, presence-at-hand, existence) that were evidently anchored in the ahistorical and 
fundamental nature of Dasein (roughly, the human being), each epoch (pre-Socratic, 
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ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary/technological) has its own understanding 
of being which determines its “beingness,” or how all beings are in that age, including 
man. Which essentially means, we should not look for Francis of Assisi-type saints in 
the ancient Greece, nor Achilles-type warriors in the medieval Assisi. Heidegger 
occasionally compares these understandings to the a priori because they are prior to and 
enable experience (Braver, 2012:192). In what ends up being a virtuous spiral (instead 
of a vicious circle), we cannot (as a subject proper) first gather neutral observations of 
the world (as we might from an object proper) from which to derive categories, since a 
particular way of understanding must always already orient the experiences our 
investigations start from16. Heidegger calls these understandings “sendings” from 
being, in an obvious attempt to indicate that they are not the results of our conscious 
choice or transcendental faculties (Braver, 2012:190-1) – the same way someone cannot 
consciously invite what she is going to dream tonight. Such historical sendings of being 
(at the heart of later Heidegger’s thought) gives him a perspective on the basis of which 
it is possible to understand the emergence of modernity that culminates in the 
(postmodern) technological understanding of being.  
In terms of the financial economics field, this essentially means that the emergence of 
modern financial economics of EMH and Behavioral Finance is a historical 
phenomenon that has simply transformed markets into epistemology-centred arenas 
where the fundamental problem is how to develop a system of justified true propositions 
that can support and subsequently trigger the appropriate economic actions. Just as a 
valid argument produces only true conclusions from true premises, the idea is that a 
properly built e.g. risk management system, insulates the circulation of financial truth 
                                                          
16 The virtuous spiral becomes vicious circle if we try to enter it from the outside; that is, if we start 
from an epistemological veil of ignorance which we then try to lift by seeking the appropriate reasons. 
But fortunately, we are always “thrown” into this circle from the beginning. 
Page 60 
 
throughout its entirety (Braver, 2012:173). Both EMH and Behavioral Finance in their 
ontology, treat all financial propositions as epistemic and hence as subject to tests of 
truth and responsible belief; therefore, we need to conduct epistemological “stress 
tests”, like Socratic elenchus or Cartesian doubt; and only those that pass the tribunal 
of reason deserve our trust (Braver, 2012:130). In finance, stress testing has now 
become ubiquitous: not only as an integral part when assessing the performativity of a 
portfolio, but as a stringent requirement when assessing the solvency capital 
requirements for both Banks and Insurance Companies under Basel III and Solvency II 
supervisory regimes. 
In that respect, Behavioral Finance simply raises the stakes by imposing extra required 
filtrations in order to render observations and inferences as impersonal and as much 
divested of any local, temperamental or psychological biases is possible, of the kind 
identified in the experimental work of Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman & Tversky 
1979); other than that, it remains like EMH, framed in an ontological picture of us as 
subjects/knowers and the world as an object of knowledge.  
This Heideggerian, historical (and thus, not necessary) emergence of the modern 
epistemic imperative imposed by EMH and Behavioral Finance where subjects 
objectively control and dominate financial objects, goes contrary to the dominating 
positivistic narrative which states that previous versions of financial markets used to 
remain caught in a limbo state of unsophisticated (and perhaps solely speculative) 
practices that were duly overcome by the rise of (“objective”) science and technology 
in the last two centuries, that eventually helped participants clear their distortions and 
prejudices, and thus achieve control over their financial fate; rather, according to 
Heidegger, previous versions of financial understandings simply didn’t have to develop 
such modern epistemic practices (the same way Aristotle’s understanding of falling 
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bodies – through teleology – didn’t have to develop practices around the postulated 
vocabulary of a gravity field). MacKenzie provides an exceptional illustration of such 
a point when he claims that “[t]he empirical success of the Black-Scholes-Merton model 
was a historically contingent process [i.e. not an ahistorical necessity] in which the 
model itself played a constitutive role.” (MacKenzie 2006:259). In other words, Black-
Scholes-Merton model and the practices gathering around it don't just make sense but 
make sense (and thus perform) for modern financial economics.  
The same is true with what currently seems to be the technological transcendence of 
modern financial economics and their epistemology-centred, subject/object ontology, 
which in Heidegger’s idiom constitutes the passage from Cartesian modernity to 
Nietzsche’s characterization of late modernity, i.e. to the technological epoch. The 
entrance point was prepared by Behavioral Finance itself, since it did not just help EMH 
to transform markets into epistemology-centred arenas (by injecting scepticism and 
demanding harder and more sophisticated controls in the course of the financial 
decision-making practices), but also did something radically new: it called into question 
the human subject itself. With modern financial economics, human subject was the one 
solid point in reference of which the mysteries of the various financial entities (equities, 
bonds, derivatives etc.) were uncovered. Nothing seemed able to resist against the novel 
set of weapons unleashed by finance's modern subject: applied mathematics, computer 
science, statistics, fundamental analysis, economic and financial theory, they were all 
used to crack every (hidden) code of the financial entities and open up the way for 
financial engineering (which included unpacking and repackaging the decoded DNA of 
financial entities). But with Behavioral Finance, exactly this subject who unleashed 
such an arsenal was called into question. And thus it became, next to every other 
financial entity, a subject for inquiry – an object. This, according to Heidegger, is the 
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entrance point of the technological transformation of modern finance, of technofinance.  
Having cracked every hidden code of all the financial entities so as to objectify and 
control financial decision-making, we late-moderns have turned exactly those practices 
back onto ourselves (Thomson, 2005:60), producing a calculative thinking that 
quantifies everything, reducing (financial) entities (including humans) to bivalent, 
programmable information, to digitized data that can be algorithmically manipulated. 
Thus, post EMH and Behavioral Finance (supported by an eager neurofinance), humans 
have been classified as another source of risk that simply needs to be recognized, 
proceduralized and properly (following “best practices”) managed: we belong in the 
category of “operational risk” which is defined as “the risk…incurred for inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems…” (Operational risk, 2016, italics added). 
But once subjects begin treating themselves as objects, the subject/object distinction 
itself is undermined and the subject is thereby put on the path toward becoming just 
another resource to be optimized, that is, secured and ordered for the sake of flexible 
use (Heidegger, 1977: 173; Thomson, 2005:60). Thus EMH and Behavioral Finance's 
human subject that continually strives to come up with epistemically sound 
representations against a given but uncertain financial universe, simply becomes 
another resource awaiting optimization, for the self-continual packaging and 
repackaging of the decoded financial DNA in an automated and efficient way, for the 
sake of its constant self-overcoming of money with money17. In short, from financial 
                                                          
17 High Frequency Trading can be thought of as an exemplar of such technological proceduralization, 
so long as all data and expectations (quantitative and qualitative) have been taken into account and 
algorithmically settled in advance. In addition, Beunza and Stark talk about reflexive modeling (Beunza 
& Stark, 2011), which takes place when “traders use models to translate stock prices into estimates of 
what their rivals think” – that is, rivals strategic thinking/actions becomes itself a resource, an entry to 
be updated so as to feed your own model. What is more, the collapse of the subject/object distinction 
that for Heidegger occurs with the passage to the postmodern, technological style of finance (what we 
here briefly call “technofinance”) is also implied by the shift of the field’s vocabulary: we no longer 
“buy” or “sell” “assets” such as cash, equities or bonds (which strongly imply the presence of a subject 
as an “owner” of a financial “real” object) – instead we are “long” or “short” in equity, interest rate, 
credit, spread or whatever “risk factors” and in synthetic (cash or otherwise) positions; here, both the 
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engineering (modern finance) to the continual re-engineering, proceduralization and 
automation of the financial universe (postmodern technofinance).   
Since for Heidegger an understanding of being creates a clearing where things show up 
as what they are (i.e. in their essence), it is possible under his terms to understand 
financial markets not only as epistemology-centered arenas (as EMH and Behavioral 
Finance suggest), social constructions (as Economic Sociology suggests) or 
sociotechnical prosthetic machines or devices for collective calculation that go beyond 
individual’s cognitive limitations and create asymmetries (as SSF seem to suggest and 
as we explore in the next section) (Callon & Muniesa, 2003; MacKenzie, 2006:268; 
Mirowski, 2002), but also as a clearing that organizes and preserves dissonance, 
generated by dissimilar participating investment styles that clash and meet each other 
(the place of meeting being the transaction price). Every market calculation that bestows 
a value and thus every market transaction (triggered by) can only take place on the basis 
of local investment communities that disclose a way of being-in-the-world that matters 
most for us. In such a way of being-in-the-word, an insistence on the salience of certain 
possibilities, aspects, entities, connections, manipulations etc. takes place, through the 
use of a particular kind of mots justes, that excludes or presents other possibilities as 
irrelevant. Therefore, the act of a simple market transaction is not only or exclusively 
stimulated by epistemological motivations (of a modern imperative) that may 
degenerate into mere algorithmic signals (in a technological universe); rather, it is an 
agent’s act of situating himself in such a way within the investment universe that 
attempts to bring out at its best the style of his investment community. Transacting in 
                                                          
“owner” and the “object” are dissipated: much more disengaged and dispassionate the former (since 
you are simply long or short), less “real” and weighty the latter, since there are “really” no assets, just 
factors that really/fundamentally drive asset behavior – the same way there are “really” no tables, just 
molecules that really/fundamentally bump each other around. 
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the markets is the result of having already being attuned with a specific investment 
community. An investment portfolio cannot be considered successful because it 
succeeded to include an objective element (as for example EMH would suggest) or 
because it simply happened to make the right subjective bet (as Behavioral Finance 
would imply). In fact, the portfolio builder does not simply understand and construct 
his portfolio in objective or subjective terms, rather he comes to see the entire world 
through his portfolio. That’s why Warren Buffet may talk and show records of his 
investing style to an EMH practitioner for years, without making any difference – 
because Buffet does not dwell in EMH’s world. As he ingeniously puts it:  
“It is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for forty cents 
takes immediately with people or it doesn’t take at all. It’s like an inoculation. 
If it doesn’t grab a person right away, I find you can talk to him for years and 
show him records, and it doesn’t make any difference.” (Graham & Dodd, 
2009: xvi)  
What doesn't make any difference for the other is the “records”, that is, the supposedly 
most important, simple, neutral and transparent fact of the performance of a portfolio – 
which casts doubt on whether such or other similar transparent metrics or evidence, 
towards which all minds supposedly converge, make any sense. Understanding a style 
– a way of life – is not about transparently understanding given facts or formulae: it is 
about “soaking it up as we respond to the endless bits of feedback we’re continuously 
receiving as to how well we’re performing Dasein-ish activities” (Braver, 2012:171). 
In that respect facts do come, but they come too late:  
Page 65 
 
“the understanding we get from our world picture is not a set of theses. It is a 
kind of orientation, a way of knowing one’s way around, what Heidegger calls 
being competent at living a certain kind of life.” (Braver, 2012:199) 
In that respect, an investment portfolio aims to uncover a particular state of affairs in 
the world: it is a demand to see the “tempo” of the events that actually determines what 
is at issue for us, that is, the cultural commitments we cannot help sharing because they 
make us what we are (Dreyfus, 1980:3). On that basis, the investor quiet his thoughts 
and wills (as a poet or a thinker) so as to let himself be carried away by the historical 
unfolding of intelligibility, that is, of how what rests today marginal (e.g. a bubble) will 
become central tomorrow (and thus change our practices with time)18. In that way, every 
investment act makes an embodied and concrete statement that its particular background 
investment community is worth caring about and is thus capable of inspiring and 
eliciting further and further meaningful involvement with it (Dreyfus & Kelly 
2011:219). Should such acts fail, the community faces the possibility of revealing itself 
as too trivial, too shallow and thus too weak to sustain its practices and elicit further 
involvement. For Heidegger, when local community and reality enmesh in such ways, 
then financial things are “thinging” and resist themselves from turning into mere 
                                                          
18 When David Swensen, Yale’s University Chief Investment Officer and an expert investor, took a 
large, short position in subprime mortgage-backed securities which during the credit crunch paid off 
enormously, his position had already uncovered the subprime mortgage industry in its essence: it 
uncovered it as a bubble, as a speculative deviation of prices which is largely unsustainable. What at 
first is only tacit and amorphous in the financial community’s background understanding (e.g. a 
bubble stemming from a profitable business in the midst of a low interest rate environment) is given 
form and lit up by the skilful portfolio-builder. In that respect, for Heidegger, it is the skilful investor 
immersed in his investment practice who primordially understands in situ what a financial bubble is – 
not the academic scholar who steps back in order to scientifically catalogue the ahistorical and 
universal features that constitute a bubble, bringing supportive, objective evidence. What is more, 
around such an uncovering skilful practice, a set of novel possibilities is opened up which may gather 
further meaningful comportments that count for the investment (and not only) community – for 
example, regulate or deregulate the mortgage industry, create a systemic-risk watchdog etc. 
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resources (which comprises the greatest danger of technofinance – more on that, in the 
next sections). 
We claim that following Heidegger, the condition of the possibility for a simple market 
transaction rests on the organized dissonance generated and sustained by the clashing 
among disparate participating investment styles, dynamically emerging and preserved 
within the public space of the markets. It is worth noticing how for Nobel laureate and 
Behavioral Finance guru Daniel Kahneman, a simple market transaction is an almost 
insurmountable perplexing issue. He keeps asking: what makes a person buy and the 
other sell given that they share the same information? What makes them both to think 
the current price is wrong (Kahneman, 2011:212-3)? It is an insurmountable perplexing 
issue because it looks like a contradiction: how is it possible one party to sell and another 
buy on the grounds of the same information? Such questioning makes sense within an 
epistemic framework: obviously, one of the parties fails to accurately interpret or 
represent the objective evidence that is offered from the world out-there. One of them 
is right, the other is wrong – at best. At worst, both parties are wrong. Thus, Behavioral 
Finance’s condition of the possibility for a simple market transaction rests on a mistake, 
an error resulting from defective judgment, deficient knowledge, or carelessness in the 
face of the given, transparent financial information: in short, from some sort of biases. 
Yet, equally perplexing is EMH’s perspective according to which there should only be 
market transactions that solely gain exposures into the Market Portfolio – nothing more 
nor less. But it's worth taking a look of Warren Buffet’s portfolio when it was first 
opened to his limited partners in order to decide if they would cash out or not:  
“After years of glittering returns, the scruffy-looking little portfolio was a bit 
of an anticlimax. They had a big position in a textile company that Buffet didn’t 
think was worth much on its own, but which had bank and insurance holdings; 
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there was Blue Chip; inside Blue Chip, there was a retail operation that was 
mostly a shell, holding ash from recent divestments; and finally a scattering of 
publications of little financial importance. Some of the shareholdings, 
moreover, were unregistered, so they couldn’t be sold on stock exchanges.” 
(Morris, 2009:74)  
 A “scruffy-looking” portfolio relative to the market’s ‘efficient’ one. 
Kahneman fails to entertain one more possibility: both parties could equally be right. 
From an analytic point of view (which endows reason with a penetrating mighty power 
in the face of which no language-game, no form of understanding can resist), this 
possibility is a simple contradiction. Yet it’s not, if reason itself is not universal but 
locally emergent on the basis of a prior inexplicit/unthematic understanding of a way 
the world opens up (and Heidegger advisedly says “a” way, “for we can never say that 
it is the absolute one.” (Heidegger, 1994:139). Within her local investment community, 
the investor simply attempts to bring out at its best the style of her investing 
understanding; in such an attempt, she may succeed or fail (so both parties of the 
transaction may be right or wrong) regardless of the actual payoff: money (“return” in 
the financial parlance) can only support, or force to collapse the particular’s style 
investing practices and even release new possibilities in such practices: 
“Saying that the point of business is to produce profit is like saying that the 
whole point of playing basketball is to make as many baskets as possible. One 
could make many more baskets by having no opponent. The game and styles 
of playing the game are what matter because they produce identities people 
care about… customary businesses and business people exist in market 
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economies to form identities that are recognized by others as respectable due 
to their usefulness or excellence.” (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1999: 55-7) 
Current financial theories see placing an investment (i.e. reaching a decision under 
uncertainty) as essentially equivalent to a prediction – of how the investment is going 
to fare within the investment horizon. A prediction needs to be supported by reason 
and/or adequate evidence. Rational arguments and the use of adequate empirical 
evidence can only be secured by the unbiased mind of a subject, which stands properly 
purified against an objective and transparent world. Only within such a subject/object 
model of knowledge can such an emphasis to predictions be given. But it shouldn’t. 
Rock bottom is not our skill at predicting: rock bottom is our skill at existing; my 
existing within a world makes me to know how to go about and do what is appropriate 
in each situation. 
2.2. Social Studies of Finance and Heidegger 
Implicitly or explicitly, the central mainstream divide in modern financial economics 
between the orthodox view of actors as rational and Behavioral Finance's view as 
subject to systematic psychological biases, presupposes a view of the actor as an 
individual human being or akin to such a human (MacKenzie, 2009:23). That is, the 
source of intelligibility in both views is sought on the individual. Fix or secure the latter 
(the individual) and gain the former (intelligible decision-making). This is not the case 
for Heidegger, who uses the term “being-in-the-world” to distinguish himself as clearly 
as possible from the traditional idea of individual consciousness. For him, intelligibility 
resides in the shared social practices prevalent in a particular culture at a particular 
historical moment. Such an understanding, far from being a function of a hidden reason, 
rests upon nothing more than the way things are done. For EMH and Behavioral Finance 
this entails an unacceptable relativism; not for Heidegger, for whom non-cognitive 
Page 69 
 
modes of being-in-the-world, like care, have priority over reason (and consequently, 
over relativism itself when seen as a simple product of reason's critique). Thus, far from 
being a pure noetic subject (a fair abstraction of reflective philosophy), active, practical, 
engaged being-in-the-world finds itself thrust in the midst of contexts that cannot 
extricate itself from.  
This change of scope, from the hidden depths of a subject to the surface of how things 
are done, is developed and extended by Social Studies of Finance (SSF), which treat 
economic agents as made up of what Michel Callon calls agencements, of combinations 
of human beings, material objects, technical systems, texts, algorithms and so on. In 
such combinations it is indeed impossible to demarcate individuality – in fact, what is 
needed is precisely a story of how anything like pure individuality can render itself 
intelligible in the first place. That's why the vocabulary of SSF shifts into terms like 
hybrids, sociotechnical, actors, networks, collectives, i.e. terms that mix, combine, 
connect, assemble, terms that emphasize more the vibration of the verb, that is the act-
ing-with, the doing, and less the doer, the segregated/independent substance, the 
congealed (in fact, what is in need of explanation is more the phenomenon of 
stabilization and less that of instability) – exactly like Heidegger's being-in-the-world 
that cannot be a-being-in-the-world. Of course, Callon's Actor-Network theory goes 
much further in that the nature of agents or actors remains undecided, potentially 
including non-human entities as well as human beings. Thus, in Callon's analysis, an 
economic actor is not an individual human being, nor even a human being embedded in 
institutions, conventions, personal relationships or groups, as Economic Sociology 
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posits, but is “made up of human bodies but also of prostheses, tools, equipment, 
technical devices, algorithms etc.” (Callon, 2005:4 italics added)19. 
This prostheses talk is quite interesting: for MacKenzie, “a human being equipped with 
a financial calculator is a different actor from one without one.” (MacKenzie, 2009:23). 
“Indeed”, he writes elsewhere, “markets themselves can be seen as prostheses in the 
sense that they enable human beings to achieve outcomes that go beyond their 
individual cognitive grasp.” In that respect,  
“the ﬁeld [SSF] can be seen as sharing behavioral ﬁnance’s view that the 
cognitive capacities of unaided individual human beings are limited. However, 
the social studies of finance also emphasize the ways in which sophisticated 
economic calculations are nevertheless made possible by material devices (the 
computerized equivalents of Black’s sheets, for example), by organizational 
routines, by concepts (such as “implied volatility”) that simplify complex 
realities, and so on.” (MacKenzie, 2006:267-8). 
Thus, under this view, the preconditions of “rational” economic action are located in 
the technical systems, procedures, ways of communicating, networking and so on, that 
make such action possible. 
Yet, in a subtle way, such a point marks a divergence relative to Heidegger's claims up 
to here. Indeed, a human being equipped with a financial calculator is a different actor 
from one without one, but that does not mean that the cognitive capabilities of the 
former get extended (or sophisticated) and thus surpass the limitations of the latter. This 
might sound odd, because in a way it is true that a financial calculator does indeed make 
you capable of calculating within a second the square root of 157.37, yet such obvious 
                                                          
19 As far as finance is concerned, MacKenzie provides an excellent de-dramatization of the attribution 
of agency to non-human entities (an attribution which in general has provoked fierce debates around 
Actor-Network theory), with the case of the law of contract (MacKenzie, 2009:21). In what follows, we 
focus on agencements that include humans. 
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cognitive extension is not essential enough to demarcate you from someone who is not 
equipped with such a calculating power at hand. A human with a financial calculator is 
faced with a different way of being disposed to things, a different way of being attuned 
in to things in the world, a different set of possibilities and practices that gather around. 
Such practices do require calculations, algorithms, systems, massive data sets, 
connectivity etc., that is, stuff which cannot obviously be related with a man without a 
financial calculator, yet it does not render humans more “sophisticated” or put them in 
a situation to produce “truer” judgments about a phenomenon at hand, say, the solvency 
estimation of a credit institution.  In fact, Michael Power’s talk is quite telling here, 
when he writes about risk management (perhaps the pinnacle of the most sophisticated 
of practices of humans with financial calculators) and “risk management fictions” that 
need to prove “links to risk adversity and motivation”. For Power, participants are not 
dupes and realize they may be simply part of a costly construction of an illusion or 
fantasy of control: “it’s silly, but we have to do it.” (Power, 2007:199). This suggests 
that man is more of a “ceremonial” creature20, a point that undermines any attempt to 
evaluate or integrate different aspects (a man with and a man without a financial 
calculator) under terms like prostheses that imply pushing, extending and elevating 
further what is, perhaps by nature, limited. In fact, the technical systems, procedures 
and so on that consist the preconditions of “rational” economic actions may as well 
hinder sophistication, as is the case of infinitively “passing the buck” in proceduralized 
Enterprise Risk Management systems that work under the imperative of setting in place 
clear “procedures and lines of responsibility and accountability” (EIOPA, 2013:20). 
Agencements with the most sophisticated of humans, material objects, technical 
                                                          
20 In fact, Ingram, Underwood and Thompson, pioneers on cultural theory of plural rationality in 
Enterprise Risk Management, entitle one of their papers as “Finding the right risk rituals to appease 
regulators and rating agencies.” (Ingram et al, 2012, italics added) For an exposition and also critique 
from a Social Studies of Finance perspective of their theory, see Fytros (2014).   
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systems, texts, algorithms and so on, cannot insulate the circulation of financial truth; 
why not? Because for Heidegger, deep down such agencements do not constitute but a 
historical complex which is not prosthetic, not epistemic, not grounded, but only, 
bestowed.  
Of course, it would be wrong to attribute to the SSF much, or perhaps better, any of the 
ontological presuppositions that define EMH and Behavioral Finance. In fact, the field 
is excellent in capturing this anti-essentialist play on how, for example, the financial 
calculator can render an agent both more (as predicted by the neo-enlightenment project 
of the mainstream financial theories) and less sophisticated than initially 
acknowledged21. This is accomplished by focusing on the particular technological 
devices, on their materiality, algorithmic configurations and so on, which uncovers what 
a 'computer solution' is in practice: nothing but a chain of further problems, a cascade 
of updates, an endless interplay of framing and overflowing. “The same goes for 
markets”, notes Muniesa, who also observes how some “notable epistemologists of 
economics have even toyed with the idea of considering markets in terms of an 
evolutionary proliferation of algorithmic forms, an ecology of 'evolving computational 
entities' as Philip Mirowski put it” (Muniesa, 2014:67). For Callon, 'overflowing' 
denotes the impossibility of total framing, which is the work of cleansing, of 
disconnection in order to conclude a calculation – made possible by the technosciences 
– and settle reality (Callon, 1998:17). In short, technologies allow the framing and 
stabilization of actions while simultaneously providing an opening on to other 
complexes, thus constituting unexpected leakage points where overflowing occurs 
(Callon, 1998:18). In such a (phenomenally infinite) process,  
                                                          
21 See for example Beunza & Stark's play between dissonance and resonance (Beunza & Stark, 2011), 
or MacKenzie's analysis of the valuation practices of ABS CDOs (MacKenzie, 2011). 
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“the tools are constantly reconfigured to take into account in more and more 
detail a set of entities and relationships which were hitherto excluded from the 
framework of calculation. The framing becomes more refined, richer, delving 
into the complexity of relationships, and in so doing it authorizes decisions 
which are more and more calculated or (to use the commonly-accepted word) 
more and more rational.” (Callon, 1998:24).  
Therefore, 
“The more an agency is able to complicate and broaden the network of entities 
and relations to be taken into account, the greater is its capacity to create 
asymmetries between itself and other agencies… The probability of gain is on 
the side of the agency with the greatest powers of calculation, that is to say, 
whose tools enable it to perform, to make visible and to take into account the 
greatest number or relations and entities.” (Callon, 1998:45) 
Now, let us try to give a picture of all this: imagine that a decision under uncertainty 
(the typical type of decision called for in the markets) is represented by a circle. For 
Behavioral Finance, a technological device such as a financial calculator that endows 
with the capacity to overcome several of the inherent cognitive human restrictions, 
manages to restrict ungrounded human discretion and opinion in just, say, one quarter 
of the circle. The other three quarters of the circle have been filled by the relevant 
“objective” calculations as performed by the technological device (i.e. the financial 
calculator), which is fed by empirical data, mathematically and algorithmically 
manipulated. For Behavioral Finance, that remaining part of the circle's one quarter, the 
unsettled part, should be minimized and is in fact minimized as long as you perform a 
systematic biases-cleansing and remain simultaneously in line with the latest scientific, 
financial innovations that have the capacity to progress and unearth, little by little, those 
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hidden factors that drive financial phenomena – for EMH, there is obviously no left 
over right from the beginning that can be attributed to ungrounded discretion and 
unexamined opinions.  
For SSF, there is in fact, no problem accepting such a picture: indeed, the bringing in 
of prosthetic technological calculative devices does 'squeeze' unsophisticated practices 
to just one quarter of the circle. But the intriguing part begins when, the more we try to 
minimize that unsettled part of the circle by “complicating and broadening the network 
of entities and relations to be taken into account”, the more we attempt to 'refine', 'enrich' 
and delve into the complexity of relationships to make the decision (i.e. the circle) 'more 
calculated, more rational', then the more such an endeavor becomes unstable and 
leakage points (critically saturated by entwining masses of human bodies, discretion, 
calculable entities, material restrictions and whatsoever) occur that provoke 
overflowing and create new circle(s) which ask in turn to be enriched, (re)filled anew 
by new computations, which, following their predecessors, cannot sustain themselves 
at the moment they begin covering the full circle. Thus, MacKenzie's metaphor is a fair 
one: like an engine, which is constantly refined, fine-tuned, updated but for exactly that 
reason spits surprises, thus effects and actively performs without simply describing or 
passively recording like a camera. An engine that keeps us busy, not a camera that 
reassures us by accurately representing what is out there (MacKenzie, 2006). 
Now, such a view tends to undermine Heidegger's relatively distinct and durable 
investment styles that are mapped onto different understandings of being as historically 
have been handed down. For SSF, the emphasis is on a much greater flux that 
disseminates surprises exactly where you think you have, after continuous trials and 
hard work, demarcated enough: exactly when, after a significant period of circulation a 
model like Black-Scholes-Merton comes to be considered as the “right” way to price 
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options, a phenomenon at variance with that “correct” way, the volatility skew or smile, 
emerges (MacKenzie, 2006:258) – which keeps the engine going22. Technology or in 
our context, quantitative finance, which is distinctively networked, mathematical, 
computational and knowledge intensive (Stark, 2009:122), in short, 'technological', 
cannot thus constitute a 'supreme danger' in so far the engine, by enriching and updating 
itself, keeps going by dispersing surprises and disruptions. For Callon, since 
overflowing is omnipresent (in so far every framing creates overflowing and all 
disentanglement provides the opportunity for new entanglement), we don’t need to 
preserve the idea “that there exist orders of reality, social spaces organized according 
to incommensurable and antagonistic logics” that can serve as a limit or resistance to 
the expansion of technologies and calculations: “[t]here is no Great Divide between 
societies populated by calculative agencies and societies in which the agents do not 
calculate”23 and “[d]ifferentiation is spawned by a single recurring process.” (Callon, 
1998:38-9).  
We shouldn't look outside finance to find those social spaces that (bravely still manage 
to) resist to technology and calculation. In fact, different calculative practices as 
organized and oriented by disparate investment styles is a phenomenon that 
inconspicuously permeates financial markets all the way down. Just to give an example 
of the incommensurability that characterizes such different calculative practices within 
finance which nevertheless passes unnoticed, think the quant-type investing style 
according to which: “It’s not like building a bridge. If you’re right more than half the 
time you’re winning the game.” (Overbye, 2009). That is, if on the average the quant 
beats the markets, then he is deemed to be successful. But interestingly enough, the 
                                                          
22 In the same spirit, Muniesa describes vividly how the quest for an explicit, 'single point' of sound 
price discovery proliferated into a wide variety of algorithmic configurations, each solving a few 
problems but generating new, unforeseen ones (Muniesa, 2014:67). 
23 In short, “we have never been modern”. 
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notion of the ‘average’ is a quant-type metric – which effectively means, the quant is 
benchmarking himself against a quant metric. The use of such a quant metric implies 
circularity: indeed, the quant measures himself in relation to a metric that makes sense 
on the basis of his quant-type understanding. But such a metric is not valued, for 
example, in Stephen Schwarzman’s investing world: in his investment style, failure is 
not an option:  
“I really hate failure… When we fail it's a major, major, major event… We 
actually changed the way we made decisions at the whole firm after a very 
early failure that we had had and changed our whole investment process; that 
one failure created most of our successes.”24  
That’s why he acknowledged he lost money on two situations in a history of 160 
investments. For Schwartzman then, if you benchmark yourself with the average, you 
most probably are an average. But not for the quants’ understanding. 
There is no doubt that within both of these styles, calculative practices are mixed with 
humanizing attributes in a hybrid way that creates surprises which are transformative, 
thus enriching and refining understanding. There is no doubt that practices become 
“more refined, richer, delving into the complexity of relationships” – indeed, practices 
do tend to gather; gathering is Heidegger’s name for how a new way of doing something 
brings all the disparate aspects of the matter or activity together (Spinosa, 2005:492). 
But such practices have a kind of telos; this telos depends upon the rest of the practices 
in the investment community, the kinds of identities the community supports, the kinds 
of traditions and uses the community is familiar with and holds valuable (Spinosa, 
2001:218). So, it's not an idea or concept that suddenly befalls on the agent out of the 
                                                          
24 Yale University (2008, April 11): Guest Lecture by Stephen Schwarzman in Robert Shiller's ECON-




necessity of overflowing that his trial of framing has effected – rather, for Heidegger, 
the entire of the agent's financial life is felt as directed towards that telos; which of 
course, may take on a new look and collect all the already built-in sophisticated skills 
to shine in a new way. Thus, the quant type investor is solicited to control and secure a 
risk-return trade off in order to optimize it (what for Heidegger is made possible by a 
modern constellation of intelligibility that culminates in a technological one), whereas 
a value investor is solicited to bring forth and nurture the intrinsic potentialities of an 
underlying entity (in a poetic-like way). Respectively, momentum investing which tries 
to capitalize trends that come and go, is made possible on the basis of an understanding 
of being as the transient arising of something from out of itself (physis-like), whereas 
institutional investing can only make sense as created and dictated by an omnipresent 
(God-like) liability index. David Stark describes postmodern arbitrage, the epitome of 
high-tech's imperative capitalist finance, as soliciting an art of association, made 
possible by an operation that makes something the measure of something else (Stark, 
2009:120). All such investing styles thus are made possible on the basis of our Western 
historical destiny – that's why they can perform and effectuate, grabbing and mixing 
people, practices and equipment together (agencements in SSF parlance): because such 
historical ways of being-in-the-world matter most for us25. The multiplicity of meanings 
is always something historical for Heidegger (Heidegger 1991:96), and this historical 
multiplicity of value/meaning-attribution is well preserved and displayed within the 
public sphere of financial markets which open up and preserve fields of historical 
solicitations.  
                                                          
25 In that respect, every assertion that defines finance as solely a modern calculative business (i.e. as 
belonging to the modern or late-modern, technological imperative) is simply not thoughtful enough. 
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Such solicitations create a market reality exactly at that point where irreconcilable 
understandings rash against all others, challenging and shattering all other's way of 
understanding and organizing experience. The density of this “othering”26 results in an 
accessed market reality that is transgressive27, not dialectic or synthetic – as EMH and 
Behavioral Finance would imply, in that sooner or later a rational or irrational 
equilibrium would prevail – but neither simply asymmetric, as SSF would imply, in that 
the party with the more sophisticated agencements/prosthetic powers will always retain 
a higher probability of gain through the created asymmetries. In fact, Charles Morris 
describes an instance of portfolio insurance that disproves SSF's case of such 
asymmetric market reality. He writes about how the specifics of portfolio insurance 
were devised by two University of California - Berkeley finance professors, Hayne 
Leland and Mark Rubinstein, who soon started a company to execute such hedging 
strategy for big investors. Within months, some 100bn$ of stock portfolios were insured 
by services provided by Leland and Rubinstein's company and most of the Wall Street 
firms that followed swiftly. Obviously, all those companies had created an infrastructure 
that refined and made the practice of portfolio insurance more and more calculated and 
thus more and more rational, creating an asymmetry between such megaportfolios and 
the rest of the market. However,  
“Richard Bookstaber, who ran the portfolio insurance program at Morgan 
Stanley, recalls a conversation with a young salesman [who apparently lacked 
                                                          
26 Which of course, is not limited only among styles but also among sub-styles. For SSF though, this 
remark is enough to render the whole notion of styles/sub-styles suspicious: that's why the focus on 
the overflowing, that is the destabilizing, disseminating, dispersive aspect of the elaboration of our 
financial practices (i.e. there are no styles, let alone sub-styles, there are simply hybrid differentiations 
“spawned by a single recurring process” (Callon, 1998:38-9)). However, this is not the case for 
Heidegger, who thus needs to give an account of the stabilization of our practices (i.e. styles) without 
metaphysical, foundational/fixed points that unite. We elaborate on this point at the concluding 
section.   
27 Lee Braver, a contemporary recognized Heideggerian scholar, has developed the notion of 
Transgressive Realism. See Braver (2012a). 
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the sophisticated agencements of Wall Street's portfolio insurance] who 
wanted to confirm that Bookstaber was indeed managing some 3bn$ in 
portfolio insurance; that if stocks started to fall, he would sell futures at steadily 
accelerating rates; and that at least twenty other big firms would do the same 
thing. Bookstaber confirmed that was all true. The young man invested his 
modest savings in market puts, which are options that pay handsomely in big 
downturns, and a few weeks later [after Monday, October 19th, 1987], retired 
to a life of skiing.” (Morris, 2008:43-48) 
No doubt asymmetries are created and have importance within styles – however, such 
importance is rarefied among styles. Thus, for a market reality that is transgressive 
rather than asymmetric, the “other”, i.e. what remains outside the understanding (style) 
that shelters and secures valuation, the excluded, is not waste: instead, it is what enables 
market reality. Every valuation creates a deficit that is filled by the other, and thus a 
transaction (the simple product of disparate valuation practices) can be said to be a 
common project between two parties that effectively share nothing in common – 
making the market a potential community without commons. After all, even High 
Frequency Trading needs other non-algorithmic traders in order for it to flourish and 
produce profits – a market flashed with high frequency traders is a systemically unstable 
market. It’s also worth noticing Stark’s remarks (Stark, 2009:147-151) with regard to 
hedge fund statistical arbitrage traders (one distinctive form of what we take to be a 
postmodern, technological style of investing): in order for them to intelligibly pilot their 
robots, they need exposure to 'other' trading desks with different evaluative principles 
(such as the merger arbitrage desk and the systems desk). 
We can even think of it the other way around: when do we have a systemically unstable 
financial reality (for example, a total market crash of everything)? When a particular 
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investment style dominates so forcefully that all otherness, transgression or dissonance 
is lost into a series of uniform decisions and orders. From this point on, it's interesting 
to note furthermore: which investment style carries along such a supreme danger? 
Obviously enough, the technological, quantitative one (which is distinctively 
mathematical, networked, and computational intensive). What makes possible such a 
style? Heidegger's answer: the essence of technology. 
Heidegger does not focus on technologies but on the phenomenon of technology itself 
– one of his most famous claim is that the essence of technology is nothing technological 
(Heidegger, 1977:4). By this, Heidegger wants to raise his concerns not with regard to 
the particularities of individual technological devices, but rather with the broader trend 
toward increasing technologization – i.e. the increasingly global phenomenon by which 
entities are transformed into simple resources standing by for optimization28. It is very 
instructive that Heidegger uses the odd word “enframing” (das Gestell) to pin down the 
essence of our current technological constellation of historical intelligibility. He 
employs the polysemic term “Gestell” precisely because it etymologically connotes a 
gathering together (“Ge-“) of the myriad forms of “stellen”, i.e. to set, stand, regulate, 
secure, ready, establish and so on (Thomson, 2005: 53) – in short, to frame. The greatest 
danger with such a constellation of intelligibility is how it succeeds to secure (frame) 
its monopoly on the real (the same way it succeeds in framing everything - including 
humans - as resources to be optimized) and thus crowd out all alternative understandings 
of being, effecting a kind of “double forgetting” in which we lose sight of our distinctive 
                                                          
28 We have already commented on such financial trends, like risk management and its operational risk 
module, reflexive modeling and high frequency trading. Another worth mentioning is the 
transformation of stock prices from vehicles for the commerce of capital stock to some sort of 
merchandise in and of itself that ends up bringing derivative finance on top of plain finance (rather 
than, as traditionally thought, the other way around) (Muniesa, 2014:77). 
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capacity for world disclosure (which is exactly what building a portfolio is about29) and 
forget that anything has thus been forgotten (Thomson, 2005:57). For SSF, this looks 
quite fatalistic, in that Heidegger misses here the overflowing phenomenon brought 
about by the particular technological device - e.g., the financial calculator. But 
Heidegger cannot be accused of having missed such a phenomenon; indeed, he does 
account for how the internal strife between 'earth' (i.e., “that which resists and eludes 
all attempts to comprehend it...thus shatters every attempt to penetrate it” (Heidegger, 
1960: 172)) and 'sky' (the disclosed or manifest stable possibilities for action (Dreyfus 
& Spinosa, 1997:183)), represents that dimension of intelligibility we experience both 
as it calls for and informs (“sky”), and as it overflows and escapes our attempts to pin 
it down (“earth”). Far from attempting to disregard SSF's anti-essentialist idea of 
framing/overflowing, Heidegger's narrative simply takes one step further – for 
overflowing by itself may constantly lead to new local complexes, but not to new local 
worlds (after all, it's not but an engine); yet, only through local worlds can things and 
people be brought out most worthily and shining. That's why Heidegger introduces two 
more elements apart from earth and sky: mortals and divinities – i.e. the temporality 
and vulnerability of our identities and constructions (mortals), and the gratefulness and 
reverential mood that descends to us for receiving all that is brought out by the particular 
situation we are thrown into (divinities) (Dreyfus & Spinosa, 1997:183-4)30. 
For Heidegger, if the current technological understanding does not gain its transparent 
obviousness neither by human doing nor by a transcendent hidden reason but is instead 
                                                          
29 In two ways: one, by disclosing a new way to organize experience and construct a portfolio (in other 
words, by the emergence of a new investment style, such as High Frequency Trading) and two, by 
disclosing what is at issue for us (e.g. the technologization of everything, what it means to live in a 
technological world). 
30 For other interpretations of the Heideggerian fourfold (earth, sky, mortals and divinities) see 
Richardson (1963), Pöggeler (1990), Malpas (2008), Young (2002, 2006) and Harman (2002,2005). 




bestowed, then eventually, either a new understanding of being will emerge and take 
hold or everything will be brought permanently into line with this spreading 
technological understanding31. As possible sources of such a new paradigm, 
Heideggerian interpreters stress those “marginal practices” that have not yet been 
completely “mobilized as resources”, “such as friendship, back-packing in the 
wilderness and drinking the local wine with friends” (Dreyfus, 1995:171). Ian Thomson 
adds the crucial role that will be played by “being as such”, a phenomenon we can learn 
to experience as a preconceptual “presencing” and extraconceptual excess that existing 
practices never exhaust (Thomson, 2005:71). My final question will be based upon 
exactly this: does finance within itself has somehow preserved such a marginal 
understanding that can get us to notice through our financial world, what in Heidegger’s 
idiom is called our mortality, entangled with the presence of the divinities that linger in 
the background of even our most advanced technofinance constructions? In short, to 
bring back our initial impossible-like conjecture: can a Heideggerian dwell within the 
financial community and disclose our vulnerability in a way that preserves in the midst 
of it, divinities and gratefulness for what has been (financially) bestowed to us, without 
in the meantime having to go as far as back-packing in the wilderness?  
2.3. Bulls and Bears 
It seems that people in financial markets find themselves resonating a unique sensibility 
or mood when being-in-the-markets, that just cannot be the net product of mere private 
projections of all participants’ inner dispositions. What is that? We name our markets 
bull or bear markets. This is a funny thing. We call them neither ‘upward’ nor 
‘downward trending’ markets. We neither call them ‘net appreciating’ nor ‘net 
                                                          
31 A third solution of entering ourselves into an enlightening program of reducing technology's (bad) 
influences, is simply another technology-guided blueprint.  
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depreciating’ markets. We call them bull and bear. One may claim, this is because we 
mean our market is like a bull or a bear market. But this is not accurate. Our markets 
are bull or bear. They are “really” bull or bear markets. And we can really be bullish or 
bearish. The bull or bear market is not a simile – it’s a metaphor. And metaphors are 
not just a matter of idiomatic expressions – that is, a metaphor is not merely in the words 
we use; it is in our way of being-in-the-world. Metaphors are primarily a matter of 
understanding and acting and only derivatively a matter of expressions or thought32. 
Thus, a metaphor, like a mood, structures our comportment by deciding what is salient 
or not33, highlighting and hiding aspects of a situation34. 
So, by talking metaphorically for the markets instead for instance, literally or by way 
of a simile, we want to denote something more fundamental than the simple fact that 
markets on the average just go up or down. We want to denote our way of being-in-the-
markets, our facticity in the markets. And such facticity does not just correspond to the 
factuality of prices going up or down. Our in-the-markets-facticity is bullish/bearish. 
This is how we understand our way of being-in-the-markets – or, to put it in 
Heideggerian terms, such understanding has been given to us; such understanding is 
what has been given and what has been preserved – up to now.  
This is a subtle point. Bulls and bears is not just a matter of expression. It’s how we 
encounter markets prior to our expressions about them. It’s a kind of concern or 
mattering which accordingly structures our being intelligently in the markets – that is, 
                                                          
32 Therefore, since an argument is a building, my action is accordingly structured so as to bring on 
more evidence to support my reasoning. Thus, I comport myself purposively in order to construct a 
strong argument – that is I check its connections, try to support it with more evidence, ask for other’s 
people opinion, etc.  
33 Therefore, since I can’t take my eyes off her, I am trying to be with her all the time – it’s more 
important to be with her than go home and watch that football game in TV. 
34 Therefore, since love is war, you can have many conquests; but then you hide the fact that love is a 
patient and your marriage can be healthy or sick – which has nothing to do with a conquest. For a 
related analysis see Lakoff & Johnson (1980). 
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our portfolios, our trading, our regulation, our education, our language, our strategies; 
everything. Within that disclosive space already opened up by bulls and bears, our 
practices make sense and become dominant while others become subordinate or ignored 
altogether. In such a space, we do not just encounter a bare investment product – say, a 
bare equity. We are entranced  by an equity that can surge and drive our portfolio high, 
can offer a spectacular growth, is in a good position to outperform, has a positive 
outlook, has fundamental value, can match our risk profile, has raised its dividends, can 
be the target of a buying spree, can rebound or bounce back; we are chilled by a rally to 
the bottom, by negative surprises in the midst of a mending market, by a long term trend 
that has been breached, by a depressing tsunami, by overvaluation and 
underperforming; markets do not matter to us but as bull or bear. And such a mattering 
and understanding is not new – it’s quite old. 
But why the bull? Why the bear? What does such a metaphor tries to highlight? Why 
not, for instance, an airplane? Airplanes go up and down, can fly high or low, can land 
softly or hardly – they can even crash, just like markets. Why talk about bull markets 
and not about markets-airplanes – especially, we, the late-modern ones? Why living in 
the markets in terms of bulls and bears and not as passengers or better, pilots in an 
airplane? Well, this is quite a peculiar question, never raised before in the framework 
of the EMH and behavioral debate, never in the SSF space as well – but indeed, quite a 
Heideggerian one.  
Seeking for a clue, we can begin by looking at the online etymology dictionary: we see 
that the relevant entry there relates the word bull to “inflate, swell”, and dates its stock 
market connotation to 171435. Another hypothetical etymology points to London 
                                                          




bearskin ‘jobbers’ (market makers), who would sell bearskins before the bears had 
actually been caught – an admonition against over-optimism. Others point to the natural 
characteristics of the bull or bear. For instance, a bear hibernates, a bull does not. Bulls 
usually charge at very high speed whereas bears normally are thought of as lazy and 
cautious movers – a misconception, as is swiftly noted, because a bear, under the right 
conditions, can outrun a horse. Bulls are herding animals, which is analogous to how 
markets react in upward or downward trending – but bears are not, which poses a 
problem. Others point to how the world ‘bull’ plays off the market's returns being ‘full’ 
whereas ‘bear’ alludes to the market's returns being “bare”36. Et cetera et cetera. 
Such attempts may be interesting, educating, amusing, or even intriguing, but fall short 
of providing any serious ground of how fundamentally bulls and bears structure our 
being-in-the-markets. If the case was that bull reminds us of “full” or that bears are lazy 
and do not run fast enough, nobody would care less – bulls and bears would have long 
been forgotten, or at best, they would have attested a temporal or partial meaning-
granting status in our expressions when talking about markets (a simile or an analogy 
perhaps, but not a fundamental metaphor). They would not have reached the emblematic 
position to which we are referring to. 
We may admit that the grounds for understanding our markets as bull and bear can never 
become explicit enough. That’s a valid point and in fact, quite a Heideggerian one. But 
as we have already attested, we are not looking for an explicit understanding – after all, 
we can never explicitly understand our masculinity or femininity; we cannot even teach 
it to little boys or little girls. We can only be masculine or feminine, and this is how 
little boys and girls get to be also. So, if what we are looking for is not explicit grounds, 
                                                          
36 See for example, Market trend (2016, February 11). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 
18 February 2016 from  https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Market_trend&oldid 




then what are we? Well, we are just looking for a hint, a hint that carries with it an 
appropriate weightiness that can echo something for us; for our living not only in-the-
markets but also in-the-world. Such hints can be found in mythological symbols – for a 
symbol, in contrast to an allegory, manifests something which cannot be translated, 
which cannot be made available any other way – thus it constitutes a condensed point 
that serves to attune us with the plain presence of life itself; with an understanding that 
goes beyond simple describing or pointing outside of itself for its meaning. 
Bulls and bears constitute such rich mythological symbols:  
“[The bull] is a very important figure in the mythologies of the whole world. 
The horns of the bull and the horns of the Moon are equated. The Moon is that 
celestial sphere that dies and is resurrected. It carries its own death within it; 
the principle represented in the Moon is that power of life that conquers death. 
The bull symbolizes that lunar character, and thus, since the Moon is the 
sacrificial planet, the bull becomes the sacrificial animal… [So, the bull] 
becomes a symbol linked with the Moon – a symbol of death and rebirth. 
Symbolically contrary to the Moon is the Sun, the blazing light that never dies. 
Wherever the Sun goes, there the light has gone... So the interaction of these 
two powers – the solar power of sheer light and the lunar power of reflected 
light, modified to life – is one of the great mythic themes... These are basic 
mythic pairs that express two kinds of immortality. There is the [lunar or 
bullish] immortality of the one who dies and comes back to life... The other 
immortality is that of the one who has gone through the golden Sun door and 
will never return... The idea of the reincarnating principle is thus of two orders: 
first, the reincarnating principle that puts on bodies and puts them off as the 
Moon puts on and puts off its light body; and the other is that principle of sheer 
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light that never dies, the light that is incarnate and immanent in all.” (Campbell, 
2003:13-14, italics added) 
And what about bears?  
“Our first tangible evidences of mythological thinking are from the period of 
Neanderthal Man...and these comprise...a number of chapels in high-mountain 
caves, where cave-bear skulls, ceremonially disposed in symbolic settings, 
have been preserved. The burials suggest the idea, if not exactly of immortality, 
then at least of some kind of life to come; and the...high-mountain bear-skull 
sanctuaries surely represent a cult in honor of...the bear... 
Particularly instructive and well reported is the instance of the bear cult of the 
Ainu of Japan, a Caucasoid race...These curious people have the sensible idea 
that this world is more attractive than the next, and that godly beings residing 
in that other, consequently, are inclined to come pay us visits. They arrive in 
the shapes of animals, but, once they have donned their animal uniforms, are 
unable to remove them. They therefore cannot return home without human 
help. And so the Ainu do help – by killing them, removing and eating the 
uniforms, and ceremonially bidding the released visitors bon voyage... The 
bears are taken when still cubs and are raised as pets of the captor’s family, 
affectionately nursed...when the little guest is about four years old, the time 
arrives for him to be sent home. The head of the household in which he has 
been living will prepare him for the occasion by advising him that although he 
may find the festivities a bit harsh, they are unavoidably so and kindly 
intended... The little fellow is quickly and skillfully dispatched... A banquet is 
then prepared... after which, with a number of farewell presents to take along, 
he is supposed to go happily home. 
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Now, a leading theme... is that of the invitation to the bear to return to earth. 
This implies that in the Ainu view there is no such thing as death. And we find 
the same thought expressed in the final instructions delivered to the departed 
in the Ainu rites of burial. The dead are not to come back as haunts or 
possessing spirits, but only by the proper natural course, as babies. 
A second essential idea is that of the bear as a divine visitor whose animal body 
has to be ‘broken’ (as they say) to release him for return to his other-world 
home. Many edible plants, as well as hunted beasts, are believed to be visitors 
of this kind; so that the Ainu, killing and eating them, are doing them no harm, 
but actually a favor... The murdered beasts and consumed plants are thought 
of as willing victims; so that gratitude, not malice, must be the response of their 
liberated spirits to the ‘breaking and eating’ of their merely provisional 
material bodies.” (Campbell, 1972: 33-4, italics added) 
Bulls are associated with the lunar aspect of our existence. We are temporal beings and 
that means whatever comes forth, reaches its peak and maturity, eventually dies. It 
nurtures within the seed of its own destruction37. Like Human Minsky's financial 
instability hypothesis, stability breeds instability. What begins as empty, feeds itself to 
become full, only to return back – and start again. “Full circle, from the tomb of the 
womb to the womb of the tomb, we come” (Campbell, 2008:8). In such a structure, a 
kind of immortality is implied: birth, death and rebirth. Things do not end, they just 
keep on going, the same way the moon keeps on waxing and waning. The same is true 
with financial markets: bull markets attune us with such a cosmic play, with our 
temporal living, with being-in-the-world. The story of our lunar existence is the story 
                                                          
 
37 “We are the seed that dies” (Seferis, 1955:246, author’s translation from Greek language). 
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of our finite being-in-the-markets. We are bulls in-the-world, bulls in-the-markets. And 
the same way one can reach a meaningful life within such a bullish, lunar or temporal 
structure, the same way such a shining life can be given by markets; because the 
market’s structure is attuned to the cosmic one – it could never be differently. Markets 
are not an isolated, independent, self-sufficient incident experienced privately by a 
bunch of equally isolated, independent, self-sufficient profit-seekers within society. 
Markets are attuned, from top to bottom by what it is to be and live in a finite human 
world. Being-in-the-markets is possible only because we are already being-in-the-
world. An airplane metaphor (i.e. an engine metaphor for that matter) could never have 
given such a lunar aspect. An airplane is piloted, takes off from a specific point and 
lands to another one. It can fly low, high, can crash, can be fixed or endlessly updated; 
it's a fitting image for control-seeking modernity or post-modern engineering 
agencements – but it falls short to provide an attunement to the mysteries of our 
temporal structure. To the moon that simply waxes and waves – no destination to reach, 
no piloting to make, no highs or lows, no prosthetic updates; just waxing and waning38. 
A birth-to-death-to-rebirth circle that goes on and on and within it our skillful coping, 
our moods, our feats and tragedies, each taking and giving its turn in a natural course.  
An airplane crash is not a natural process. But what is more, the bullish aspect tells us 
that a financial crash is neither an anomaly; if it were, all it required would be more or 
less regulation to be fixed. But with every fixation, there will always remain something 
decisive that resists. And this is resonated by the bull; a direct attunement with that 
resisting mystery of being-in-the-world and being-in-the-markets; and our openness to 
it. Economist Paul Mc Culley writes that ultimately, when the bubbles created by 
                                                          
38 In his “The Principle of Reason”, Heidegger favorably quotes Angelus Silesius' verses: “The rose is 




financial bullish alchemy hit the fundamental wall of financial affordability, the day of 
reckoning arrives: “ultimately, fundamentals do matter.” (McCulley, 2009:265). 
Indeed, fundamentals do matter – but not the arithmetic fundamentals of financial 
affordability, but the fundamentals of our lunar, bullish attunement. It’s more than just 
financial fundamentals. It’s more than our financial factuality. It’s about our bullish 
facticity; our way of being-in-the-world, in-the-markets. 
The bull is focused to life that ends in death – and begins again. To growth that breeds 
its own distraction. From waxing to waning. To our mortality. The bear focuses to the 
opposite; to death that ends in rebirth. To what Mc Culley calls, the reverse Minsky 
journey. From waning to waxing. And what is to be found? The same hand that has bred 
the bubble, the same hand “quickly and skillfully” dispatches it. And what is now dying, 
what is collapsing, is not an end: “there is no such thing as death”. So, it should not 
haunt us – it’s only a “proper natural course”, a course which lets babies, not possessing 
spirits, come forth. And we should accept such a thing without malice but with 
gratitude; what has reached its peak, what has dominated, willingly gives itself to that 
“proper natural course”; to its destruction. It’s a deliberating self-willingly breaking. 
The bear tells us that markets are given to crashes in an act of self-willingness – crashes 
are not and cannot be the net effect of a deficient human nature, or of a leakage that 
failed to be framed adequately. 
Our finite living, creation-destruction, in forward or reverse. What does it mean to live 
in temporal terms? It means to live in a vulnerable, crude and most risky reality where 
even the most stable or safe option is defined by the instability and unsafeness that 
ultimately breeds. In such a world you may legitimately claim that ‘the best always lose 
and the worst always win’. A world full of greed and hubris on the way up and full of 
suffering and despair on the way down. How can one accept such vulnerability and 
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suffering? How can one participate in such sorrow? With malice or with gratitude? Bulls 
and bears make possible a graceful attunedness to such luminosity of being-in-the-
markets, that is, of being-in-the-world.  
2.4. Concluding Remarks 
To construct a meaningful talk between Heidegger and modern finance, we have sought 
to contrast our philosopher with the views that emerge from the two mainstream theories 
of financial economics, EMH and Behavioral Finance, and the more marginal, yet richer 
and further sophisticated account of Social Studies of Finance39. Against EMH and 
Behavioral Finance, we noted how Heidegger deflates the scientistic pretentions of their 
rational and evidence-based reasoning. If EMH's financial actor can be construed as 
living and breathing outside the markets in a sphere permeated by an ahistorical, 
transcendental rationality, then Behavioral Finance's actor seems in contrast so tightly 
entangled and helplessly thrown within the markets that consequently falls victim of its 
noises and contingent drifts. 
Heidegger restores the world-like aspect of the financial actor. She hasn't fallen from 
the sky, neither does she wallow in the earthly mud. Instead, she stands between earth 
and sky, feet firmly on the earth, eyes up until the sky – in short, she finds herself within 
an historical, horizonal ring of contextual meanings. According to this view, the 
widespread notion of calculation as the dominant practice of a financial actor recedes 
or even dissipates in the face of such more primordial being-in-the-world. Calculation 
(and especially the modern kind of calculation that purportedly seeks to maximize gain 
and minimize loss) may take place, undoubtedly, but it's not what only or par excellence 
takes place in finance. Financial practices of valuation need to be understood not in 
                                                          
39 As exemplified mainly by the works of Michel Callon, Donald MacKenzie, David Stark, Daniel Beunza 
and others (see the relevant literature at the references). 
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terms of series of calculations but against the background of a more fundamental 
account of the way we are open to the world, the way in which the world opens itself 
and makes itself available for thought – ways that solicit for different kinds and degrees 
of calculation; portfolio building is a responding to such a primary event of availability 
– a craftmanship (of calculation too, but not of calculation per se). 
SSF is very close to such a Heideggerian view. By adopting a symmetric position 
between quantitative or numeric calculations and qualitative judgments, SSF realizes 
that calculation can either meet the requirements of algorithmic formulation or be closer 
to intuition or judgment. The dividing line cannot be therefore where it is drawn by 
EMH and Behavioral Finance, that is, between calculation and judgment, since they are 
both about arraying and manipulating entities in a space in order to achieve a ranking, 
a decision, a value-attribution – a judgment, a calculation. To account for that, SSF 
coins the hybrid term “qualculation” (Cochoy, 2008). Under these terms, the dividing 
line is redrawn between arrangements that allow calculation (either quantitative or 
qualitative) and those that make it impossible. Thus calculation, whether arithmetical in 
form or not, is about the manipulation of objects within a single spatiotemporal frame 
– which can be done in indefinitely many ways (Callon & Law, 2005:719, Callon & 
Muniesa, 2002:1231-2).  
However close to unearthing the phenomenon of qualculation against EMH and 
Behavioral Finance, Heidegger and the SSF assume a different stand in the face of its 
elaboration. Whereas SSF focuses on the overflowing, that is disseminating and 
disrupting ways of its deployment, Heidegger tends to see its elaboration in terms of 
producing better and better articulations of its core (but not fixed or intrinsic) style's 
imperative (Spinosa, 2001). Qualculation practices within investment communities/ 
styles display a kind of telos – not a hard teleological law, but a gentle law, a feeling as 
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it feels-like, a tendency that connects them to the rest of the (investment) community's 
life in such a way that the practices and the personal identities involved are taken as 
worthy (Spinosa, 2001:218). The same can be said to hold for styles per se: we have 
already noticed how the density of the other investment communities/styles result in a 
dense market reality – of how, that is, the “other” is not a waste, but instead what enables 
market reality. This effectively implies that each investment style is not segregated, 
contingent or simply drifting by its own in dispersion. That is, investment styles that 
carry along the historical understandings of the different epochs, are not derived out of 
necessity (as for example EMH would suggest), nor are simply contingent (as 
Behavioral Finance would suggest), but neither are endlessly overflowing and 
uncontrollably dispersive (as SSF would imply). Instead, they form a legacy: 
“The epochs can never be derived from one another much less be placed on 
the track of an ongoing process. Nevertheless, there is a legacy from epoch to 
epoch. But it does not run between the epochs like a band linking them; rather, 
the legacy always comes from what is concealed in the Geschick [destiny, 
sending], just as if from one source various streamlets arise that feed a stream 
that is everywhere and nowhere.”(Heidegger 1991:91). 
This might delimit SSF's antimetaphysical penchant for the overflowing, uncontrollable 
dispersion of new possibilities into multiple contexts, however, what is obvious is 
Heidegger's effort to provide a story of how gathering, uniting, in short “worldling” and 
thus “nearing”40 is possible – without assuming any metaphysical unity rules that rule 
over polysemy. For Heidegger, the dancer shines at its best not at those moments where 
the human body releases itself energetically in the multiple rhythmic contexts of a 
                                                          
40 In a world we are always not simply near in particular beings, but near to their presence to us 
(Braver, 2009: 60).  
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disseminative choreographic play, but at exactly those consummating moments where 
the dancer simply “whiles” (and around which, such energetic overflowings are 
eventually gathered): 
“The fiddle stops and the dancer whiles” (Heidegger 1991:127) 
Heidegger notes how “'[w]hiling', 'tarrying', 'perpetuating' is indeed the old sense of the 
word 'being'. The while that every founding and every 'why' guards against, names the 
simple, plain presence that is without why - the presence upon which everything 
depends, upon which everything rests.” And also: “To 'while' means: to 'tarry', to 
'remain still', to 'pause and keep to oneself', namely in rest.” (Heidegger, 1991:127, 
italics added). It is instructive to contrast such a Heideggerian “tarrying”, such 
“remaining still” and “keeping to oneself in rest” with what belongs to the highly 
appreciated by both Economic Sociology and SSF notion of network, which is 
constantly in move between multiple contexts, either extending and proliferating or 
shrinking and disintegrating. 
At those whiling, tarrying moments, another kind of dance seems to take over: 
“The fouring, the unity of the four, presences … as the worlding of world. The 
mirror-play of world is the round dance of appropriating.” (Heidegger, 
2001:178) 
Heidegger talks about his fourfold (earth, sky, mortals and divinities) in the context of 
the thing. He chooses to speak about things, because in a technological epoch we are 
flashed by things (that's why SSF's talk about agencements is so timely). Given his bleak 
view about technology in that it turns everything (subjects and objects) into flexible 
resources, the difficult question he tasks himself with is, if it is possible for a 
technological device (i.e. the thing of the technological era) to gather the fourfold, that 
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is, if it is possible in technological agencements one's activity to receive a temporary, 
shining, even celebrating focus where everything gathers or fits together – in short, if 
the local technological gadgets (that turn everything into resources) can become things, 
that is, local gatherings that set up local worlds, allowing for a multiplicity of different 
(i.e. not mere technological) ways of being to emerge (Heidegger, 2001:141-184, 
Dreyfus (1995), Dreyfus & Spinosa (1997)). A thing obviously does not create a world, 
just as a world does not create a thing – there is, instead, 
“a relation of reciprocity [or mirror-play] between thing and world, such that 
the thing allows the world to reveal itself in the interconnections [i.e. 
overflowings] of things, just as the world also enables the thing itself to be 
revealed through the way it stands [i.e. “whiles”] within that set of 
interconnections.” (Malpas 2008:246). 
Now, the financial universe is exactly that space where excessive technological 
gadgetry constantly multiplies, and where Heidegger's fourfold can be stress-tested. 
Such financial universe, caught up in an endless loop of innovative technical 
overflowings, full of tales of hubris and wretched excesses (which do not comprise but 
further kinds of overflowings), might be accurately described and decoded by both 
SSF's overflowings and Economic Sociology's networks, yet not intensely enough from 
a Heideggerian point of view, which asks: can this financial universe be a world41? Can 
                                                          
41 Why such an obstinate emphasis by Heidegger in the “world”? In the Spiegel interview, he 
proclaims: “…according to our human experience and history, everything essential and of great 
magnitude has arisen only out of the fact that man had a home and was rooted in a tradition.” 
(Heidegger, 1966:57). Such acknowledgement is offered by Heidegger against the interviewer's 
comment that “[i]t is thinkable that man has absolutely no determination at all. After all, one might 
see it to be one of man's possibilities that he reaches out from this earth to other planets…where is it 
written that he has his place here?” This is exactly the problem posed by technology: for the first time 
in history, it creates the conditions for men to live in a fully artificial environment, without having to 
walk on the earth (thus, flattening localities) or dwell below the sky (thus, flattening time), as if, in 
other words, without the previous background of a world that includes a home and tradition. To 
account for that, we don't need to go as far as live in a space station in Moon or Mars: the financial 
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this frantic, dispersive, mobile and fluid computational business gather the fourfold, and 
thus meet its limit (i.e. delimit itself and thus open the possibility of gathering itself) not 
by the ways of other non-computational social spaces, but precisely by itself? 
Our claim, even against Heidegger himself42, is that such impossibility is indeed 
possible and in fact engraved in the most conspicuous (and thus, equally inconspicuous) 
of our financial practices: in the way we name our markets. The bullish and bearish 
aspect of our being-in-the-markets gathers the constant provided set of opportunities to 
qualculate, that is, detach, manipulate, rank and display so as to conclude a well-
grounded position that will eventually interconnect and overflow, in a thankful, non-
qualculative attunedness of the simple waxing and waning of our temporal being-there. 
Such gathering leads to a ritualized transubstantiation of the brute factuality of the 
incessantly qualculated market prices into meaningful wholes, made possible by a more 
sensitive and fragile attentiveness to the plain temporal presence that is without why, to 
the (nonqualculative) awareness of its (qualculative) awareness. 
When SSF's pioneer Daniel Beunza recognized that bubbles are the central challenge 
of our financial times, he embarked in a legitimate quest to devise strategies that would 
allow actors to deal with them (Beunza, 2010). He acknowledged that since the field of 
                                                          
environment is already such a technologically constructed space. Thus, the question Heidegger poses 
is, if and how such teletechnological (Clough 2000:3) gadgetry of the contemporary electronic 
markets, if and how the constant electronic trading that flattens out places (London, New York, Tokyo) 
and time (day and night) can, nevertheless, gather up a world, a home and tradition. That's why he 
offers us the possibility of the fourfold which, in the face of the technological devastation of our 
inherited, large-scale worlds, may turn gadgetry into “things” that gather up instead local worlds 
(fields of other than technological ways of being), and thus may make possible a free (not a 
compulsory) relation to technology, that is, a way of living in such teletechnological spaces that can be 
equally “essential and of great magnitude” as has always already arisen out of human experience and 
history. 
42 Against that Heidegger who sees a devolution of the Greek's aletheia as unconcealment, to the 
Romanized and christened veritas, to the modernized certitudo and ultimately to the technological 
enframing. This Heidegger considers finance as a calculative business which is not but the end result 
of a series of gradual erasures that have led to the extremity of the oblivion of Being – for a succinct 
description of such a Heidegger versus a reconstructed/”demythologized” one, see Caputo (1993).  
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Economic Sociology and SSF has been studying markets for a few years now, “maybe 
we already know a thing or two that could be ‘translated’ in investment strategies.” 
Thus, “a conversation about the move from Economic Sociology to dollars is going to 
be inevitable.” (Beunza, 2009, italics added) Such “inevitable” move (of the 
sociologists of finance into finance by e.g. initiating a performativity hedge fund) seems 
like an overflowing dispersion in a new and different concatenation where the 
possibilities of market recontextualization are themselves indefinite. This is a 
celebrative moment for SSF, in that it keeps the flux in play and constructs an even 
denser socio-economic reality by mixing and assembling together what was previously 
considered purebred and segregated: the academic theory is dragged downstairs into the 
agora, the agora upstairs into the theory's abstractions. 
For Heidegger's taste, however insightful and intriguing such developments might look, 
SSF's hard won expertise simply becomes in this way part of the contemporary 
imperative for the contribution of sociological, anthropological and organizational 
reasoned proposals, that is, part of the late-modern imperative to broaden and further 
refine the framework of calculations that could authorize “decisions which are more 
and more calculated or … more and more rational” (Callon, 1998:24) in order to 
streamline economic activity and stave off bubbles – in short, SSF becomes part of a 
global fixing-the-economy imperative43 which simply feels like the right thing to do. 
Thus, Heidegger would not object to the “inevitability” of such developments. He 
would however, tarry in the face of it. Indeed, it is inevitable within a technological 
understanding that mingles, links, accelerates and surprises. But he would object, 
inevitability can only occur on the basis of something that is not inevitable; of 
                                                          




something that is simply bestowed. Thus, Heidegger is able to think not just for the 
(technologically stimulating) play between contexts that reconfigure and refine, but for 
the play of the play: that play we did not initiate, yet a “play in which [our] essence is 
at stake.” (Heidegger, 1991:113). A play that plays without why, the mysterious 
withdrawing and sheltering of the different styles that are granted, linger for a while, to 
go in the margins again. The simple, plain waxing and waning – which, as the very 
existence of the financial markets show us, is economical. The “economic” is not simply 
the non-wasteful, non-excessive, effective rule/law (nomos: law/rule) governed 
management of our house (oikos: house), that is, of our markets. More profoundly, it's 
the other way around: markets are, so long as they remain economical; that is, so long 
as they remain tolerant, charitable and excessive44 in letting-be populated by the 
manifold unfoldings of the meanings of Being, of the multiple sendings of Being which 
simply wax and wane without persisting in their presence, without refusing to give their 
way, without absolutizing but charitably moderating (i.e. economizing) themselves, 
without unwillingly but generously accepting their transient authority as a partial 
sending of that which gives itself (“es gibt”). In such economic mindfulness, the 
technological way of being delimits itself and lessens its grip in favor of a possibility 
that we can become attuned to financial things, and them to us, in an other than a 
technological way. In such a simultaneous attunement, meaningful wholes come about 
in which humans and things do not merely overflow each other in financial 
agencements, but also become intimate, that is singular, spoken of in tenderness and 
                                                          
44 This is the “Divine Economy” of the Eastern Orthodox Church: the unlimited/excessive distribution 
of alms or charity or dispensation, which thus calls for tolerance and (for)givenness (Runciman, 
1997:5,32). That's why the supreme paradigm of the “excessiveness” of the Divine Economy is the 




maintained with care (Introna, 2009:41), thus allowing for destinies no mere 
technological, no mere market-like. 
Our reconstructed Heideggerian claim in the face of SSF assertions has been that such 
gracious openness in such a profound play (beyond the play of agencements) has been 




3. Folding the Actuarial: The Aporetic Financialization of Risk Liabilities  
3.1. Introduction 
Financialization entails, in a broad sense, the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the 
economy (Epstein, 2005:3). In that respect, it has come to blur the lines between 
insurance companies and banking and investment firms (Chiapello & Walter, 
2016:171). This has not always been the case. Insurance until some decades ago, was 
not classified within the financial sector but within industry, and it is only in the System 
of National Accounts of 1993 that insurance companies were put in the new major 
sector of financial corporations (Thimann, 2017:12). A peculiar sense that the insurance 
sector deserves an exceptional position relative to banking and investment activities is 
reserved even today, 25 years after the reclassification. Indeed, Turnbull suggests – in 
recapitulating the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 – that insurance institutions that 
relied on actuarial advice (and not on financial economics advice) were not in the front 
line of the crisis and they generally weathered its immediate impact successfully – with 
the notable exception of AIG “with its notorious financial products division that was far 
removed from conventional insurance business.” (Turnbull, 2017:319). If we generally 
agree that the global financial crisis, despite the financial system's increased 
interconnectedness, primarily affected other than insurance institutions (such as 
banks45), then we implicitly accept that there is something in the “conventional” 
insurance business and the actuarial logic that serves it, which intrinsically distinguishes 
it from the rest of the financial sector and the financial economics logic that 
accommodates it. After all, AIG's “conventional insurance business” should not be 
confused with the financial havoc released by its financial products division.  
                                                          
45 See for example the Turner Review (2009). 
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If it were indeed the case that actuarial advice naturally displays an orthogonal relation 
with the unpredictable swings of the financial markets, then it would be reasonable to 
expect to see actuarial practices to migrate and inform financial economic practices. 
However, what we see is exactly the opposite: financial economic practices explicitly 
invading actuaries and insurers' territories. Indeed, under Solvency II (S2), the new EU 
insurance regulatory framework that came into effect on January 1st, 2016, it is 
explicitly demanded to mark-to-market both insurer's assets and liabilities. As noted by 
Thimann, “[i]t is ironic that banks only have to mark-to-market their limited trading 
book, whereas insurers have to mark-to-market their full balance sheet even though 
insurance contracts are generally not tradable.” (Thimann, 2017:12). 
The valuation of insurance liabilities, that is, the amount (reserve) insurers need to set 
aside today so as to cover past and future claims, has been traditionally dealt by actuaries 
in a delicate way. Insurance liabilities have always been considered complex and 
technical since differences in marketing and underwriting practices result in a sea of 
subtle particularities that prevent wide homogenizations. This is why they have been 
characterized as “a countryside to explore on foot and not by fast cars.” (Kennedy et al., 
1976:46). This is also why trading of insurance contracts – that would provide a market 
value – is generally not seen as possible. Such natural distaste against standardized 
market valuation has given ample space to actuarial practices that tended to estimate 
reserves in close relation to their underlying subtleties and over their full lifetime – what 
is usually called “run-off”. However, such run-off approaches are orthogonal to modern 
financial economics’ conceptualizations that simply ask for the replication of the 
liability cashflows through a current portfolio of assets as closely as possible (Hibbert 
& Turnbull, 2003:726).  
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The first is an attempt to establish an actuarial value, the latter, an economic value46. 
Both are practices of worth attribution (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). The first derives 
worth by looking more closely to the subtleties of the underlying liability, forming 
probabilistic cashflow projections of their future, ultimate development, in a kind of a 
fundamental (Chiapello & Walter, 2016) and on-going concern for the long-term view 
(Day, 2014). The second has a taste for short-term, snapshot-type cashflow models that 
are silent (and thus symmetrical) about long-term developments, by requiring future 
values to be anchored in current values (implying no arbitrage opportunities) and 
disallowing subjective manipulations that may further particular stakeholders' interests 
at the expense of others47 (Day, 2014).  Actuarial valuation is thus a technically complex 
and opaque, subjective endeavor that puts human discretion and expertise at the center 
in order to account for the future – i.e., for how liabilities will ultimately develop; 
whereas economic valuation is an objective, transparent process that puts financial 
markets at the center in order to account for the present – i.e., for the liabilities’ current 
worth. 
The shift towards market-consistent (economic) valuations is widely perceived as 
requiring the technically obscured actuarial valuation expertise to be reduced to the 
mere mechanical plugging in of the market's latest bond prices (Turnbull, 2017:268). 
However, how can this become possible given the technical minutiae of every liability 
portfolio that resists being valued in a financial derivative form that is indifferent to its 
own underlying contingent biography (Amoore, 2013:61)? When insurance liabilities 
                                                          
46 Economic value tries to answer the question: what is the asset or liability worth? In contrast, 
traditional accounting historical cost tries to answer the question: what is asset or liability cost? 
(Penman, 2007). 
47 Think for example, of agency costs: a weak valuation of the liabilities may be desired by 
management in order to disguise operating results and thus maximize their bonuses at the expense of 
shareholders (Day, 2014:96-7). 
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seek to own their singular trajectories in time, when they display their own timing, 
which seems asynchronous with short term market-timing? Nonetheless, it could be 
argued that financial markets are specialized in exactly this: how to derivate a price 
(Preda, 2007), often in the absence of any standardizable, or even any underlying entity 
to price (Aspers, 2009). After all, the basic tenet of marketization is that risk can be 
managed and transferred via market mechanisms (Çalışkan and Callon, 2009) – 
whatever the case at hand.  
Traditional actuarial practices are closer to what Jarzabkowski (2017) describes as the 
blending of technicalizing and contextualizing understandings. Actuarial valuation – 
which allows risks to be priced and managed in order to enter circulation via tradable 
premiums between insurers and consumers and reinsurers – are generated at the nexus 
of these two practical understandings (Jarzabkowski, 2017:84). Technicalizing refers to 
the use of actuarial probabilistic models, which after being loaded with the relevant 
empirical data, have the ability, via appropriate actuarial reconstructions of past events, 
to generate technical rates – essentially expressing a large quantity of empirical data 
into multiple, technically abstracted sets of single modeled outputs. Such technical 
outputs, however, do not comprise the endpoint of the valuation process. On the 
contrary, they serve as anchors that provide structure for the valuation process and a 
point of departure for “qualitative overlays” (Svetlova, 2012:430). The latter are based 
on actuarial and management expertise relative to the particular contextual features of 
the underlying liabilities and to the well-known limitations of the models. Such effective 
contextualizing practices compare and amend the generated set of technical values to 
arrive at a final valuation figure (usually called “selected”) that is considered relevant 
and appropriate. In that way, actuarial valuations remain meaningful (contextualizing), 
even as significant statistical, actuarial abstractions are achieved (technicalizing). 
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Such an approach differs from existing research into the role of models in calculation 
and the performativity of markets (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003, MacKenzie, 2003, 2006; 
Millo & MacKenzie, 2009; Muniesa et al., 2007). Performativity theory, in its strong 
form, implies that the model unambiguously shapes or conditions how, for example, 
option traders make decisions and behave – a hard structure from which everyone 
obtains similar results (Svetlova, 2012:419). Thus, the model functions as a more or less 
significant structurational modality, iteratively – that is, its technicalizing force is most 
dominant. Such a dominant technicalizing aspect is clearly mitigated in the insurance 
sector as long as contextualizing practices are allowed for, which introduce variation in 
the actuarial valuation process and thus feed in counter-performativity. Such variation 
should, however, not be seen as a defect. Indeed, the point of technicalizing practices 
cannot be to become free of presuppositions, but rather to find the right ones (Caputo, 
1999:38) – ones that support an appropriate actuarial value. For Jarzabkowski, this is 
the job of contextualizing. 
However, this is a job increasingly at risk due to the financialization/marketization of 
risks. The financialization pressures for market-consistent valuation of liabilities tilts 
the balance towards the technicalizing aspects of the process. That is, what becomes 
relevant is not anymore, the underlying elements of the liability and how they are going 
to play out in the future within the concrete insurantial, technological and societal 
contexts, but rather the obtainable and transparent market assessments that presumably 
incorporate all current available information – as if markets have always already done 
all the necessary contextualizing work. In market-consistent valuation, models are no 
longer oriented towards the liability itself – rather, they are calibrated to the market. 
The absence of market transactions (as with insurance liabilities) does not pose a 
problem because in such a case – where the direct use of quoted market prices is not 
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available – a model should be employed that extracts an “implied” fair value by 
reconstructing a hypothetical transaction, given current market generally available 
data48. If meaningful valuations are generated at the nexus of technicalizing and 
contextualizing, then Jarzabkowski is right to ask worryingly what might happen if 
contextualizing becomes a skill of the past (Jarzabkowski, 2017:180). The demand for 
market-consistent valuation seems to strain traditional actuarial modalities which 
tended to temper models’ technicalizing tendencies by requiring contextualizing expert 
knowledge, potentially increasing the performativity aspect of the valuation models. 
However, by taking a closer look in the way the financialization of insurance liabilities 
is materialized, our approach departs from Jarzabkowski's blended two-stream schema. 
We need to acknowledge that the point cannot be to contrast between the fertilizing 
plow of a valuation that is drawn by technicalizing and contextualizing yoked together, 
versus an evaluative junkyard yoked beneath the iron collar of abstract technicalizations 
(Brassier, 2007:201). Instead, by zooming-in in what is considered an invasion of short-
termism into long-termism, market prices into actuarial values, an aporia emerges that 
dictates how the further technicalizing is accentuated, the further it requires 
contextualizing – that is, the further we stretch to attain a purely market short-term view, 
the further we find ourselves entangling with long-term actuarial views. Our thesis is 
thus closer to that of Muniesa (2007) who, in his analysis of the automation of the 
closing auction of Paris Bourse, uses a culinary metaphor to describe how automation 
can retain a social component: according to him, just as cocoa powder has to be carefully 
“folded” into fresh cream to preserve the qualities of the cream, the social aspects of a 
                                                          
48 See Directive 2009/138/EC, article 76.  
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live trading floor need to be understood and then adapted into algorithms to preserve 
the social component of a market (Pardo-Guerra et al., 2010).  
We would suggest that the financialization of insurance liabilities does not uncritically 
expand financial economics conceptions at the expense of actuarial logics. Instead, it 
becomes possible so long as the actuarial aspects are recognized and then adapted into 
market-consistent valuations to preserve the actuarial component of the insurance 
business. However, our claim goes beyond the mere presentation of a mild version of 
Muniesa's folding thesis.  We wish to defend a more radicalized version, one that does 
not contentedly see the preservation of the (nearly extinct) actuarial within the financial 
for the sake of a more comprehensive, balanced and maybe higher dialectic position – 
one which resolves oppositions and restores equilibrium. Rather, we would propose a 
view that recognizes the necessary and fundamental disruption of the financial by the 
actuarial, the short-term by the long-term, the technicalizing by the contextualizing and 
vice versa. We wish to demonstrate how the financialization project of insurance 
liabilities, by precisely attempting to construct itself, deconstructs itself (Derrida, 2001) 
into an actuarial project, which in its turn is itself disrupted in a recurring play that can 
never be arrested precisely because of the constant efforts to arrest it. Our suggestion 
is theoretically supported and anticipated from a Derridean perspective which detects 
within our practices, including the modeling valuation practices, an “autoimmunity” 
process. This process turns something, e.g., the financial sovereignty of the valuation, 
against its own defenses – it is a process inevitably at work at the heart of every 
sovereign identity. Such autoimmunity tension that inheres in the midst of the 
financialization project, simultaneously constituting and de-constituting the financial 
sovereign and thus the modeling valuation practices themselves, has been under-studied 
in the current performativity literature. For example, whereas Jarzabkowski (2017) 
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worries about the potentially destructive power of the technicalizing sovereignty of the 
models in the financialization process, Muniesa (2007)’s aforementioned folding 
position implies a mild preservation process for that component (in our case, the 
actuarial component) which is in danger of extinction – a mildness that is far from the 
“aporetic” strain and restlessness which accompany Derrida’s autoimmunity concept. 
MacKenzie (2006), on the other hand, takes an empirical stance and simply sees models 
as subtle sovereignties that may empirically perform or counter-perform the markets, 
without any further theorizing ado about the constitutive elements of the phenomenon. 
And Svetlova (2012) who, although rightly so, sees models as departure points from 
their technical sovereignty, her perspective seems to trail a practical instillation “from 
the outside” of a fresher and more invigorating qualitative layer into the technical 
surface of the model – she does not entertain the possibility that the sovereignty of the 
technical itself solicits its qualitative deconstruction precisely “from the inside”. In that 
respect, the paper aims to extend this part of the performativity literature towards the 
recognition that an autoimmunity process is at work within the modeling valuation 
practices of insurance liabilities, which simultaneously constitutes and de-constitutes 
the financial and actuarial aspirations of the valuation process. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we take a close look 
of the reserve valuation practices before and after the requirements of market-consistent 
valuation under the S2 regime. In section three, we discuss how the market-consistent 
requirement alters the playing field for insurers and actuaries. We attempt to show the 
different logics involved between the actuarial and financial economics valuations, and 
the steering levers each one uses. In section four, we present how the financialization 
project of the market-consistent valuation in order to sustain itself, disrupts itself by 
folding in orthogonal to mark-to-market actuarial practices. In the final section, we 
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conclude by defending a Derridean approach of an autoimmunity process that is 
inscribed within models, before issues of technicalizing vs contextualizing, or 
performativity vs counter-performativity arise. 
3.2. Actuarial and Fair Values  
There is a broad consensus about the advantages of market-consistent valuation – for 
example, transparency, a general alignment with internal risk management, the ability 
to capture the impact both of embedded options and guarantees and of asset/liability 
mismatches (Focarelli, 2017:351). This is because efficiency of the capital markets 
acknowledges that prices are the result of the market's correct assessment of all available 
information (Zyla, 2012:5). To fair value then is to bring financial reporting of financial 
instruments closer to market values, resulting in risk valuations that are transparent and 
closer to the underlying economic reality (Towers Perrin, 2004:7). 
How does one establish fair value when there is no market available? This is the case 
with insurance risk liabilities, since historically no secondary market for insurance 
liabilities has ever emerged. This is because portfolios of insurance contracts have never 
been homogeneous – even within a given product line they differ because of differences 
in company marketing practices, underwriting policies, policy forms, coverage terms, 
and claim handling strategies. On top of that, potential purchasers of insurance liabilities 
do not have access to an insurer’s private information and thus may have legitimate 
concerns regarding anti-selection, expecting that the insurer would only attempt to lay 
off its most problematic claims (Towers Perrin, 2004:19). Such real-world asymmetries 
have been proved sufficient, historically, to prevent the formation of a market for 
insurance risk liabilities. 
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In the past, the problem of evaluating insurance liabilities in the face of their 
heterogeneity was dealt in multiple ways. In non-life insurance49 for example, reserving 
and pricing was determined on a case-by-case basis by specialized underwriters using 
their expert judgment and individual experience (Turnbull, 2017:276). Gradually 
however, reserving by case-by-case estimation was viewed as inherently subjective, 
unstable and inadequate, especially for that problematic category of claims that had 
already been incurred but not yet reported to the insurer (Turnbull, 2017:296). 
Accordingly, valuation should involve some form of statistical method, some kind of 
calculative manipulation that could result in an estimate even for that part of claims that 
were absent from the currently reported claim cases. Such knowledge gap was naturally 
filled by the actuarial profession, which, after a series of technical explorations, adopted 
a standardized set of calculative methods that provided an ubiquitous technical basis to 
adequately valuate unpaid claims. Such standardization was based on the organization 
of the insurer's empirical past claims data in a particular technical way so as to build 
what is called a “run-off” or “development” triangle, which helps to identify and 
analyze statistically, patterns of development of unpaid claims that are present in 
historical experience. Such patterns, in their turn, are used for future projections of 
current unpaid claims.  
This step is not usually seen as a step towards financialization, since at that time50 
financial markets still played a minor role. However, it was an essential development in 
the spread of financial calculation since it managed to translate a plethora of case-by-
                                                          
49 We mainly focus on the non-life business of the insurance sector (which includes for example, 
automobile and homeowners policies), because in general, it is considered the more orthogonal to the 
financial markets (i.e. there is usually no relation between a low or high interest rate financial 
environment and a car accident). The point is to examine how such orthogonality eventually becomes 
aligned with a market-consistent requirement.   
50 End of '70s, beginning of '80s (Turnbull, 2017:275-309). 
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case data into “sides” of an aggregate triangle out of which patterns of historical claims 
development could be identified, statistically analyzed and appropriately projected, 
beyond the original individual claim data details. In other words, it managed to 
standardize and (at least in theory) narrow down possible calculative outcomes, 
significantly diminishing variation or convincingly explaining variation of results51, 
stabilizing and thus enabling an actuarial epistemic culture (Knorr Cetina, 1999) of the 
valuation of non-life insurance liabilities.  
However, the power of triangle aggregation comes along with a significant loss of 
information of the original individual claim data details. Actuaries are not blind to the 
shortcomings of the triangle models and the uncertainty about the ability of these 
models to properly capture the pattern of claim development (Boumezoued et al., 
2017:1). Thus, the actuarial valuation of insurance liabilities was never a mere technical 
issue. Indeed, the actuary blended its technicalizing professional expertise with 
contextualizing activities (Jarzabkowski, 2017) in order not only to overcome the 
models' limitations but also to better calibrate valuations with the particular business 
practices of the insurer, the current and expected phases of the market risk-cycle etc. 
The main goal of such actuarial practices was to come up with adequate reserves – that 
is, to secure today, with a high level of confidence, that level of funding that would meet 
the uncertain liabilities of unpaid claims as they evolve in the future (Tunbull, 
2017:221). Against such background understanding, actuaries did not hesitate to 
overcome technical specificities and inject significant margins of prudence within their 
valuations by imposing ad-hoc qualitative amendments on the technical results. Such 
                                                          
51 Variation of results is usually attributed to different methods of organizing and projecting data in 
the development triangle. Different methods represent different preferences – such differences allow 
“the technology” of the development triangle and its associated methods to be flexible and adaptable 
in a plethora of different business contexts.   
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prudence margins were (and still are) a substantial steering (and competitive) tool in the 
hands of the management, as long as they can be accurately budgeted via actuarial 
techniques and thus piled or released throughout the peaks and valleys of the market 
risk-cycle52, in effect operating as a stabilizing factor against the swings of the economic 
environment, the actual claims experience and the wider market competition.    
Given that a large percentage of non-life insurance insolvencies over the past few 
decades have been heavily correlated with the understatement of technical provisions 
(Courchene et. al., 2008), it became clear that the way “adequacy” of reserves is 
obtained via the technology of the triangle was not subjective-free and thus opaque, 
since it depended on the actuary's overall attitude. Indeed, the earlier “appointed 
actuary” approach (which put regulatory obligations on a suitably qualified individual) 
placed the actuary in a stressful position since it required her to balance management 
pressures regarding manipulation of reserves according to the business needs and 
market cycle, policyholders' “reasonable expectations” about current and future 
benefits, and regulatory authorities' obligations. In such a context, adequacy of reserves 
indeed looked like a “heroic” act (Collins et al., 2009). Regulatory authorities were not 
blind to such inherent tensions (Morris Report, 2005). If we couple this with the failure 
of the actuarial profession to recognize and account for the financial market risk 
exposures that their life businesses were underwriting in an ever-increasing scale 
(Tunbull, 2017:194), then the significant criticism long-established actuarial practices 
received from financial economics practitioners does not seem overstated. In the 
                                                          
52 The market risk-cycle shifts between hard and soft market on the basis of the cost of capital 
available in the market (Jarzabkowski, 2017:205). Adverse claims experience (including catastrophic 
events), a litigious legal environment and/or a poor economy can set the stage for a hard insurance 
market (i.e. with increased premiums required from consumers). The reverse is true for soft periods. 
An insurer who enters a hard market with high prudence margins in his reserves, has the ability to 
remain relatively soft by releasing such margins, mitigating thus the impact in his lapse ratio and even 
attracting new business.  
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absence of market consistency, actuarial valuations end up being inward-looking and 
thus, either inadequate (that may lead to insolvency) or overly prudent (that may allow 
for management manipulations to override the market risk-cycle).    
As of January 1st, 2016, a new supervisory framework for insurance companies called 
Solvency II (S2), has become applicable. It claims to provide a more accurate reserving 
approach by requiring liabilities to be calculated on a market-consistent basis. As 
already mentioned, such requirement, directly imported from financial economics, has 
the advantage to disallow subjective prudent or aggressive manipulations, and to direct 
instead attention towards current values, which in their turn encourage an everyday – 
i.e., with a short-term view – risk management approach.  Market-consistent valuation 
requires that “liabilities shall be valued at the amount for which they could be 
transferred, or settled, between knowledgeable willing parties in an arm’s length 
transaction.”53 To achieve that in the absence of a developed secondary insurance 
liabilities' market, S2 requires the reconstruction of a hypothetical fair market 
transaction via a valuation model that breaks up in two explicit pieces: a best estimate 
and a risk margin. 
Continuing our non-life example: the best estimate in its most general sense is 
calculated from practices already established and widely followed by actuaries (such as 
the use of triangle-based techniques), which as already described, after being adjusted 
by the application of judgment based on sound reasoning and business logic, can 
provide a reasonable estimate (Courchene et. al., 2008) – however, with a critical 
departure.  It is now a “best estimate”, that is, an expected or mean value (probability 
weighted average) of the present value of future cashflows.54 Thus, any implicit margins 
                                                          
53 Directive 2009/138/EC, article 75. 
54 See CEA-Groupe Consultatif, Solvency II Glossary, March 2007. 
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of prudence that previously targeted adequate reasonableness, should now be removed. 
In that respect, although ‘best estimate’ approaches may build on existing actuarial 
technicalizing and contextualizing practices, they simultaneously include a shift from a 
more contextual-tilted “adequate estimate” to a more technical-tilted “expected or mean 
value”.  
What about risk margin? In simple terms, it is the amount you would need to pay another 
insurer to “allure” him to purchase your liabilities. It is easy for the risk margin to be 
misinterpreted, especially given its name.  Nevertheless, it should be stressed that it is 
not a prudent margin on the reserves. That is, it is not there to compensate for the 
probable inadequacy of the best estimate amount, especially as the latter no longer 
targets adequacy but only expected or mean values. Risk margin is simply intended to 
represent the amount to be transferred to a third party, so that it covers the expected cost 
of future regulatory capital on the business transferred (IFA, 2013:72).  There are many 
possible approaches in circulation for risk margin calculation, with diverse quantitative 
and qualitative results for different insurance products. This does not imply that 
anything goes. All approaches are in fact anchored in concepts of market efficiency and 
rationality – which in turn denotes that, with respect to insurance liabilities, there can 
be different responses to what a rational market participant, in a transfer market, would 
require at the time that the measurement is to be made (IAA, 2009:66). This effectively 
means that economic rationality is both more fragile and more diverse than usually 
acknowledged. It is not like Newton's laws that are supposed to be at work everywhere 
in the universe but is instead a more fragile property that must be carefully preserved 
by creating a hospitable environment (Guala, 2007:147). 
The shift from what is conceived as subjective sphere to a calibration with what is 
supposedly implied transparently in the Great Outside of the markets, does not come 
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naturally or unambiguously, as guided by a steady, yet invisible hand of the markets. 
There is nothing “obvious” in putting a fair value to insurance liabilities. Although the 
details for the calculation methods of the risk margin are beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is sufficient for our purposes to note how the construction of S2's provisions on risk 
margin calculation has not at all been obvious, easy or straightforward.  Indeed, not 
even fully aligned with suggestions provided by the insurance industry (for example, 
by Insurance Europe which represents insurers that account for around 95% of total 
European premium income, and by the CRO Forum, consisted of Chief Risk Officers 
from large multinational insurance companies55). In effect, imaginaries had to be 
produced,56 assumptions and simplifications had to be engineered and re-engineered, 
which carried over their own allure and impact57, in order to form those entanglements 
and alliances that could properly envelope long established and current best practices. 
To make possible the conclusion of the risk margin calculation (and thus the fair valuing 
of insurance liabilities), S2 had to simultaneously construct a hospitable environment 
and make its way through a diversity of approaches in order to conclude the calculations 
that make possible, in a peculiar performative circularity, its own rhetoric about market-
consistent valuation58.  
                                                          
55 See CEIOPS-DOC-36/09 (p.21) for a table that summarizes some of their differences in view. 
56 See for example CEIOPS-DOC-36/09 and especially all this talk about the reference undertaking: 
should it be a mirror of the original undertaking? An empty, non-empty or another undertaking? Each 
one of them (or a combination thereof) rests on a different imaginary of what consists the best way to 
determine “the cost of providing an amount of eligible own funds equal to the Solvency Capital 
requirement necessary to support the insurance […] obligations (Directive 2009/138/EC, article 
77(5))”. 
57 For example, in order to avoid a circular definition of the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) “it is 
assumed that the risk connected to the assets that cover the SCR is zero. This simplifying assumption 
leads to an understatement of the risk margin, but it is useful for practicability reasons.” (CEIOPS-DOC-
36/09, 2009:17). 
58 For a list of twelve assumptions that makes possible the calculation of risk margin, see article 38 of 
EU Regulation 2015/35. 
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Indeed, we should not be surprised. Existing literature in the field of asset fair valuing 
has already pointed out how such values were never in fact “real” market values, but 
only estimates of market prices that would, or could be obtained by a reference entity, 
a fictional, ideal marketplace participant. They thus constitute “as if” or fictional 
constructs which depend on critical assumptions (Power, 2010:201). By aligning itself 
with the imperative of fair value that was supposedly envisaged to anchor value 
judgments into the objective and transparent bits of market reality, S2 had to construct 
a hospitable frictionless and fictitious space within which uncertainties could be 
rarefied, and therefore risks and references could be set and defined. Paradoxically thus, 
the (in principle) objective, market-based, outward-looking and transparent project of 
market-consistent valuation of insurance liabilities – that supposedly demarcates it from 
conventional actuarial valuations – could never get off the ground, unless precisely 
enabled by its “other”: a fictional, constructed, inward-looking and full of ambiguous 
assumptions, ideality. 
Having broadly sketched the actuarial and the market-consistent valuation paradigms, 
we now move on in the next section to examine the accompanying shift in the logic and 
the sensitivities that each one implies.   
3.3. Reserve and Capital Levers 
In the traditional framework, an actuary is oriented towards predicting ultimate future 
benefits (i.e. take a long-term view). In order to understand how well an actuary does 
her job, all someone had to do is wait and see how close her predictions of 
future/ultimate benefits “really” were. That is, patiently monitor how experience 
‘releases’ itself with the passage of time and compare its emergent ‘actual’ pattern with 
the actuary's predicted or ‘expected’ one. However, in asking to place a fair value on an 
insurance liability, the actuary is now asked to do something fundamentally different. 
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She is asked to predict not the cost of future benefits but a price at which a hypothetical 
(fair) transaction would “now” (presently) take place. Once that prediction is made, 
there is no way to check upon the actuary – as with traditional actuarial work where all 
that was needed was patience for experience to unfold itself. Once the hypothetical 
transaction moment is past, any subsequent transaction would have a different inforce, 
different interest rate conditions, and more information for experience studies. That is, 
in a fair value world, an insurance actuary becomes like an investment banker, trying to 
predict the unknowable present instead of the unknown-at-present future which 
eventually becomes knowable in due time (Zimmerman, 2007:19). In a fair value world, 
comparison against experience as it unfolds itself, what is usually called actual-to-
expected, has no currency.  
In a pre-S2 world, validation techniques, such as actual-to-expected, were required to 
monitor and reveal deviations of the expectations from the actual unfolding experience, 
as long as the actuary's expectations were based on attempts to predict the future by 
uncovering past regularities via probability-based techniques. Comparison against 
experience was a technical exercise that enabled close calibration with the risks' 
underlying characteristics and actual development – one might say an ongoing process 
of adaptive learning. This can be seen as a ‘getaway’ from the shortcomings of the 
technicalizing and contextualizing actuarial practices, since it revealed, on the one hand, 
the models' technical limitations for predictions, and on the other, held the leash on 
unbridled actuarial judgment and discretion.  
In S2 however, actual-to-expected techniques do not carry any weight since, strictly 
speaking, there is no “actual” involved. To understand this, we need to think, for 
example, of the analogy with equities. When an insurer marks-to-market his equity 
holdings day by day, he simply records their market prices – he is not additionally asked 
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to perform an analysis on their underlying fundamentals (e.g. sales, EBITDA, patent 
applications etc.) that may explain their price changes. In fact, even if such analysis is 
robustly performed, price changes may be driven by other “endogenous”59 (Danielsson 
et al., 2002) market factors – such as a change in the trust climate. The same goes with 
a purely market-consistent insurance liability. The actual drivers of their market price 
are now blurred between the underlying features of the liability and wider “endogenous” 
market expectations, including expectations about how that particular insurer is faring 
relative to other peers and the market. Market expectations may thus over or understate 
an insurer's liability portfolio relative to the actuarial (underlying-related) values, since 
the point is not anymore what the internal actuarial function expects about the 
underlying liabilities within its ivory actuarial department, but what other market 
observers observe. Traditional actuarial valuations considered underlying liabilities 
features as the most relevant information: such features and the way they develop in the 
long term were considered as the “actual”, as that underlying “real” against which 
validation of the actuarial virtualities (projections and expectations) would be compared 
and assessed. In purely mark-to-market liabilities, though, such “real” is blurred, since 
the underlying features are conflated with the orientation and expectations of others. 
Such conflation cannot be delineated in the way the run-off underlying liability features 
can, via for example, “triangle” actuarial techniques. Instead, it is always already 
overflowing in that the information concerning the orientation and expectation of others 
is not contained in prices, but is constantly reproduced by the behaviour of operators 
                                                          
59 For Danielsson (2012, Danielsson et al., 2016), endogenous risk refers to the risk from shocks that 
are generated and amplified within the system. It stands in contrast to exogenous risk, which refers to 
shocks that arrive from outside the system. Financial markets are subject to both types of risk. 
However, the greatest damage is done from risk of the endogenous kind, since it is the risk created by 
the interaction between market participants and by their desire to bypass risk control systems. 
Page 118 
 
who are oriented to prices (Esposito, 2013:111)60. Thus, if we are to speak in terms of 
S2, the actual-to-expected becomes expected-to-expected, which denotes a process of 
expecting (observing) your expectations (observances).  Such a process raises 
performativity to its highest level – in the double sense that both the technicalizing 
aspects of the models are strengthened, and their operators/observers observe each 
other. 
Such a shift is expected to be intensified by the recent trend towards the issuance of 
insurance-linked securities, which can be seen as early steps towards the establishment 
of a market for insurance liabilities. Insurance-linked securities are complex financial 
securitizations of insurance risks that provide directly observable market prices of 
insurance liabilities – which eventually delink insurance liabilities from their underling 
run-off patterns. However, for the time being, their circulation falls short from 
determining a deep and liquid market. The practice of using market-consistent models 
rather than directly observable market prices, still remains prevalent61.   
However, this practice, even if it’s not pure mark-to-market, seems to change the very 
terms under which actuaries and other professionals used to understand the business. 
The new sensibilities seem to privilege the technicalizing aspects of the business in a 
way that conventional actuarial practices, with their effective contextualizing aspect, 
did not.  
A way to highlight this, is to understand what a best estimate represents: it’s a mean 
value.  For a symmetric liability distribution therefore, a best estimate implies that 50% 
                                                          
60 This process is further accentuated by the natural information asymmetry of the insurance business, 
which does not allow other insurers to have full access into the liability portfolio of another insurer, in 
order to come up with a more informed valuation. Such information asymmetry is at odds with the 
financial economics assumptions of transparent and frictionless markets.  
61 That does not mean the reinsurance industry has not already been impacted by the issuance of such 
securities. See for example Jarzabkowski (2017), pp.158-184.  
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of the times the estimate will prove itself adequate and 50% inadequate. In other words, 
in a market-consistent framework (and assuming a symmetric liability distribution) an 
insurer targets those levels of reserves that will prove sufficient only half the times. But 
then, how is the other half going to be covered? The answer is, through capital. That is, 
S2 requires a market-consistent valuation that targets a best estimate that has been 
stripped away of any prudential margin. Such a “lame” valuation is then supplemented 
by capital that seeks to provide a buffer in order to absorb any unexpected liabilities 
beyond the best estimate. Who funds best-estimates? The insured, by the premiums 
paid. Who funds risk-based capital? Shareholders, or the purchasers of the liabilities. 
Why should they commit their capital? For profit, of course. But where is the profit? It 
is booked within the risk margin which, as already discussed, does not represent but a 
reserved amount of the shareholders' future profits according to the current cost of 
capital (and which, as time passes, and the claims experience gets developed, gradually 
releases itself) (Chatzivassiloglou, 2017).  
What has happened here? Before S2, the major lever that determined an insurer's 
success or failure along the market risk-cycle was reserves and the prudence margins 
that accompanied them (or not). Capital was still there, but as it was calculated in a rigid 
rules-based way, it stayed more on the background as a typical regulatory obligation. It 
was the reserves, and the wise use of their periodical accumulation and de-accumulation 
(release), that allowed the insurer to survive the perils of the market risk-cycle. In fact, 
a good actuary was recognized by his contribution to the injection and consumption of 
the prudence margins in the face of the risk-cycle's uncertainties – in the business of 
taming uncertainty. 
In the current financialization era, such a schema is considered too opaque and inward-
looking. That's why it is significantly changed to reflect a new, closer to the capital 
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markets set of sensitivities. Reserves lose much of their prominence and become a 
simple number, extracted either by the market or by a technical actuarial exercise that 
makes maximum use of generally available market data – it cannot anymore be overlaid 
by qualitative judgments or contextual business needs. Reserves are there to cover 
anticipated risks, i.e. the mean of the distribution – nothing more, nothing less.  The 
rising star now becomes capital. Its purpose is to cover for the unexpected part of the 
liabilities. In other words, to provide a buffer to absorb extreme movements, what is 
usually referred to as the “tail” of the risk distribution.  In contrast to the anticipated 
losses, the unanticipated ones do not determine the cost, but the risk of the insurance 
entrepreneurship (Chatzivassiloglou, 2017:101). This is a risk assumed by the 
shareholders, who agree to commit their capital (i.e. detract it from other investment 
opportunities in the capital markets) in exchange for future profits which have been 
calculated according to the current cost of capital. Such profits are booked within the 
risk margin and are gradually released as claims experience develops itself. 
Capital in S2 is risk-based, that is, analogous to the risk assumed by the insurer. It is 
risk-sensitive, based on the simple idea that the riskier the assets and/or liabilities, the 
more capital needs to be committed. It is calculated by using a set of pre-specified, risk-
charges which is supposed to mirror in technical terms the inherent risk of the particular 
insurance liability – it is calculated, in other words, in a technical way, without the need 
for any contextualizing overlay. 
Such risk-sensitive capital becomes now the new lever for insurers to survive the market 
risk-cycle: in hard times, the insurer may pull it downward and derisk himself. In good 
times, he may push it upwards to assume greater levels of risks. Everything thus boils 
down in the new “capital” lever. How is it going to fare relative to the old, “reserve” 
level? Is Jarzabkowski right to claim that the new capital level is privileging the 
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technicalizing aspects of the business at the expense of the contextualizing ones? Or, 
differently stated, that it raises performativity and model risk to the highest? In addition, 
what does that mean for the future of insurance and the broader financial system? These 
are challenging questions. Our aim is to show, in the next section, why Jarzabkowski is 
right and simultaneously wrong. Moreover, to claim, in the concluding section, that the 
point is to go beyond the technicalizing and contextualizing dilemma – to think about it 
as a whole, “desperately hard though that kind of thinking may be.” (MacKenzie, 2011). 
3.4. (De)leveraging the Capital Lever  
We have already argued in the previous section how a ‘pure’ mark-to-market valuation 
of liabilities, based on directly quoted market prices – that could in principle be 
generated from a deep and liquid markets of insurance-linked securities – increases 
performativity, in the double sense of both strengthening the technicalizing aspects of 
the models, and through the operators/observers observing each other. Such a process 
tends to delink insurance liabilities from their underling “run-off” patterns – a linkage 
that is generally thought to be preserved by the conventional actuarial valuation 
practices. 
We will begin this section by claiming that performativity increases, even in the absence 
of directly quoted market prices – that is, even if a market calibrated valuation model is 
used that needs to calculate a best estimate and a risk margin. Indeed, as long as the best 
estimate is conceived as a mean value, the use of stochastic (instead of more 
conventional deterministic) models is implicitly encouraged, since they display a better 




Stochastic models for unpaid claims reserving emerged in the mid-90s with the seminal 
paper by Thomas Mack (1993) who proposed a stochastic model that grounded the 
triangle-based conventional technique. Deterministic models (based on run-off 
triangles, as described in the second section) have the disadvantage that they ignore 
random fluctuations likely to occur, since they end up with a single point estimation. 
Sensitivity analyses does not completely remedy such deficiency, since it is generally 
limited to a fixed number of defined scenarios. On the other hand, significant 
advancements in computing power have made possible the smooth (and inexpensive) 
integration of such computational intensive techniques. Thus, although stochastic 
models have not yet gained widespread use (IFA, 2013:10), they nevertheless are 
gaining wider acceptance and replacing more conventional deterministic methods (IAA, 
2010:xv). 
Stochastic models by their nature are more technical constructions than the conventional 
deterministic ones. Although they also make use of the run-off triangle architecture, 
their utilization is more hands-off and automatic, in a kind of a black-box way. They 
tend to reorient the valuation practice towards more technical abstractions, such as, how 
to diagnose if residuals prior to heteroscedasticity adjustments are independent and 
identically distributed. Such diagnosis requires significant technical expertise to be 
appreciated – a point that seems far removed from more mundane but urgent matters, 
such as the close monitoring of the developments in the tort system in the context of 
which the assumed risk liabilities are eventually going to be released – and insurers' 
profits and losses are ultimately going to be adjudicated. What is more, the use of 
thousands of scenarios tends to create a sense of precision – especially to those who 
lack the technical skills to challenge the embedded technicalities. By providing a full 
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distribution of results, the user tends to think that he has succeeded to make available, 
in one technical sweep, all future possibilities on the screen in front of him.  
For that reason, stochastic modeling is also considered a perfect candidate when 
analyzing extreme outcomes or “tail risks” (IAA, 2010:I-2). Extreme or tail risks is what 
we referred to above as the unanticipated part of the liabilities. That is, stochastic 
modeling does not just increasingly come to replace deterministic valuation of the 
anticipated part of the liabilities – i.e., the best estimate conceived as the mean of the 
distribution – but it also dominates the valuation of the unanticipated part – that is, the 
valuation of capital which as we showed, supplements best estimates in order to provide 
a more comprehensive coverage (of both anticipated and unanticipated losses). 
Stochastic production of the full probability distribution seems to open up a view into 
the tails of the distribution, that is, into a concrete calculation of the possible losses for 
future Black Mondays and Lehman Brothers.  
The stochastic examination of the unpaid claims development tends thus to become a 
more complex, computational intensive and thus technical examination of their 
underlying records in a “collusion of anonymity” (quoted in Castel, 1991). Stochastic 
models demand significant technical expertise for their operation to be appreciated and 
challenged. This is coupled with their power to present a comprehensive range of results 
(that stretches from the anticipated mean to the unanticipated tails). As such, they are 
turned into sophisticated black boxes that tend to impose their assessments without 
further ado – straining contextualizing, qualitative overlays. They tend thus to increase 
performativity, in that their technicalizing effects perform the valuation of both the best 
estimates and the risk-sensitive capital. 
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As already discussed, the financialization project of insurance liabilities market-
consistent valuation ends up substituting the traditional “reserve” lever by a “capital” 
one. The latter is heavily supported by stochastic technologies that privilege the 
technicalizing aspects at the expense of contextualizing. This can have destructive 
effects, since the capital lever may fall short not only to safely steer the insurer 
throughout the peaks and valleys of the market risk-cycle, but may also induce 
procyclical behavior that magnifies the fluctuations of the market cycle. It has been 
recognized in the wider financial literature, how risk-sensitive capital and mark-to-
market requirements can jointly prompt fire sales of distressed securities by the capital-
constrained financial institution (see for example, Ellul et al., 2011; Koijen and Yogo, 
2015; Merrill et al., 2014). That is, due to the capital lever's simple and binary logic 
(release gear and increase risk/capital or pull gear and decrease risk/capital), it tends to 
propose in stressed times an industry-wide similar response: decrease risk by fire-selling 
risky assets or by significantly shrinking the liability portfolio – i.e., disrupting in this 
way the flow of insurance coverage, exactly at that time when society mostly needs it. 
The whole “race to the bottom” process is exacerbated by the fact that the deeper we 
move towards the tails of the distribution – i.e., the deeper we move into the crisis – the 
more the risk-sensitive capital valuation model spit surprises, invalidating its pre-crisis 
forecasting performances. Technically speaking, the capital valuation model fails 
because it experiences a structural break in stochastic processes governing prices that is 
reinforced by endogenous changes in the behavior of market observers – who keep 
feeding in the change in the trust climate (Danielsson, 2011). In other words, capital 
models counter-perform exactly at that time they were initially designed to perform. 
This comes in stark opposition with the traditional view of insurers as stabilizers of the 
financial markets and the economy, which is often attributed to their business model. 
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For example, investment decisions in insurance are driven by the liability structure 
(Focarelli, 2017:346). The long-term nature of liabilities creates the need to match them 
with usually illiquid assets in a buy-and-hold strategy that is orthogonal to a mark-to-
market requirement that implies intention to sell (Mennicken & Power, 2015). The 
context of such a long-term strategy naturally mitigates pressures by the capital lever's 
uniform technical demands to fire-sell in order to derisk and reduce capital. What in the 
capital lever is read, technically, as a risk (an illiquid asset) is in practice immunized by 
a buy-and-hold strategy that takes into account the context of business – i.e., to deliver 
a long-term promise.  
To summarize: the dominance of the technicalizing aspects (at the expense of 
contextualizing) of the capital lever in the context of the financialization project, makes 
it to perform the market in normal times and to counter-perform it in non-normal – 
stressed – times. This may end up having disastrous procyclical results not only for the 
insurance sector, but for society as a whole.  
Is Jarzabkowski (2017) right then? Is it possible that the aggressive drive of the 
financialization enterprise for modeling, has ignored long established practices so 
uncritically – such as the accumulation of prudence margins in the reserves, and the 
asset-liability matching principle that insurance investments follow? We want to claim 
that this is not the case. We would suggest, in turn, that even in the financial economics 
paradigm, such actuarially driven practices are recognized, re-packaged and folded 
(Muniesa, 2007) into the newly engineered market-consistent envelope. 
First of all, let us consider the matter of reserves. As we explained above, reserving has 
been transformed into a technical exercise to estimate the mean value and does not allow 
for any prudential – or aggressive – margin. However, S2 requires the insurer to allow 
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for all possible outcomes in setting its reserves and not just the reasonably foreseeable, 
or some other subset. In other words, an additional amount needs to be included in the 
best estimate to ensure that the best estimate is a “true” best estimate (mean) of all 
possible outcomes, as opposed to something less, such as a best estimate of all 
reasonably foreseeable outcomes (IFA, 2013:45). Such an amount provides for the very 
low probability but very high severity events, that tend to be ignored since they are not 
contained in the data (often referred to as Events Not In Data – or ENID). There is a 
very large range of possible set of events that could fall into this category – from claims 
arising from nanotechnology, to a meteor strike, to a Florida tsunami, and more (IFA, 
2013:45, 47-8). The allowance of ENID is a new and obviously very subjective element 
of calculations (IFA, 2013:82). It disrupts the technical, market-consistent calculation 
of reserves, and requires a form of calibration with something that is beyond data and 
markets themselves. Such a calibration ends up with a loading that is very difficult to 
validate, to assess that is, in terms of its inadequacy or excessiveness. However, the use 
of the terms “adequacy” and “excessiveness” already belongs to the conventional 
actuarial paradigm. The allowance for ENID, thus, provides actuaries with one more 
lever, beyond the “capital” one. In normal times, the ENID lever allows for an injection 
of prudency; in non-normal, part of it might be withdrawn (since after all, the low 
probability and high severity event occurred). In other words, it allows for a counter-
cyclical management of prudence that may better match the insurer's business and 
market cycle contextual reality. This of course means that it allows for the possibility 
of the capital valuation model to counter-perform in normal times (since more capital 
is required due to the ENID's loadings) and to perform in non-normal – contrary to the 
initial technical tendencies of the capital lever. 
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Secondly, let us consider the issue of investments. The S2 did not stay blind to the long-
term nature of the insurance business that drives investment decisions. To ensure that a 
market-consistent valuation of assets would not result in an artificial volatility and 
procyclicality – with unintended adverse economic and social impacts – a so-called 
Long Term Guarantees Package (LTG) was incorporated, which included measures that 
better reflect the long-term nature of insurance business and a hold-to-maturity strategy. 
In its essence, the LTG measures allow a series of adjustments that defer market 
consistency in the valuation of either a particular set of liabilities that satisfy certain 
criteria (called “Matching Adjustment”) or more generally, for the whole liability 
portfolio (called “Volatility Adjustment”). The LTG lever thus, counter-performs 
throughout normal and non-normal times. 
3.5. Conclusion: Folding the Actuarial    
The market-consistent valuation of insurance liabilities, a product of the financialization 
drive, dramatically alters the actuarial and insurantial landscape. Conventional actuarial 
reserving processes targeted long-term adequacy by a delicate blending between 
technicalizing and contextualizing practices. Such practices supplied management with 
a “reserve” lever that if wisely used, could safely steer the company throughout the 
peaks and troughs of the market cycle. This was in essence a counter-cyclical 
management of prudence: during good times, the reserve lever switched to 
accumulation; during harsh times, to de-accumulation.  Financial economics have 
criticized such conventional actuarial valuation practices for being inward-looking and 
in some cases, overly prudent (Courchene et. al., 2008). However, the requirement for 
market consistency that was introduced by S2, cannot be conceived as a move from the 
previous private actuarial spheres to the Great Outside of the markets. Instead, the 
financialization project of S2 had to create another “more artificial, more fragile, more 
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engineered envelope” (Latour, 2011:158) that could attract long-established actuarial 
practices, albeit in a new light. 
Assuming a short-term view, reserves no longer need to strive for ultimate adequacy: a 
best estimate conceived as a mean value of the distribution of unpaid claims, is enough. 
Such best estimate is supplemented by the necessary risk-sensitive capital, which now 
becomes the new star. Best estimate and risk-based capital provide the necessary buffers 
for anticipated and unanticipated losses. Risk margin envelops the promise of profits to 
be gradually released to the one who commits the required capital. The previous 
“reserve lever” is substituted by a novel “capital” one, which performs the required 
steering well in normal times, but counter-performs in non-normal.  If the story ended 
here, we would be justified to deplore the loss of contextualizing skills. It would be as 
if the navigation of the insurance business had been relinquished over to an autopilot 
which, after thousands of stochastic scenarios recalibrated every new second, makes a 
claim that it has always and already unearthed the best course amidst the market risk-
cycle. This is however, a false claim, in that it ignores the potential destructive and 
procyclical effects of the technical-driven, capital lever. However, the story does not 
end here. The financialization project recognized and thus folded within its 
requirements levers that are orthogonal to the logic of its own capital lever. Within best 
estimate, an allowance is asked to be made for a loading that cannot be calibrated by 
any “reasonable foreseeable” set of data. Such allowance reintroduces the old actuarial 
possibility of a counter-cyclical management. In addition, hold-to-maturity exceptional 
measures allow for long-term de-linkages with short term asset volatilities.  
Our point is simple: the more exclusive a short-term view becomes, the more the 
insurance company will be forced to betray its long-term commitments and stop 
following an insurance business model. An insurance business model is as such, as long 
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as it can precisely exploit an arbitrage opportunity of ignoring short-term market 
pressures. On the other hand, the more exclusive a long-term view becomes, the more 
the company may not get to the “long-term” because it will be declared insolvent before 
it gets there (Merz & Wüthrich, 2008:545). A short-term view is an imperative for 
management decisions. After all, most actions in an insurance company are usually 
taken on a recurring yearly basis – that is, within a recurring short-term window, 
enframed by a long-term view. 
From a Derridean point of view, our analysis reveals an “autoimmune process” in which 
the financial sovereignty of short-termism produces, precisely in order to be sustained, 
the very actuarial long-termism that threatens to undermine it – and vice versa.  
Autoimmunity for Derrida turns something against its own defenses. It is a process 
inevitably at work at the heart of every sovereign identity (Naas, 2008:124). It is a kind 
of “weak force” because it at once compromises the integrity and identity of the 
sovereign form, and simultaneously opens it up to a future (Derrida, 2005:xiv; Naas, 
2008:125). In precisely such an autoimmunization process, the financialization of 
insurance liabilities creates its own sovereign capital lever that can only have a future 
if it lets itself be de-leveraged by its “other.” That is, an actuarial one that produces 
surprises in normal times, so as to disrupt technical complacency and prompt 
accumulation of capital (in its own financial economics and technical sovereign terms) 
in the face of the imminent non-normal times.  
In the bible, Genesis (41) tells the story about the seven years of plenty, when the 
Pharaoh is instructed to accumulate food, and the seven years of famine that follow, 
when the Pharaoh is instructed to de-accumulate. Although more than two thousand 
years have passed since the telling of this story, it seems that we still, at least in the 
insurance (and the financial) sector, have not found a better way to deal with the years 
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of crisis that follow the years of growth – it is how you enter in the crisis that matters, 
and less how you respond to the crisis, at that moment. That is, it is the previous 
accumulation – of reserves pre-S2 and of capital post-S2 – phase that allows an insurer 
to withstand the coming period of crisis. It is not, in other words, the financialization 
project per se, with its technicalizing sovereignty, that inherently impairs the insurer’s 
capability of withstanding harsh times. Rather, it is the insurer's history that incubates 
the possibility of performing or counter-performing his future – not so much short-term 
responses at the time of the crisis prescribed by technical reflexes. After all, it is never 
you, a sovereign substance, that leaves traces. On the contrary, it is the traces that 
delineate you: sovereignty thus, is not the starting point, but the end result of a long 
series of traces (Harman, 2009:81). In that respect, it is the prior, accumulation-phase 
traces that form the insurer's sovereignty and hence capability to withstand the imminent 
harsh times. Possibilities for such tracing are not undermined by the S2 financialization 
requirements – or, more accurately, they are no more undermined relative to the pre-S2 
era, albeit in a new way. The S2 financialization project preserves possibilities for 
accumulation-of-capital traces by requiring precisely the constitution of a market-
consistent, and thus technicalizing valuation of insurance liabilities in normal times. 
The moment such technicalizing sovereignty is constituted, an internal resistance, an 
autoimmunitary resistance to itself (and thus, an inherent divisibility of itself) 
(Wortham, 2010:160) is ascertained in the search for a “true” best estimate – one, that 
simply can never be market-consistent. Such autoimmunitary resistance opens up the 
possibility for the insurer to infuse prudence in its market-consistent valuation and hold, 
consequently, more capital than envisaged by the technicalizing sovereignty – in other 
words, the possibility for the insurer to leave traces of a counter-performative 
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accumulation of capital during normal times, is opened-up, by efforts to precisely 
delimit it. 
Such traces, in their turn, create options for genuine decisions – in that they always risk 
being wrong – during non-normal (crisis) periods: should I begin de-accumulation? If 
so, when exactly and how much of the margin should be spared? Such options are not 
pre-given possibilities but are novel opportunities created by the traces themselves 
(Esposito, 2013:110). They call thus for a genuine decision, i.e., a suitable way to be 
exploited, which is always at risk of being wrong. Without such traces, the insurer loses 
his own sovereignty, in that he is then – and only then – obliged to follow the pre-given, 
uniform, technical prescriptions of the capital lever: fire-sell assets or discontinue 
production. 
Derrida (2005:101) suggests that: 
“to confer sense or meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to find a reason 
for it, is already to compromise its deciding exceptionality, to subject it 
to rules, to a code of law, to some general law, to concepts. [It is] . . . to 
compromise its immunity. This happens as soon as one speaks of it in 
order to give it or find it some sense or meaning. But since this happens 
all the time, pure sovereignty does not exist; it is always in the process 
of positing itself by refuting itself, by denying or disavowing itself; it is 
always in the process of autoimmunizing itself, of betraying itself…”  
Sovereignty, thus, must remain silent and yet must go on speaking endlessly in order to 
protect itself – but then it compromises by precisely protecting itself, expressing and 
justifying itself by introducing within itself counter-sovereignties that threaten to 
destroy it (Naas, 2008:128). The autoimmunity of the technicalizing sovereignty can be 
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translated into this sort of double bind: technicality is by its nature silent; it does not 
need any proof, it is self-proving. However, precisely to impose itself as a technical 
issue that deserves examination (i.e. turn itself into a necessary “technical criterion”), a 
reason must be given. For example, why does “heteroscedasticity” need to be checked? 
A reason must be given. However, such a reason inevitably points to how a technical 
notion such as heteroscedasticity links itself with the underlying liability patterns and 
how the latter, in their turn, violate or not other technical assumptions, such as the 
“independence and identical distribution of the standardized Pearson residuals” 
(Shapland, 2016); which, in its turn, must give another reason in order to defend itself, 
etc., etc. For Derrida, since this happens all the time, the technical is always in the 
process of positing itself by refuting itself, i.e. by linking itself in a context. The more 
it becomes technical, the more it refutes itself by giving reasons and linking itself to a 
context. In other words, the more technical it becomes, the more “political” it becomes. 
To simply account for the blending of technicalizing and contextualizing, as well as the 
inherent tension which exist between them, as Jarzabkowski (2017) does, falls short of 
what Derrida describes above. For Derrida, the relation between the technicalizing and 
the contextualizing is always already aporetic. That is, it suggests an absolutely 
impassable situation, one which cannot be resolved through rational analysis or 
dialectical thought (Wortham, 2010:15), due to a “constitutive autoimmunity”, which 
at once threatens both of them and allows them to be perpetually rethought and 
reinscribed (Naas, 2008:124). If this is the case, then a model, as the site of 
technicalizing and contextualizing practices, may perform or counter-perform the 
market – but such performativity issues arise in the first place because the model is 
always already disrupted by the inscription of an autoimmune impossible possibility: 
impossible, due to its autoimmune transgressions that keep it open and unsettled. And 
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possible, because it is perhaps the only one worth its name (Wortham, 2010:15), since 
a “possible” possibility would fail to open up a possibility beyond that already 
enveloped or prescribed within the various levers. 
The impossible possibility of the act of valuation cannot be resolved by more 
sophisticated technical analyses, or through the availability of more big data. Neither 
by becoming all the way native (i.e. increasingly allowing itself to be immersed in the 
context). The aporia inscribed makes value self-deferring, always left unsaid, always 
to-come, even if it addresses us, especially at the moment it addresses us. Valuation 
calls for re-evaluation, not because more data is at hand and/or a better calibration is 
possible, but precisely because valuation itself relinquishes its sovereignty, its self-
identity. It thus comes to denote not some past, present or future valuation regime but a 
field of possibilities in which all valuation regimes might arrive or appear – and as that 
field of possibilities, it would be irreducible to any of these regimes (Naas, 2008:41). 
Such field is full of cracks – i.e. full of borderline areas, mixtures and marginal spaces. 
But it is also what gives sense to the whole actuarial and financial economic valuation 
infrastructure. In that respect, there is no answer in the question of valuation of 




4. Pricing (In)Solvency: Performativity as a Play of Differences 
Maybe sometimes — the wrong way 
is the right way? You can take the 
wrong path and it still comes out 
where you want to be? Or, spin it 
another way, sometimes you can do 
everything wrong and it still turns 
out to be right?” (Tartt, 2016)  
4.1. Introduction and Background 
On November 5th, 2008, the reigning British monarch visited the London School of 
Economics where she was briefed by academics on the turmoil of the international 
markets. During the briefing, she infamously asked, “Why did nobody notice it?” 
(Pierce, 2008). Four years later, during a tour in the Bank of England, it was explained 
to the Queen that the City got “complacent” and people thought regulation was not 
necessary, but they assured her that the staff at the Bank were there to help prevent 
another crisis (The Guardian, 2012). 
Since January 1st, 2016, regulatory staff has a new weapon to combat or notice turmoil 
early in the insurance sector: the new supervisory framework for EU (re)insurance 
undertakings, widely known as Solvency II (S2). S2 concerns itself with the appropriate 
amount of capital that EU insurers must hold as a buffer to reduce the risk of insolvency; 
that is, it defines the price that needs to be paid in the form of capital to be held aside 
to provide security to policyholders in the event of subsequent adverse developments 
that might impair the insurer’s financial health. In other words, S2 is a kind of 
Page 135 
 
“bankruptcy self-insurance” imposed by the regulators against shocks and adverse 
events. 
There was much enthusiasm at the beginning of the S2 project. Indeed, early on, it was 
regarded as the “crown jewel of the European Union”62. Today, it is widely considered 
as one of the, if not the, most sophisticated regulatory regimes in the world (Rae et al., 
2017:5), not least because it introduces a standardized risk-based solvency framework 
across the entire EU insurance industry which manages about €10 trillion of assets (Rae 
et al., 2017:35).  
According to its narrative, S2 aims to reduce the risk that an insurer would be incapable 
of meeting claims, provide early warning to supervisors so that they intervene promptly 
if capital falls below the required level and promote confidence in the financial stability 
of the insurance sector (Hulle, 2017). In short, it aims to deliver what pre-crisis 
regulatory regimes apparently did not, allowing the regulatory staff to avoid future 
embarrassment from a seemingly naïve royal question. 
S2 did not fall from the sky, of course. It had, on one hand, its own history: it took about 
15 years, including multiple implementation delays, to develop (Hulle, 2017), which 
indicates the enormous size of and complexities inherent in the project. On the other 
hand, it was heavily influenced by the Basel regulatory schemes for banks, in line with 
the latest developments in risk management and recommendations from the 
International Accounting Standards Board, the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors and others (Grima et al., 2017:187). In that respect, S2 belongs to that 
contemporary current of regulatory changes which, akin to the understanding of the 
“epistemization of economic transactions” (Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2001:27), claims to 
                                                          




make use of the most advanced tools of finance theory and risk analysis, such as Value-
at-Risk modeling, to enact a set of scientific and technically sophisticated regulatory 
standards (Engelen et al., 2011). At the heart of such regulatory standards lie a risk-
based capital requirement and a market-consistent valuation imperative for both assets 
and liabilities. 
Thereby, it can be said that S2 looks much more closely to the current banking 
regulatory scheme than to its own predecessor, usually called Solvency I (S1), in its 
formation. S1 established capital requirements for insurers back in the 1970s, by 
requiring them to follow a specific, prescribed formula (i.e., formula-based, not risk-
based, capital requirements). Assets were valued at so-called book values or historic 
entry values with little relation to their market value. Technical provisions for 
liabilities63 were valued on a prudent actuarial basis (Power, 2015) – that is, on a basis 
that relied significantly on actuarial judgement and subsequently was far from being 
characterized as market-consistent. Due to such reasons, it was not rare for regulators 
and practitioners alike to adopt an informal prudential approach by encouraging the 
holding of significantly more capital than prescribed by the S1 requirements (Humphry, 
2017:114). 
With the gradual expansion of markets, the development of financial economics and a 
series of insurance collapses (most notably that of Equitable Life), it became evident 
that S1 was insufficiently sensitive to risk. Other types of risk beyond traditional 
insurance risk, such as credit, market, and operational risk which were not included in 
the S1 assessment (Humphry, 2017:114), should be accounted for. What is more, S1’s 
                                                          
63 Technical provisions (or reserves, usually referred simply as “insurance liabilities”) comprise the most 
significant liability item of an insurer’s balance sheet. The creation of technical provisions is perhaps the 
most distinctive feature of the insurance business. Granting insurance automatically involves creating 
technical provisions to meet promises of future compensations (under)written by the insurer. This is why 
the valuation of insurance liabilities is always a topic of insurance supervision (Doff, 2011:15). 
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market-inconsistent approach in both valuing assets and liabilities did not incentivize 
modern risk management practices such as, in the case of assets, hedging. In the case 
of insurance liabilities, it gave room for discretional practices such as over- or under-
reserving64. Additionally, the backward-looking orientation of S1 (i.e., its reliance on 
past business and past probabilities) gradually became incompatible with the start-of-
the-century’s emerging “emergency imaginary” of a potentially catastrophic future 
(Opitz & Tellmann, 2015), which required a more anticipatory, preemptive and thus 
forward-looking technology to be reckoned with (Amoore, 2013; Anderson, 2010; 
Aradau & Van Munster, 2011; De Goede, 2012; Grusin, 2010). In short, S1 was risk-
insensitive (i.e., requiring algebraic and not risk-based capital) and market-inconsistent, 
thus prone to management manipulations and unable to incentivize appropriate 
corporate governance practices such as risk management which is, by default, a 
forward-looking, market-calibrated activity that can preemptively account for a 
potentially threatening future. 
Hence, there was a need for the changes brought about with S2, which demands market-
consistent valuation of both assets and liabilities, and capital requirements that are 
sensitive to the risks assumed by the company. Such demands are widely thought to 
incentivize best corporate governance practices – in effect, risk management. In 
practice, risk management needs a clear way to explicitly measure both the individual 
types of risks (insurance, credit, market and operational) and the single, aggregate, 
enterprise-wide risk assumed by the company. Such measurements allow for the 
efficient management of the risk, i.e., for the technical regulation of increasing or 
decreasing risk via market techniques (like hedging) or practices specific to the industry 
                                                          
64 Over-reserving is suspect of earnings manipulation. Under-reserving has a more direct relation to 
solvency since it undermines the insurer’s ability to honor its liabilities.  
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(like reinsurance or asset-liability management)65. In this way, it is made possible to 
assure that both the individual and the aggregate risks are constantly kept in line with 
the firm’s risk appetite and do not breach its prespecified risk tolerance limits – or if 
breached, to automatically trigger subsequent actions for realignment – even in the face 
of a catastrophic future.  
Such a clear-cut, market-calibrated, algorithmic way of measuring risk (in order for risk 
management to operate) is precisely what is offered by S2’s technical standards: risk is 
no longer buried within prudential and highly subjective assumptions as in S1 (Power, 
2015:51), but is instead released, technically, in both its individual and enterprise-wide 
forms. This means risk is explicitly defined and measured in strict conformity with 
market reality, net of discretional and highly controversial non-market elements.  
Risk-based capital and market valuation, therefore, do not simply inform the typical 
solvency indicator66 of an insurer’s S2 solvency status, but constitute what is widely 
thought of as a set of scientifically sound and technically oriented governance practices 
(risk management) to be followed by the S2 insurer. Thus, the aim of this paper is to 
zoom in and attempt to unearth the general working embedded in S2’s risk-based 
pricing algorithm. Risk-based capital, despite its own rhetoric to provide a scientific 
                                                          
65 Hedging is about protecting the insurer’s investment portfolio, by engaging in market transactions 
which are designed to neutralize the market or credit risk of the portfolio, whereas reinsurance is about 
mitigating the risk of the insurer’s liabilities, by effectively insuring them with other insurers (for that 
reason called “re-insurers”). Asset-liability management is about managing both assets and liabilities in 
ways to offset the interest rate risks involved.  
66 A typical indicator of an insurer’s solvency status is the ratio of its own funds (equal to assets less 
liabilities) to the Solvency Capital Requirements. For example, assume an insurer which, under the S1 
conventions, measures its assets and liabilities and finds them to be 340 and 220 units, respectively. This 
means that the insurer’s own funds is 120 units (=340-220). Assume that the insurer then calculates its 
Solvency Capital Requirements (using the S1 prescribed formula) and comes up with a figure of 100 
units. Then, the insurer’s solvency indicator or Solvency Capital Requirement ratio under S1 is 120% 
(=120/100), which is interpreted as holding 20% capital in excess of the required (=100). Obviously, a 
ratio below 100% denotes insolvency status. Leaving aside a lot of subtle differentiations, the same 
approach generally holds for the S2 framework. However, what changes in S2 is the way assets and 
liabilities are measured (market-consistent, not book or historic values) and the way the single figure of 




and neutral assessment of the risk assumed by the insurer, is technically designed in 
ways that open up particular possibilities of diagnosing and interpreting risk, 
empowering and disempowering specific behaviors that are not only in conformity with 
the initial designing intentions, but most crucially, beyond and in opposition to them. 
Such zooming-in will allow us to subsequently zoom out and disclose an aporia at the 
heart of S2. This aporia shows how the technical and scientific conditions of the 
algorithmic possibility to ensure solvency bring about their own destruction and 
conditions of impossibility, unless allowed to be deconstructed by their non-scientific 
“other”, which are calls for prudence, discretion and good judgment beyond mere 
technical efficiency and scientific validity.  
The S2 risk-based capital model is a classic case of a model considered to be scientific, 
and thus idealized, which is asked to function in a complex and mundane reality. It 
brings, however, a distinctive peculiarity relative to other such cases: it is not an 
instrument to be used by practitioners for achieving non-epistemic goals, for example, 
“making money” (Svetlova, 2013:321-22); in contrast, it is an instrument required to be 
used by practitioners to precisely safeguard an epistemically defined concept: the 
solvency of an insurer. In the first case, it is reasonable to expect that the model will 
need to endure a de-idealization process in its application in order for practitioners to 
bridge the gap between the model-as-science (a purely theoretical enterprise) and reality 
(a field of application). Such a de-idealization process seems to inevitably involve the 
blurring between epistemic and non-epistemic values for the eventual empirical success 
of the model (Douglas, 2000, 2009; Laudan, 2004; Svetlova, 2014). 
In the case of the S2 model, however, the model-as-science has been both designed and 
calibrated precisely to serve its own pragmatic application, which in a peculiar circular 
way, is epistemically defined. For example, the quantitative requirements for solvency 
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are (epistemically) defined as that amount of capital that is sufficient for the insurer to 
withstand a variety of stresses over a one-year horizon with a confidence level of 99.5%. 
In that respect, the calibration of the S2 model (i.e., its transportation within the field of 
application) is supposed to precisely mirror that confidence level (and not something 
less or something different). Such “technocratic calibration” implied by models like S2 
has been criticized within the performativity literature for its tendency to crowd out 
non-epistemic values under an epistemic and technically laden vocabulary. For 
example, Lockwood (2015), is keen to emphasize how the apolitical and technocratic 
technology of the Value-at-Risk modeling (a structure eventually adopted by the S2 
algorithm itself) is not just inherently unable to predict the unpredictable, but also 
renders the unpredictable unimagined by crowding out alternative anticipating 
responses such as subjective judgement and systemic financial regulation (2015:743). 
From there, it is easy to argue against the increasing spillover performative effects of 
such technocratic tendencies. 
From our point of view, it is not that solvency assertions (i.e., “imagining” and 
preparing for the unpredictable with a confidence level of 99.5%) could be better served 
by mitigating or supplementing scientific and technical aspirations with prudence, 
subjective judgments, simplifications and even a second layer of macro-prudential 
regulation with an exclusive focus on systemic risk (Baker, 2017). In fact, what needs 
to be acknowledged is that S2, besides its “hard”, technical and scientific predilection, 
does not fall short in calling for “soft” modes such as prudence, the four-eyes principle 
(requiring at least two persons to review a significant decision prior to its 
implementation), proportionality and simplifications (i.e. making decisions according 
to the nature, scale and complexity of the risks inherent to the business), and even 
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supervisory authorities taking heed of potential pro-cyclical effects67. What is 
impressive with S2 is its paradoxical nature: where it calls for market-consistent 
valuation, it simultaneously calls for prudence68; however, you can either follow the 
market or deviate from it by assuming a “prudent” stance (the degree of which is, by 
itself, quite subjective). Where it requires significant decision making based on 
scientific and empirically valid criteria, S2 simultaneously asks at least two persons to 
review any such decision, as if the scientific and empirically valid is inadequate by itself 
to make (any) two minds converge in a neutral and “neat” way. Where it is overly 
prescriptive to the point of becoming rules-based, its aspirations are explicitly stated as 
principles-based. 
Davies and McGoey (2012) claim that, in the wake of the financial crisis, there have 
been two different demands from elites and regulators. First, rational economic 
knowledge is to be further and more vigorously extended to prevent the “nobody noticed 
it” from being possible in the future. Second, a new, softer rationalism should be 
allowed for instead, which factors in the possibility of errors and systemic complexities. 
Although S2 is widely considered to belong to the first category, what is impressive is 
that it makes this distinction collapse by simultaneously enveloping both a “hard” 
(technical, scientific/economic) and a “soft” (judgmental, prudential) rationality to 
account for solvency. S2 makes available both “hard” and “soft” tools in an attempt to 
safely navigate towards solvency. If this is so, then Lockwood should be content: S2 is 
that one regulatory regime which does not fail to explicitly introduce “other possible 
ways to confront unknown unknowns” (Lockwood, 2015:745) and thus supplements, 
                                                          
67 Calls for prudence, proportionality and the four-eyes principle are scattered throughout the S2 Directive 
(2009/138/EC). See for example Chapter 4 of Section 2 (specially Articles 41 and 76). For procyclicality, 
see Article 28 and Paragraph 61 of the Directive’s introductory notes.  
68 Most notably in the valuation of technical provisions (Article 17 of the S2 Directive), the management 
of the business (Article 41) and investments (Paragraph 71 of the Directive’s introductory notes). 
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or if you will, mitigates excessive technicalities with good judgement and alternative 
anticipating responses. If this is so, then, what is left for us to do? One answer might be 
to simply strive to overcome all implementational issues which perhaps hinder proper 
implementation. However, our point is that no matter how hard we struggle, solvency 
is as much about presence (implementation) as it is about absence (what is excluded 
and thus constantly defers proper implementation). That is, solvency is always to-come 
since solvency itself points to insolvency.  
What we mean by this is that the difference between the “hard” and the “soft” is aporetic 
in a Derridean sense: that is, where either of them manages to succeed, it precisely fails 
(Derrida, 1986:35). Why? Because “hard” is structurally informed by “soft”, and vice 
versa. In that respect, solvency is already permeated by insolvency, in that a perfect 
“bankruptcy insurance” (if existed) would simply remove responsible decision making, 
exponentially increasing the chances of going bankrupt (Huerta de Soto, 2009:75).  
The aporia involved in the solvency project and in the wider risk management modeling, 
usually passes undetected in the theorizing framework about performativity. On the one 
hand, performativity literature reveals that economic ideas and models change, shape 
and construct reality (rather than simply describe it). In that respect, the wide use of a 
risk management tool (like the S2 model) changes reality in ways that might reinforce 
or undermine the model’s initial aspirations. The performativity commitment, therefore, 
is about the entanglement of knowledge (theory) and practice (Boldyrev et al., 2016:7); 
it cannot be about evaluating what is “better” or what “succeeds” from a privileged 
knowledge viewpoint that can safely guide practice. However, on the other hand, as 
long as the performative spillover effects are detected and disclosed, we cannot help 
noticing a tendency that seems to underlie part of the performative analysis conducted: 
the use of performativity as a resource to provide a more informed and more 
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comprehensive response to the “What might be done?” question. A telling example can 
be found in the work of Michael Power (2004) who, after providing a convincing and 
thorough diagnosis of the first- (primary) and second-order (performative) risks of the 
risk management practices69, finds himself in a privileged position to conclude with a 
few suggestions on how to secure an “intelligent” risk management approach. Such 
intelligent suggestions obviously address both primary risks and performative effects in 
ways that current organizational practices most probably fail to do70.  
Our point is obviously not to delegitimize the performativity perspective, for it is very 
important in its own terms. Our point is more subtle and follows Introna (2018), when 
he suggests that “…scholars want the world to always add up”; in our case, it is 
performativity scholars who want the world to always add up: we tend to suggest that 
if we had done this or that, then our risk management practices would have been 
“intelligent”, and the failure (in our case, insolvency) would have been avoided 
(2018:17). In that respect, understanding performativity and why, for example, one 
theory is capable of affecting the world while another cannot (Brisset, 2016), becomes 
a crucial resource in our efforts to decide “this” rather than “that”, i.e., to design and 
implement an intelligent risk management system that can stave off insolvency. 
Indeed, it is entirely plausible that an “intelligent” risk management practice can help 
avoid insolvency; however, our point is that “we simply do not know!” (Gray, 2009). 
Solvency is indeed possible as long as it is seen as a set of deliberative practices that 
organize uncertainty (first-order risks) and mitigate (counter) performative, second-
                                                          
69 First-order risks are the primary risks embodied in the formal mission of risk management (Power, 
2004:15), e.g., credit, market, insurance risks, etc. Second-order risks are, e.g., personal, legal and 
reputational risks (2004:15) which emerge from the sheer workings of the risk management system. 
Second-order risks have the perverse effect to counter-perform, hence undermine, the formal mission of 
first order risk management. 
70 Although, as Power acknowledges, many organizations will rhetorically claim that such suggestions 
“are already part of their operating philosophy, that they are already intelligent.” (Power, 2004:61) 
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orders effects. However, if it were only that, i.e., a matter that is of deliberative 
practices, then we would all know, for sure, how to remain solvent, and a definite (and 
intelligent, for sure) account and program of solvency could be given. However, it is 
precisely at such a point that solvency would lead to insolvency in that no responsible 
decision about risks and solvency would ever need to be taken, as such. This is because, 
for Derrida,  
“[w]hen the path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the 
way in advance, the decision is already made… [and then] irresponsibly, and 
in good conscience, one simply applies or implements a program… The 
condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience 
and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia 
from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible 
invention.” (Derrida, 1990:41) 
In order for solvency to be as such, that is, a responsible decision and assessment, it 
needs to remain open towards that “which continually escapes our perception, is 
continuously deferred, yet which can disrupt…at any moment, sometimes tragically” 
(Introna, 2018:17) our horizon of deliberate and intelligent possibilities. This is an 
impossible possibility. 
In that respect, where performativity is analyzed in the wider literature simply to be 
used as a resource to deliberate for intelligent solvency practices, we are interested in 
withdrawing towards that pre-performative field, that prior impossible possibility 
always and already inscribed within our practices which keeps them open, 
deconstructable, undecidable, thus fragile, contingent and vulnerable – in other words, 
worthy to mesh with. Such withdrawal will allow us to reframe performativity as an 
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effect of the play of differences that constitute the written text of the S2 standards – an 
uncontrollable play that eventually renders performative effects undecidable. From our 
perspective, we want to denote how performativity is always and everywhere exposed 
to that play. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we attempt to take a 
closer look at the way S2’s risk-based capital model71 works and how it is transformed 
into a technology of governance that builds upon and goes beyond previous practices. 
We examine how, by defining and technically putting a price onto each risk, 
possibilities for a new set of scientific governance practices are released which 
legitimate solvency claims relative to current and future risk emergence, even in the 
face of a radically uncertain future. In the third section, we get to examine the counter-
performative effects that the S2 algorithmic model brings about and how such effects 
affect both the financial markets and what is perceived to be the core of the traditional 
insurance business model. 
After examining both the initial aspirations (Section 2) and the counter-performative 
(Section 3) effects of the S2 model, we conclude in the last two sections by elaborating 
the Derridean aporia that we detect in the midst of solvency itself. We position our 
claims relative to the existing theorizing framework and show how such an aporia is 
inscribed within the S2 algorithmic code and precisely preserved within the S2 
fragmented written text, rendering performativity an undecidable of the play of 
differences.  
                                                          
71 S2 provides a generic risk-based capital model (called the standard formula) that can be followed by 
insurers who do not wish to develop their own internal model. We focus here on the standard formula 
since the percentage of insurers who eventually use an internal model has been very low. Although the 
standard formula is considered suitable for smaller and medium-sized insurers, it is believed that outside 
the UK, it is used by many larger insurers (Rae et al., 2017:21). 
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4.2. The Opening Up of New Possibilities 
Risk-based capital is founded on a very simple, theoretical idea: the riskier the assets 
and liabilities are, the more capital an insurer has to hold. The riskiness of assets reflects 
the riskiness of the insurer’s investment strategy; the riskiness of liabilities reflects the 
riskiness of his insurance activities (for example, different lines of insurance business 
have historically proved more volatile than others). At a first glance, this is a sensible 
idea: after all, why should we not want capital to reflect riskiness (Danielsson et al., 
2015)? In that respect, a risk-based capital approach conveys a very clear message: 
should insurers up-risk themselves, they are required to hold a larger amount of capital 
to operate as a buffer in the event of adverse developments. Should they de-risk 
themselves, then a lower amount of capital is required. In such a context, it makes 
perfect sense for insurers to decide, a priori, the level of risk they feel comfortable with, 
i.e., to define their risk profile (or risk appetite), and to then navigate (risk-manage) 
themselves accordingly so as not to breach the risk tolerance limits that effectively 
quantify their risk appetite – or, in the case of a breach, to have a proper plan in place 
for re-alignment.  
Such a simple idea manages to turn measurement of risk into a powerful governance 
tool: risk management. Risk management redefines insurers’ activities, but also changes 
the concept of regulation itself. It redefines insurers’ activities because insurers are now 
given the possibility to manage not only their individual risks72 on a segregated basis 
(as they used to in an S1 environment), but also on an enterprise-wide level. The latter 
is considered an extra and more enhanced type of risk management, called enterprise 
                                                          
72 The standard formula recognizes and quantifies the following main categories of risks faced by an 
insurer: insurance risk (which is specific to the industry), financial risk (market and credit) and 
operational risk. This is not an exhaustive list. A usual concern about the standard formula is how it fails 
to include risks that may have a significant impact in the insurer’s balance sheet (for example, volatility 
risk. For more, see Doff (2016: 593-5)). 
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risk management, precisely to discern itself from older “silo-based” risk-management 
regimes where individual risks were managed in a segregated and thus uncorrelated 
way, creating a potential source of risk itself. Indeed, the “silo-syndrome” was criticized 
heavily after the 2008 financial crisis since it was considered to have contributed to a 
surprisingly fragmented organization in the midst of the Internet and global 
interconnection. It is suggested that under silo-based risk management, the unintended 
consequences of the interaction of different practices and worldviews were largely 
ignored. Enterprise risk management brought the possibility of breaking down the 
barriers within organizations (Tett, 2016) and gestured towards the epistemological and 
psychological comfort of a panoptic view (Power, 2015:51). Under its aegis, all silo 
risks are aggregated and managed, interactions are accounted for and capital is more 
efficiently used since it allows for diversification effects. In fact, the very practice of 
setting the risk appetite is considered “best practice” under enterprise risk management 
since it typically involves the determination of the enterprise level of risk the insurer is 
willing to accept to achieve his strategic objectives. This then trickles down into 
definitions of appetite for each of the silo risk categories (insurance, financial and 
operational)73, thereby altering the way silo elements are seen and acted upon: they are 
still managed as in the previous S1 environment but now with the goal to be subsumed 
into an enterprise risk management framework.  
Enterprise risk management also redefines the concept of regulation because it becomes 
a technology of governance-at-a-distance which claims to resolve the eternal dispute 
between proponents of tighter regulation and the industry lobby which stresses the 
ultimate cost of regulation to the policyholder and outside investors (MacNeil, 2012). 
The point is that regulation, in the face of risk-based capital – that is, in the face of 
                                                          
73 Also for other individual key elements, such as earnings stability (Duverne & Hele, 2017:64). 
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explicit prices on individual and enterprise-wide risks – may depart from more classical 
steering tools, such as prohibitions and constraints, to leave space for  more autonomous 
and self-responsible navigation by insurers. For example, regarding the investment 
strategy, the S1 regulatory environment was full of prohibitions and regulatory limits 
that concerned permissible asset classes and maximum limits; such regulatory 
constraints are absent from S2. This is because the embedded risk-based approach is 
thought to incentivize proper risk management behavior by itself. If an insurer is willing 
to assume higher levels of risk, she should simply pay for it in the form of higher capital 
requirements and extensive risk monitoring requirements. There is no need for 
regulators to enact any investment restrictions a priori. Enactment of S2 regulation takes 
place at the level of each and every business decision. Regulation takes the form of 
effective corporate governance practices which, in their turn, are informed by the 
technical measurement of the prices of risks. 
This brings us to the core problem of risk-based capital, which is nothing other than 
how to define and technically measure individual and enterprise-wide risk – in other 
words, how to put a price on risk. Measuring risk is a project of its own. It is not that 
we can somehow stick some sort of “risk-o-meter” deep into the bowels of the financial 
and insurance system to get an accurate measurement of the risk of complex financial 
instruments and insurance liabilities (Danielsson et al., 2015). This is because risk is an 
elusive entity with both technical and social aspects. In fact, it seems like less of an 
entity with clear boundaries and more of a vague horizon on the basis of which specific 
entities (for example, equities) show up as threatening. The technical quantification of 
risk, thus, seems quite ambiguous right from the start. Nevertheless, for a risk-based 
capital approach, such measurement is necessary since, in the absence of sound and 
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accurate risk measurements, risk-based capital is at best meaningless and at worst 
dangerous (Danielsson et al., 2015). 
In general, many (if not most) of the core technical elements used by S2 for the 
calculation of its risk-based capital are drawn from the realms of finance and investing74 
(Conwill, 2016:3). In that respect, S2 follows finance theory and defines risk as a matter 
of volatility in expected outcomes (Power, 2004:14). Such a definition allows capital 
requirements to exhibit risk sensitivity by adopting a scenario-based approach75. That 
is, the capital requirement for each of the individual risk submodules is determined as 
the impact of a specified scenario on the level of the insurer’s own funds (i.e., the excess 
of assets over liabilities, already required to be measured in a market-consistent way). 
Key parameters surrounding the scenarios have been calibrated thanks to the technical 
analysis carried out by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA), which is, by definition, an independent advisory technical body that assists 
the European Commission in the design of S2. Calibration and relevance are thought to 
be secured by the use of current and historical market and industry data in line with the 
inherent characteristics of each individual risk submodule. These data span from, for 
example, the MSCI World Developed Price Equity Index for the equity-type risk 
submodule, to country or sub-country data about earthquakes, windstorms and other 
extreme events for the non-life, catastrophe-type risk submodule. The overall risk is 
based on a modular structure where separate solvency capital requirements are 
computed for each individual risk submodule. These are then aggregated with the help 
of prespecified correlation matrices to allow for diversification effects. In technical 
                                                          
74 How these may or may not extend naturally to the specific insurance sector domain of insurance risk 
is investigated in the next section.  
75 Formula-based calculations are used for submodules where a scenario-based approach was not 
considered as the most appropriate (EIOPA, 2014:7). 
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terms, S2 ends up with Solvency Capital Requirements on a Value-at-Risk measure 
under a 99.5% confidence level over a one-year time horizon. This simply means that 
the aggregate, enterprise-wide capital required to be kept aside by the S2 insurer to 
remain solvent at the end of the coming year is algorithmically calculated in such a way 
as to be considered adequate to make her withstand 199 next possible years and fail in 
just one. This calibration objective equally applies to each of the individual risk 
submodules.  
To give a simplified view of the matter, the S2 capital algorithm comes up with a 
standard capital charge for each of the insurer’s key financial or insurantial instruments. 
For example, a particular equity within the investment portfolio of the insurer receives 
a specific equity-type capital charge that is higher than, for example, the spread-type 
capital charge of a high quality corporate bond. Such differences in the standard capital 
charges are supposed to reflect the different “riskiness” inherent within each of the 
financial instruments; for example, equity listed outside the OECD is riskier than equity 
listed within the OECD, which is riskier than a highly rated corporate bond, which is 
riskier than a government bond; similarly, receivable exposure is riskier from an unrated 
rather than a rated counterparty, and so on. Questions of how much riskier one 
instrument is relative to another are not answered by political narratives. They are 
decided by the empirical data themselves as they are technically gathered and analyzed 
by EIOPA. Such a “scientific” process is supposed to secure the soundness, neutrality 
and the apolitical status of the S2 risk-sensitive capital charges. In their turn, capital 
charges institute a technical field that provides a clear orientation between high (capital-
intensive) and low (capital-efficient) risk instruments, on the basis of which technical 
governance-at-a-distance (as described in the beginning of the section) is made possible. 
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Such a technical calculation by the S2 Capital Requirements algorithm does not just 
make possible the assessment and management of the current solvency status, but opens 
up a further, more radical possibility.  
A key technical element for the calculation is the time horizon to be used. As already 
noted, S2 opted for a one-year mark-to-market approach. S2 capital requirements, 
therefore, are bound to detect current risk emergence within a short period of one year. 
This effectively relinquishes the possibility to separately examine solvency capital 
requirements with respect to future risk emergence over a longer time horizon. Indeed, 
risk emergence due to longer-term risk issues is required by S2 to be addressed 
separately, beyond current solvency capital requirements, through adverse scenario 
analysis over a business cycle of three to five years, bringing in the whole range of 
management actions which might reasonably be taken in each scenario (Farr et al., 
2008:15).  
A longer time horizon includes risks that may look immaterial in the current solvency 
assessment (i.e., within a one-year horizon) but might become quite material in 
subsequent periods. Their solvency assessment should take place in the internal report 
of Own Risk Solvency Assessment (ORSA) which, in a more narrative-style manner, 
is intended to work as an all-encompassing statement of strategy and related risks 
(Power, 2015:50), anchored in the current point in time, and looking forward towards 
the unknown future. 
ORSA is considered more of a process for decision making and strategic analysis than 
a regulatory document. The insurer is to actively take a close look at almost every 
possible future development of the environment in which its activity will evolve and 
produce, under such conditions, future possible solvency capital requirements along 
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with future possible economic balance sheets. Such projections differ from current ones 
in that the insurer identifies and integrates into its future scenario planning the impact 
of emerging developments, such as, for example, the emergence of new technologies 
like 3D printing or advances in biomedicine. The insurer is further required to consider 
other future developments, such as prolonged low interest rates or the possibility of 
catastrophic events (events with high severity but low frequency) that might affect its 
financial standing (Sandstrom, 2011:625); this is usually called stress testing. Stress 
testing is not simply scenario testing where projections of the trends of the company’s 
financial conditions under various scenarios are plotted. Stress testing radicalizes 
scenario testing, in that it involves the worst-case and unlikely, in terms of probability, 
but nevertheless possible scenarios to be examined – an excess of the standard scenario 
testing.  
Stress testing findings do not have any currency in an S1 world, where the uncertainties 
of the future are digested as risks by probability-based techniques that rest on the 
certainties of the actuarial science. Stress testing can only be meaningful in an S2 world, 
where the uncertainties of the future are not to be tamed by systematically studying the 
regularities of the past, and thus cannot be predicted and prevented. What remains, then, 
is to simply embrace them (Baker & Jonathan, 2002). Where in S1, uncertainties were 
transubstantiated into risks with the help of conventional probability-based 
technologies, in S2, a new set of technologies is used which preemptively looks for the 
possible; technologies, such as the solvency capital requirements algorithm and ORSA, 
which make possible a new form of risk perception – one that keeps the process of 
accumulating not certainty, but suspicion and doubt, going. In such an S2 world, the 
event cannot merely be what actually happens, as in the S1 world. The S2 event can 
only be imagined by anticipating its abstract form. ORSA and the solvency capital 
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algorithm are indifferent to whether a particular event occurs or not. What matters is 
anticipating it, visualizing it, and thus preemptively acting in uncertainty (Amoore, 
2013:4). In this way, the future is brought into the present. No waiting for an unfolding 
future experience is required. That is, if you, as an insurer, cannot withstand a possible 
stress test disclosed in the forward-looking horizon of ORSA presently, you are 
automatically deemed insolvent, irrespectively of whether such a possibility ever occurs 
or not. If you are unable to absorb the algorithmic solvency risk charges at present, you 
are automatically deemed insolvent. Again, this is irrespective of whether the implied 
associated scenarios of the risk charges materialize or not within the one-year horizon. 
Solvency risk charges and ORSA are not about predicting the future, but about writing 
the event from within, in advance, ahead of time. The possible future (both in the short- 
and in long- term) is placed into our hands to preemptively act and decide. It is produced 
in the present to deny a future that could possibly be. In a radically uncertain world, S2 
requires insurers to ensure their solvency status by acting upon a technically rendered 
present future. 
By requiring solvency to be assessed both in current (via the algorithmic risk charges) 
and in forward-looking (via ORSA) terms, S2 manages to integrate the traditional 
accounting modality with practices of organizational governance, like enterprise risk 
management (Young, 2011), in a radically new way. Indeed, the traditional, prevailing 
accounting modality has been that of the point-in-time balance sheet in which the static 
presentation of history has been regarded as more reliable than the uncertain projected 
future (Power, 2015:51). However, as our temporal frames of the future shift 
increasingly towards an “emergency imaginary” of a potentially catastrophic future 
(Opitz & Tellmann, 2015), static presentation of history becomes less and less relevant. 
What matters now is how such a radically uncertain future can be rendered technically 
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visible and acted upon in order not to be lived, but precisely to be survived (Elmer & 
Opel, 2006). Algorithmic risk charges and ORSA dynamically link the balance sheet as 
a point-in-time statement of assets, liabilities and own funds with all current and 
emerging risks which are technically imagined to be faced by the organization and their 
management, effectively removing traditional balance sheet foothold on history and 
resetting it towards the unexpected, embodying the principle that, in the face of a 
radically uncertain future, history is a poor predictor of future outcomes. In this way 
solvency becomes not a “spot” concept – a point estimate of a discrete valuation process 
informed by history – but rather a temporary, and thus fragile outcome of a broader 
organizational anticipatory infrastructure, involving continuous and relentless stress 
testing, governance practices, data collections and monitoring (Power, 2015:50). 
4.3. Counter-Performativity 
In the previous section we sketched out the broad underlying logic of S2’s algorithmic 
pricing of solvency. Specifically, we demonstrated how S2 institutes itself as a 
legitimate technology for governance-at-a-distance by redefining practices inside the 
insurance organization (bringing down silo barriers) and by claiming to dissolve the 
long-lived disputes on the role of regulation itself; how it neutralizes and depoliticizes 
its algorithmic claims of risk-sensitive capital charges, making available, in this way, 
reliable and relevant prices for individual and enterprise-wide risks; and finally how, by 
separating calculations of current and future solvency status, S2 manages to interlink 
them, mirroring, in this way, the dynamics of a radically uncertain economic 
environment and giving due consideration to both short- and long- term issues of 
continuity and survival in the face of a potentially catastrophic future. In so doing, S2 
succeeds in integrating accounting (with its emphasis on representations of history at 
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points of time) with forward-looking risk budgeting and enterprise risk management 
(Power, 2015; Young, 2011). 
In this section, we will attempt to take one step further and disclose the counter-
performative effects of S2’s algorithmic technology. That is, we will try to identify 
mechanisms that reveal how the practical use of S2’s model enacts economic processes 
to undermine its accuracy76.  By attempting to analyse S2’s technology and claims 
through the lens of performativity (Beunza and Stark, 2009; Callon, 1998, MacKenzie, 
2003, 2006; Svetlova, 2012), we acknowledge that the financial and insurantial model 
advanced by S2 does not neutrally represent but actively participates in the construction 
of the financial and insurantial system at large. If the S2 model approximated an 
objective financial and insurantial reality with a 99.5% level of confidence as it claims, 
then we would only be left to celebrate S2’s intellectual breakthrough so that regulators 
and policyholders would have nothing left to do but go home, reassured that insurers 
would deliver their promises since, after all, failure is inscribed in 1 out of 200 years. 
However, nobody seems to be celebrative, and nobody seems to be going home. In fact, 
the regulatory staff at the Bank of England reassured the Queen that their job was 
precisely to stay vigilant to combat complacency and stave off another crisis – an 
indirect hint to counter-performativity.  
Our approach will restrict itself to the examination of two counter-performative effects: 
procyclicality (in both the asset and the liability side) and gaming of the model. 
  
                                                          
76 MacKenzie (2008:19) distinguishes between Barnesian performativity and counter-performativity. In 
the former, economic processes are changed such that they better correspond to the model; in the latter, 




The simplicity of the idea embedded within risk-based capital, i.e., more risk requires 
more capital, comes with an implicit ontological commitment regarding risk: risk is a 
single, “real” entity which is inherent in the characteristics of a financial instrument 
(WC, 2009:4). So, all we need to do is design the right “risk-o-meter”, place it under 
the financial instrument and record the relevant level of risk. Such a process will show 
us that, for example, an equity is riskier than a bond and a derivative is riskier than cash. 
In the framework of such an implicit ontological commitment, capital requirements are 
calculated, and (enterprise) risk management is enacted. 
The obligatory implementation of the S2 model by all EU (re)insurers commits them to 
following the same ontological principle which leads them to convergent investment 
strategies. For example, it has been noted that between 2001 and 2010, European 
insurers cut their allocation to equities (which are considered “risky”) by 11 percentage 
points (equivalent to more than €1 trillion in current value) while their US counterparts 
did not. One of the key explanations put forth is S2 (Focarelli, 2017:349-50), i.e., the 
product of following a risk management logic that satisfies the same ontological 
commitment. 
Such technically produced homogeneity may yield performative effects in normal times 
but has the potential to cause disastrous counter-performative, procyclical effects in 
non-normal times (i.e., exactly at that time when every solvency regime is asked to 
perform). For example, in an environment of falling markets, insurers may sell risky 
assets to comply with their risk tolerance limits (Rae et al., 2017:9). Such actions drive 
prices down further, such that, ultimately, if many insurers become forced sellers, a 
solvency crisis could be created for the insurance and the financial services industries 
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at large. In effect, S2’s use of one-year Value-at-Risk, which carries within it the 
assumption that market volatility is a good measure of risk (Haldane et al., 2014), and 
its move towards market consistency increase the risk of herd behaviour and, thus, 
procyclicality.  
The paradox here is that where market consistency succeeds in incentivizing the insurer 
to introduce and implement proper risk management practices, such practices, in turn, 
may ultimately undermine solvency. For example, a typical sophisticated risk 
management practice is delta hedging, which tries to manage equity risk in UK with-
profits funds77. Delta hedging aims to provide protection in case of falling equity 
markets, as it involves selling equities and moving into cash. Thus, such a strategy is, 
in itself, procyclical (Rae et al., 2017:35). What is more, alternative asset practices may 
be crowded out: an asset manager may perceive an opportunity to buy assets that appear 
cheap in a falling market. However, in risk management technical terms, this is read as 
increasing risk positions which triggers requirements for additional capital to allow for 
the possibility that markets could continue to fall (Rae et al., 2017:35).  
The point is that, since risk has been ontologically disambiguated and endowed with the 
status of being “real” and inherent in the nature of the financial and insurantial 
instruments, its management becomes more of a “processual” issue. Indeed, S2 
embraces such a process-driven, technocratic attitude. What matters is not what an 
insurer does with an equity, but that the equity is “bad”, per se, for an insurer. That is, 
an equity portfolio is read technically as increasing the insurer’s risk profile, and the 
context of its use cannot be captured by the technical radar of the risk-sensitive capital. 
The same holds the other way around: until 2008, mortgages were considered a safe 
                                                          
77 These are life insurance contracts which participate in the profits of the company; thus, they can also 
be seen as investment products. 
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asset; after 2008, we learnt that, apparently, we can do many risky things with safe 
assets (WC, 2009:4). 
The point can be made more dramatically if we turn to the liability side and consider 
insurance risk, which is specific to the insurance industry, i.e., not shared with the 
banking or asset management industries. A risk-sensitive capital may make sense for 
financial instruments such as equities, bonds, derivatives, rated and unrated entities 
(with the qualification of the unintended procyclical effects), but has a peculiar sense 
when it is extended to insurance risk. Insurance risk is defined in the same way as 
market risk, i.e., following financial theory definition: it is the risk that the actual 
experiencing of the liability claims may emerge differently than expected (ending with, 
for example, more claims than anticipated from the premiums received). 
The extension of the philosophy of risk-sensitive capital charges in the field of insurance 
risk does not seem so naturally obvious. This is because, in such a framework, high 
reserves result in higher capital charges (the same way higher amounts of equity result 
in higher capital charges), but this is counterintuitive in that, traditionally, a high 
reserve78 ratio relative to premiums was considered a healthy indicator.  
Our point has to do with the way reserves are seen under S2’s risk-sensitive capital 
relative to the traditional sensibility. Formerly, reserves were perceived as one of the 
most important allies of the insurer’s effort to honor future liabilities as they fell due. 
Reserves were (and still are) kept within the insurer’s books for many years, for a variety 
of reasons. These include the particularly long-term nature of some of the liabilities 
                                                          
78 As already discussed, reserves are kept by insurers to meet future benefits. They are one of the main 
tools to safeguard policyholders’ expectations. So, high reserve levels are traditionally considered a 
“good” thing for policyholders. In pre-S2 regimes, prudential margins were usually injected within 
reserves in order to increase the total reserve amount and ensure that they will always prove adequate, 
even if future experience unfolds adversely. 
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(such as pensions), delays in the settlement of a claim which, in some cases, takes time 
to evaluate the entire size of, and disputes in the claim amount which have been 
relegated to the courts to decide. Indeed, an immense variety of reasons may inhibit a 
claim to be settled rapidly and force it to remain within reserves. Thus, the liabilities of 
the insurers (i.e., their reserves) exhibit a natural “latency”: they are illiquid and non-
runnable (in contrast with banks), and they display a kind of “maturity” process as time 
passes which is unique for each insurer. Part of the everyday insurance job has been to 
closely monitor this maturity process, be attentive to changes in the patterns of claims 
behavior, unearth and analyze their trends, measure the development of reserve 
expectations relative to the actual experience unfolding, and properly arrange all this 
within the insurer’s collective memory for future navigation. In other words, an insurer 
would cultivate a “deep” mode of attention in order to unearth the social or technical 
fundamentals that drive changes in the maturity patterns.79 Much of the core insurance 
business model has been how to respond to this distinctively “latent” activity that 
differentiated the insurance sector from the rest of the financial industry. It is on this 
basis that unique insurance strategies, such as hold-to-maturity liability-driven 
investments, reinsurance, actuarial provisions and others, have been developed. For 
example, the unique capacity of the insurance sector to embrace liquidity risk (in 
contrast with banks which have a limited capacity to hold assets that cannot be sold 
quickly) should be mostly attributed to this subtle differentiation.  
Within the S2 framework of risk-sensitive capital, reserves are nothing more than one 
more instrument which receives its own capital charges according to its own “riskiness” 
as measured by, for example, the historical volatilities of the different lines of insurance 
                                                          
79 In that respect, reserving and reserve-monitoring were always more than a technical exercise for 
insurers: they were an open window to the world. 
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business. Reserves, in this respect, are not capital-free. They carry risk since they might 
fall above or below their fair value80 and thus are not considered “safe”. In view of this, 
the more an insurer accumulates reserves and the longer it takes for them to “mature”, 
the more she is penalized by being required to set aside higher capital requirements for 
longer periods.  
The contrast is obvious. Under S2, insurers are technically disincentivized to 
accumulate high reserve levels for long maturity periods. They might thus seek ways to 
turn their liabilities liquid by, for example, speeding up their claims settlement rates. 
Alternatively, they may try to sell their liability portfolios to a third party, or package 
them within insurance-linked securities81 and upload them to the markets. Furthermore, 
they may start offering new products with enhanced liquidity features, which transfer 
uncertainty to policyholders and decrease the maturity horizon. Such efforts effectively 
transform insurers’ liability side from a more “latent” to a more “runnable” instrument. 
Insurers thus tend to converge their liability profile to the rest of the financial sector’s 
(banking and asset management) – a shift that enhances procyclicality effects by 
gradually removing some of the fundamental distinctiveness of the insurance sector, 
hurting the diversity of the financial flora and fauna.  
Accordingly, the paradox of risk management continues: a company taking measures 
for good risk management such as increased tariffs or more prudent reserving is 
“punished” by higher capital requirements, and vice versa: taking higher risks (i.e., 
under-reserving) results in lower capital requirements (Doff, 2016:593).  
  
                                                          
80 In the traditional sensibility, over-reserving was not considered risky; only under-reserving was. 
However, this is not the case with S2, which sees dispersion around the fair value (due to over- or under-
estimations) equally risky. 




(b) Gaming the model 
The technical structure of the S2 model inevitably requires technical skills to operate. 
Its operations demand highly skilled personnel82 that can mobilize its vast technical 
infrastructure. The logic of the S2 risk-based capital model is not difficult to 
comprehend: it inevitably draws in users to translate key elements of their everyday 
business into technical terms that can work as inputs within the risk-based model. The 
user, in other words, learns to see the world through the technical lens inscribed within 
the model itself. For example, a bond is not a “real” entity that pays coupons at pre-
specified dates and returns its face value at its maturity date; instead, it is a set of 
elements each displaying its own risk sensitivity, and thus, must each be “dividuated” 
(Deleuze, 1992) and assigned to the appropriate individual risk category (e.g., interest 
rate risk, spread risk). In this way, the user and, along with her, the insurance 
organization as a whole learn to see the financial and insurantial universe through 
technical “risk factors” which contribute positively or negatively to the overall risk 
charges. Such an algorithmic view inevitably privileges the technocratic processual 
aspect of the model (which serves the ontological commitment of risk as a “real” entity 
inherent within instruments themselves) and remains blind to other, less technical and 
processual, but more behavioural and contextual elements of the business. The end 
result is to see solvency as a “technical” exercise that requires optimization in the quest 
for capital efficiency.  
In a mere optimization exercise, however, the problem is that the model itself can be 
gamed. That is, capital experts end up working to minimize capital requirements and 
maximize the solvency indicator, without necessarily turning the company more solvent 
                                                          




– in fact, usually making it less solvent due to the “technical complacency” created. 
Danielsson (2009) is quite telling when he writes: 
“One thing we have learned in the crisis is that banks that were thought to have 
adequate capital have been found lacking. A number of recent studies have 
looked at the various calculations of bank capital and found that some of the 
most highly capitalised banks under Basel 2 are the lowest capitalised under 
the leverage ratio…” 
What is the source of this gaming? For the most part, the answer is the inputs of the 
model themselves. The implicit assumption is that, initially, raw data are entered within 
the model, and such raw data is then algorithmically manipulated in order for the model 
to “produce” the outputs, i.e., the prices per level of risk (individual and/or enterprise-
wide). Such a neat visualization misses the fact that inputs are not simple, given nor 
transparent raw data on the value of which every mind converges. Instead, they are 
estimates, meaning they themselves are, for the most part, mediations derived from 
other interconnected models which, in their turn, enact new dependencies on further 
data and associated assumptions and interpretations. S2 should thus not be seen as an 
algorithmic chain that transparently binds raw data with prices of risk that accurately 
represent the level of risk absorbed from the world out there. Rather, it is more 
accurately described as a modelling “swarm” (Bennet, 2010:32) of flows that participate 
in a particular ontological choreography (Introna, 2016:25; Thompson, 2007) in which 
each member can potentially determine the output in a more or less significant way.  
For example, during the pragmatic use of the model, one (quite powerful) way to check 
the quality of the inputs is through the output itself. Anomalies in the output/result may 
dictate reconfigurations of the inputs (at the level of data and/or assumptions); they are 
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not instantaneously swallowed without further ado83. That is, it is not the case that first, 
inputs are stabilized and then, results are naturally born in such a stabilized 
environment. Instead, both inputs and outputs are stabilized simultaneously in a 
recurring process. This suggests that inputs and outputs are not neatly separated a priori. 
Rather, their borders are situated in a porous space where they are being drawn and 
redrawn in a recurring negotiating process by both an anticipated “forward” (i.e., from 
input to output) and an unanticipated “backward” (from output to input) use of the 
model. 
If the S2 model’s output is mediated by layers of intersected interpretations instead of 
a direct connection to reality, then there is a broad way to not just consciously game the 
model, but more importantly, to unconsciously game it, too. The S2 model may counter-
perform even under the best intentions of its users (and initial designers). If then that is 
the case, where does that leave solvency? Is solvency (and for that matter, S2 as a 
particular solvency regime) hopelessly caught in a vicious hermeneutical black hole 
from which nothing can escape? We will attempt to provide an answer in the following 
concluding sections.  
4.4. The Aporia 
We have claimed that the technical availability of prices for every level of risk 
(individual and enterprise-wide) assumed by an insurance company has opened a field 
with a new set of possibilities. Most crucially, new possibilities arose for a scientific 
and technical self-governance via legitimate risk management practices on an enterprise 
                                                          
83 Typically, users keep a record of successive period results. Differences in successive periods results 
are always checked and analyzed since they carry much informational value about the appropriateness of 
data and assumptions used. For example, an unanticipated peak or fall of a result beyond a reasonably 
expected range relative to its historical development is thoroughly scrutinized. Such thorough 
investigations may dictate for a different perspective on the way a specific set of data or assumptions has 
been historically used or currently interpreted. 
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level, beyond silo barriers which typically obscured interconnections. The possibilities 
disclosed do not restrict themselves to current assessments but rather institute a decisive 
forward-looking and anticipating organizational infrastructure, suitable to come to 
terms with a potentially disruptive and catastrophic future. Such possibilities are 
thought to serve the main objectives of S2, which are policyholder protection and 
financial stability.   
However, a performative analysis of the S2 model revealed a paradoxical aspect: the 
more risk is managed technocratically, i.e., the more insurers strive to implement and 
use the S2 model in an efficient self-disciplinary way, the more the insurer herself (due 
to efficient gaming) or her macro environment (due to procyclical effects) turn unstable, 
endangering solvency and policyholder protection. This, we claim, is an inherent aporia 
within the S2 project itself, serving as an aspect of a more general aporia in the concept 
of solvency more broadly.  
An aporia for Derrida is an event that prevents a metaphysical discourse from fulfilling 
its promised unity – not a contradiction that can be eventually resolved into the unity of 
the concept, but an “untotalizable” problem at the heart of the concept, disrupting its 
trajectory and opening out its closure (Burke, 2002:4-5). It is not just a rhetorical term 
to denote doubt or “difficulty in choosing” (Royle, 2008:92); it is more radical, a sort 
of absolute blockage – not in the way a huge rock suddenly collapses and blocks the 
road indefinitely, but more of an event whereby “success fails” and “failure succeeds” 
(Derrida, 1986:35). Such an aporetic structure denotes that no notion, including that of 




This point differentiates the approach taken here from other analyses in the Social 
Studies of Finance that equally account for performativity effects. As already mentioned 
in the introduction, Lockwood (2015) is keen on stressing the (counter) performative 
effects of Value-at-Risk financial models, which share the same ontological architecture 
as the S2 model. Although Lockwood (2015) acknowledges that she does “not advocate 
specific financial regulatory reform”, her performative critique is offered to reveal 
current shortcomings of VaR and diagnose how its dominance makes it difficult “to 
create space for alternative or additional ways [such as subjective judgments and 
macroprudential regulation84] to acknowledge, act in, and respond to a world of risk, 
uncertainty, and reflexivity.” (2015:749). After all, the first step towards a healthy 
organization is to have a clear diagnosis of the particular disease that endangers it: then, 
and only then, does it become possible to fight the disease and restore or preserve the 
organization’s healthy status. Performativity is thus used as a resource in such a noble 
cause: to enhance solvency and stave off instability. 
Our perspective is closer to the work of Svetlova (2012) who claims that “models are 
not performative per se. The performative power of models depends on the way they 
are used.” (2012:421). Her point is that many models, 
“fail to be performative because they are part of ‘calculative cultures’ where 
market participants must adjust them to market complexity. … Model users 
account for unrealistic assumptions and neglected factors by applying their 
own judgements. Precisely because this judgement is necessary, the model is 
not an ultimate determinant of decision and action.” (Svetlova, 2012:422) 
                                                          
84 Macroprudential regulation is an extra layer of regulation focused on the macroeconomic curbing of 
the procyclical effects that are created by the microeconomic use of S2 and Value-at-Risk-type models. 
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Our argument against Lockwood’s strategy is that her appeal to a “soft” rationality 
capable of policing, or delimiting, or substituting “hard” modeling cannot restore any 
healthy solvency status. This is not because something alternative, more (or perhaps 
less) is still needed. The point is to move beyond notions of deficiencies, not by 
attempting to compensate for them but by precisely letting them be, by realizing that 
we are always already “deficient” – and we call that “efficient”. For Svetlova, we simply 
cannot know whether a model may perform, even if widely adopted, since models are 
always and already open to soft adjustments to assume relevance in the “meshwork” 
(Ingold, 2011) and complexities of the market life happening (Introna, 2018:8). In a 
similar vein, counter-performance alternatives, such as subjective judgments and 
macroprudential regulation (the ones Lockwood appeals to), may simply fail, even if 
widely adopted, since such soft imperatives are always and already open to hard 
adjustments in order to assume reliability and allow for responsible decision making.    
In fact, S2, despite its commonly recognized science-based, technical and hard 
structure, is surprisingly keen on providing a wide range of soft alternatives to manage 
its own potential model performativity. For example, as we have already discussed in 
the introduction, despite the commitment of S2 to market consistency (that is, to fairness 
and transparency), calls for prudence (which is subjective and opaque) are central within 
its standards (as if the co-existence of market consistency and prudence is 
unproblematic or natural). Further demands for soft qualitative overlays, such as 
proportionality, simplifications and the four-eyes principle, are scattered throughout the 
S2 Directive. 
What is more, a surprisingly extended range of tools is provided to manage market 
consistency’s tendency to beget procyclicality. For example, the equity stress in the 
standard formula includes a countercyclical capital requirement (called “symmetric 
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adjustment”); its effect is to temporarily reduce the capital requirement and provide 
breathing space for insurers to manage the timing of any asset disposals (Rae et al., 
2017:36). Additionally, a so-called Long-Term Guarantees (LTG) package includes a 
set of measures with the aim of eliminating “artificial” volatility from the balance sheet 
of insurers by removing S2 away from “full” market consistency. Such a package has 
received fierce criticism on the grounds that it is not “economic” (Danielson et al., 2011; 
Swarup, 2012; Wuthrich, 2011), i.e., not scientifically sound.  
Another issue is the so-called Ultimate Forward Rate (UFR), which has a material 
impact on the discounting of deep long-term liabilities of the insurance industry for 
which no liquid financial instrument is available. In this case, the S2 yield curve is 
extrapolated from a stipulated Last Liquid Point (LLP) to the UFR in such a way that 
the extrapolated curve converges to the UFR over a period of many years (Rae et al., 
2017:11). Obviously, both the determination of the UFR and the rate of convergence 
towards it can only be “imagined” and are heavily dependent on the selected method of 
calculation. This is why their nature is widely considered more as the locus of political 
compromises and less as science. In fact, Sven Giegold, a member of the European 
Parliament, came so far as to argue that “the setting of the UFR (the expected long-term 
level of future interest rates) requires democratic legitimation as it represents a 
collective bet on long-term economics. It [thus] should not be left to the discretion of a 
[technical] authority [such as EIOPA]” (Solvency II Wire, 2013, italics added). 
Another soft issue is the use of regulatory flexibility: although under S2 it looks as 
though insurers would go technically insolvent before any forbearance is possible (Rae 
et al., 2017:40), a new article added to the S2 Directive after the financial crisis (Article 
28) stipulates that “authorities shall duly consider the potential impact of their decisions 
on the stability of the financial system... In times of exceptional movements in financial 
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markets, supervisory authorities shall take into account the potential pro-cyclical effects 
of their actions.” (Hulle, 2017:317). What is “exceptional” obviously rests on imaginary 
discretion; for example, one cannot but wonder, under the current low interest rate 
environment, how low and how long interest rates need to remain for an “exceptional” 
market condition to be declared (Rae et al., 2017:39).  
That said, beyond such explicit soft transgressions which blur the scientific application 
of S2’s standards, we would like to suggest that S2 incorporates in its application an 
inexplicit, and thus more radical, play between the technical and the prudential, the 
scientific and non-scientific, deep inside its algorithmic code.   
Our case can be found in the calibration of the equity risk submodule (one of the market 
risk submodules). In a simplified view, the whole point of the equity risk submodule is 
to come up with a risk charge for the equity holdings of a company that will ensure a 
99.5% market calibration. In simple terms, if an insurer holds an equity portfolio of, 
e.g., €1 million, the point is to find out the most the insurer could expect to lose over 
the next year with a 99.5% level of confidence. Would it be, for example, €300k, thus 
resulting in a risk charge of 30%? Or €400k, thus resulting in a risk charge of 40%? As 
already discussed, in the S2 scientific framework, only historical, empirical market data 
can answer this question, not political narratives about how markets work or should 
work. In the calibration study that was carried out by EIOPA85, we read that, based on 
similar technical analyses, there exist two views; one is called the “majority view” 
(because it is supported by the majority of member states) and calls for a 45% risk 
charge while the other, called the “minority view”, calls for a 39% risk charge (CEIOPS, 
2010:41). What is interesting is how, within the study, it is demonstrated in an evidence-
                                                          




based, technical and scientific way that the 39% minority view “understates the equity 
stress” (CEIOPS, 2010:39), i.e., it does not constitute a “truly” 99.5% market-based 
calibration, and thus should not be opted for. However, within the final S2 requirements, 
the risk charge that was finally selected was indeed the 39%.86 So, what happened 
between the calibration proposal of the 45% scientific view and the final legislative 
selection of the 39% risk charge? Obviously, a range of explanations can be provided, 
from those that advance a “conspiracy/power theory” (i.e., the insurance industry lobby 
overpowering the scientific, economic and evidence-based calibration of the EIOPA) to 
less suspicious ones, that simply point to expert judgments and concerns ultimately 
tipping the balance in favor of the minority view. 87  
Whatever the reasons for the adoption of the lower risk charge of the minority view, our 
point has to do with the “aporia” involved in the calibration/application project. 
Specifically, an economically pure calibration at such a high level of 99.5% renders 
capital requirements so burdensome for the industry that it will necessarily end up 
reducing its diversity by allowing only larger and thus fewer insurers to achieve 
solvency by S2 standards, which in itself implies an increase of the insurance industry’s 
systemic risk – precisely what is to be avoided in the first place. On the other hand, a 
looser, non-economic calibration may preserve the industry’s diversity by allowing 
more and smaller insurers to achieve solvency by S2 standards; however, it opens up 
the possibility for a higher rate of future insolvencies, eventually increasing the 
insurance industry’s systemic risk. Therefore, in the case of S2 calibration/application, 
it seems that it is impossible to hold the lines between the economic and non-economic, 
the scientific and the non-scientific. The only way to achieve a scientific/economic 
                                                          
86 Article 169 of the final Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/35. 
87 What is equally interesting to note is how the technical analysis of the calibration project is supported 
by a “majority” and “minority” view – as if the technical does not enjoy any “automatic” legitimacy. 
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solvency calibration is precisely by breaching the economic and evidence-based 
conditions that make it possible and allow for non-economic, political and expert 
judgments (its “other”) to be heard.  
In other words, for the S2 model to preserve its ideal technical character (which 
legitimates solvency capital calculations and its self-governance capabilities), it needs 
to be “de-idealized” (Svetlova, 2013) to account precisely for the aporetic structure of 
its raison d’être (i.e., solvency). In that respect, as we move deeper into the “tails of the 
future”, that is, into a world that is getting more complex, more interconnected and thus 
potentially more destructive and disruptive, “the relationships between science, 
expertise, and decision are radically rearticulated so that distinctions between ‘science’ 
and ‘non-science’ become more malleable.” (Amoore, 2013:9).  
4.5. The Play 
This brings us to our last point regarding the relation of our claims with respect to the 
existing theorizing of performativity. We begin by addressing the crucial question: how 
do we account for all this range of “soft” transgressions within the S2 standards? What 
are we to make of S2 when it is simultaneously criticized, on the one hand, for 
displaying a disproportionate bias towards scientific and economic technicality, and on 
the other, for not being scientific and economic enough, as it has allowed the existence 
of such soft measures, and even “hacking” its own algorithmic code in the first place? 
Are these mere controversies to be ironed out in the future? We want to suggest that 
they are not. In fact, in light of Svetlova’s argument that “[i]nstitutional design might 
obstruct the potential model performativity” (2012:422), we claim, in a more 
provocative way, that S2’s own “fragmented” standards obstruct its potential 
performativity. The sheer effort to frame solvency in hard and scientific terms is already 
enframed by a host of soft and non-scientific requirements.  
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Derrida’s aporia is a useful insight that should help us go beyond notions of 
“controversies” that can presumably be ironed out in later, more sophisticated versions, 
or notions of “alternatives” that can better resolve or supplement existing deficiencies. 
The point is not simply to “create space for alternative or additional ways” (Lockwood, 
2015:749) in the fight against uncertainty (insolvency), but to denote how every space 
that gathers a meaning is always and already fragmented, constantly transgressed so 
that the thing itself (market consistency or prudence, solvency or insolvency) slips away 
(Derrida, 1973:104). This is what makes Derrida so relevant: for him, the text, i.e., any 
discourse, whether political, social, philosophical, or as in our case, regulative in the 
form of technical standards, is the field of operation of deconstruction – a field which 
harbors within itself that which transgresses it (Cooper, 1989). In that respect, our paper 
has a distinctive contribution to make. According to the existing literature, it is 
acknowledged that the performativity of a scientific model is limited due to institutional 
reasons and bureaucratic constraints (Brisset, 2016; Henriksen, 2013; Svetlova, 2012). 
In our case of the S2 market-consistent and risk-based capital scientific model, we come 
to see how its own technical standards, the written text upon which solvency comes into 
being, harbors in itself a double bind: the possibility of performation and its negation. 
The text itself both extends and limits performativity of the model in an undecidable 
way. This is in line with Callon, for whom what really matters is this back-and-forth, 
uncertain and staggering movement of performation, for which nothing can be 
guaranteed (Boldyrev et al., 2016:17).  
This textual “pre-performative force”, prior to the distinction between actual 
performativity and counter-performativity, is evident even in the most exemplar case of 
the performativity corpus, the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) option pricing model 
(MacKenzie, 2003; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003). The BSM model has the typical 
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structure of a model: within its text, a specific set of inputs is defined, which when 
algorithmically manipulated on the basis of a particular set of assumptions, yields a 
price option. MacKenzie (2007) and Svetlova (2014) discuss how there were two phases 
in the BSM model’s life: one before 1987, when the internal consistency of the text of 
the model was not contested, contributing to its performativity, and one after 1987, 
when it was contested and thus counter-performed. Before 1987, the model operated in 
an anticipated “forward” way: from its inputs and assumptions to the output. However, 
after 1987, the model operated in an unanticipated, “backward” form: investors began 
reading it backwards and started using a type of cheating called “volatility fudging” to 
obtain the price they considered “correct”. In other words, “[i]nvestors (mis)used the 
model as a structure to tell their truth about the market.” (Svetlova, 2014:90-1). The 
implied performativity twist of 1987, i.e., the shift from the forward to the backward 
use of the model, is consistent with a Derridean reading, according to which there is 
nothing outside the text, i.e., outside the context (Derrida, 1988) of the views and 
practices of investors. This means that, on the one hand, the option pricing model does 
not achieve any transcendental height outside the context of practices that could 
guarantee its forward-directed performance. And on the other, this context of practices 
does not impose itself as an enclosing frame that over-determines option pricing but is 
more of a surprise – an event – which even allows for the “backward-directed” usage 
of a model. In other words, it is an open-ended “process through which collective 
practices are constructed” (Callon et al., 2002:291) according to a network of 
differences and, hence, of referral to the “other” (Derrida, 1988:137). 
For Derrida, any effect-producing system, such as S2 or the BSM model, produces its 
effects by a kind of “spacing”, by producing marks or traces which make nominal 
unities called concepts, or meaning, not merely or primarily in virtue of the intrinsic 
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“substance” of the signifier but in terms of the differential relationship – the space – 
between the signifiers (Caputo, 2000:96). In that respect, models are differential: they 
produce nominal and conceptual unities as effects of the differential play (spacing) 
opened up between their marks or traces. Models, thus, are not oppositional: their 
technicality (idealization) does not undermine subjective judgments (de-idealization). 
But neither are they dialectical: they do not ascend the staircase of the dialectic by going 
through the lower opposites to attain the higher (Olthuis, 2002:84) since, in the 
differential play, what is lower can never be left behind, and there is also no ascending 
staircase involved. 
What is more with this Derridean approach is that difference reestablishes reference in 
a way beyond the traditional confrontation between constructivism (as implied by 
performativity) and “reality checks” (Felin & Foss, 2009; Ferraro et al., 2005, 2009). 
Following Derrida, the capacity of the text of a model to differentiate enables 
signification. The more differential, the more fine-grained it can be. In this way, the 
power of reference increases exponentially with the complexity and richness of the 
differential economy of the model. A rich, differential vocabulary increases the power 
of description and understanding while an impoverished differentiation weakens it. In 
that respect, what is being perceived within the solvency text as an inconsistent 
differentiation between the principle of market values and the introduction of market-
deference measures, or between the paradoxical demand for market consistency and 
prudence, increases rather than obfuscates the understanding of the subtleties of the 
insurance business and its solvency issues. However, if reference thickens through 
differentiation, performativity becomes precisely more undecidable because, on the one 
hand, the increase in reference has the potential to enable the model’s performativity, 
but on the other, the increase in differentiation makes available more strategies and 
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reasons to resist or adjust the model’s recommendations. This is performativity as an 
effect of the play of differences. 
But what Derrida adds to all this is that such a differential play cannot be enclosed or 
regulated – the circle of the play cannot be closed:  
“For it belongs to the very idea of differential play that the play is self-
differentiating, disseminating, and that any such formal rules as one could 
devise would be ‘effects’ of the play not the ‘basis’ of it, subsets of the play of 
signifiers, not rules which govern it.” (Caputo, 2000:98).  
If any assembly of signifiers is always and already set adrift by this differential play, 
then we need to recognize that the distinctions we make between market consistency 
and prudence or science and non-science spring a leak, and that what is carefully 
excluded is actually used. From this point of view, the familiar and persistent question 
of the existing theoretical literature on why some forms of knowledge become 
performative while others do not (Boldyrev et al., 2016:17; Brisset, 2016) loses its 
prominence since the point cannot be to identify those formal mechanisms to which 
performativity subjugates itself – because, even if properly identified, they can only 
explain, but they cannot determine.  
Brisset (2016) identifies three conditions that need to be fulfilled for a theory to be 
performative. What is interesting to note though, is that the S2 model can be argued to 
fulfill all three of these conditions. For example, (1) it is empirical, in that it identifies 
and discriminates between at least two different ways of behaving (opting 
for/dismissing risk efficient/inefficient instruments), (2) it is self-fulfilling, in that all 
insurers are required by law to follow it so that “everybody thinks that everybody 
conforms to it” and (3) it fits with the existing conventions, as it precisely builds and 
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extends itself upon the widely accepted financial economics conventions. So, does that 
make it performative? No, as long as the differential play introduced by the S2 text 
itself, precisely to account for solvency, simultaneously introduces its own 
deconstructable conditions. In that respect, Brisset’s (2016) conditions may be 
necessary, but they are not sufficient. It is not enough that everything be in line and 
fulfilled; and conversely, it might be enough, even if nothing is in line and fulfilled – 
which is the point in Tartt’s (2016) quote at the beginning of this paper. S2 accesses 
solvency by opening up its own idealized and determinate field of possibilities, but it 
simultaneously de-accesses solvency by rendering it de-idealized and undecidable, 
always-to-come and deferred.  
If performativity is simply an effect of the differential play of the model, then the point 
cannot be about our ability to keep our head in the midst of the play and rationally 
exploit the decoded performativity mechanisms as a resource to regulate solvency or, 
in the framework of a more general noble cause, the financial cycles of booms and busts. 
The point is not to safeguard our entities (insurance entities, in our case) from the 






5. Concluding comments  
The first section of this final chapter summarises the implications and contributions of 
the thesis. This is followed by a discussion of its limitations and the potential avenues 
for future research. 
5.1. Contributions and implications of the research 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the driving force behind this thesis is to bring 
into sharp focus a tension or contradiction that seems to persist in actuarial and financial 
practice.   This is that, on the one hand, there are the efforts of finance and actuarial 
practice to deliver the promise of managing uncertainty and making an indeterminate 
and unknowable future knowable and calculable, and on the other, how such efforts 
seem to contain in themselves a contradiction in that where they succeed precisely, they 
also simultaneously seem to fail. In that respect, the thesis argues that it is not that our 
certainties are temporarily disturbed by uncertainties that will eventually yield, in due 
time, into settlement; rather, it is that our certainties are always and already permeated 
by uncertainties, and vice versa. Thus, what the three papers argue and show is the 
radical and inescapable entanglement of certainty with uncertainty, or of the technical 
with the social, which is not simply oppositional or complementary, but in a more 
fundamental way, aporetic. What this is termed in other words within the thesis as an 
“ongoing play”. 
The thesis explored this research focus on both the asset (first paper) and the liability 
(second paper) sides of an insurance company (second paper). It also explored the risks 
and the nature of the aforementioned contradiction inherent in such asset and liability 
valuations (third paper). 
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By engaging with the existing literature in financial economics, the thesis demonstrated 
that the theories of the Efficient Market Hypothesis and Behavioral Finance share a 
common ontological architecture – a point that runs contrary to the common and 
widespread assumption that these are two competing and largely opposing theories. 
The thesis also makes a contribution by arguing that an investment strategy is not 
designed on the basis of “making money”. Obviously, this does not mean that “return” 
is not a pressing issue for every financial or actuarial practitioner, as is widely 
acknowledged. It rather denotes that “return” is the outcome of a more primordial 
commitment to a background investment style that allows financial entities and 
strategies to show up as something. “Return” in this view simply supports, releases new 
possibilities, or even forces to collapse some of the specific practices of the particular 
investment style. 
The Heideggerian analysis of the first paper also manages to extend the Social Studies 
of Finance’s (SSF) classical argument about the entanglement of the technical and the 
social: financial markets are conditioned by a further entanglement, that of investment 
styles. In fact, if we nullify the distinction between investment styles, the same way SSF 
nullify the distinction between the technical and the social, then what remains is this 
ongoing play of the “sendings” of being, which plays without “why”. If anything enjoys 
autonomy here, it is this play, that seems to carry along SSF’s agencements by its own 
momentum (Caputo, 2000:102). 
The thesis also makes a contribution in that, contrary to the claims of Jarzabkowski 
(2017), the so-called financialization of the insurance liabilities does not uncritically 
expand financial economics (practices oriented to the market with a dominant 
technicalizing aspect) at the expense of actuarial logics (practices oriented to the 
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underlying liabilities with an effective contextualizing aspect). Instead, the arguments 
and analysis presented show that it is possible, as long as the actuarial aspects are 
recognized and then adapted into market-consistent valuations, to preserve the actuarial 
component of the insurance business (Muniesa, 2007).  
What is more, it is revealed that within our modeling valuation practices, an 
autoimmunity process is at work. Such autoimmune tension inheres in the midst of the 
financialization project, “auto-deconstructing” the financial sovereign, and thus the 
modeling valuation practices themselves. 
This is most evident when considering the text of the Solvency II (S2) regulatory 
standards. One of the most central contributions of this thesis is that such a text (and its 
accompanying algorithm), precisely to serve the goal of solvency, can never be made 
unambiguous or free from material paradoxes. However, instead of obfuscating, this 
paradoxical quasi-structure ultimately increases the chances of understanding the 
subtleties of the insurance business and its solvency issues. A theoretical implication 
that follows this recognition is that all the S2 principles, which are designed and 
described within the regulatory text to safeguard solvency, can always be repeated 
differently, even in a way that produces insolvency. In that respect, the regulatory text 
does not remain authoritative because it has secured a solid reference to the financial 
world. On the contrary, it can make a difference, and thus contribute to solvency or to 
insolvency, as long as it remains cut off from any authoritative authorship – that is, 
consistently undoing itself, i.e., “auto-deconstructing”.  
In this respect, performativity is reconsidered as a play of differences. Such rethinking 
extends the current literature on performativity by not merely including in its notion the 
“possibility of failure” (Brisset, 2016:180), but by focusing more decisively on not 
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knowing – a point that leaves the issue of performativity open and unsettled. This does 
not imply that “anything goes”, since the power of reference increases exponentially 
with the complexity and richness of the differential economy of the model. However, if 
reference thickens through differentiation, performativity becomes precisely more 
undecidable because, on the one hand, the increase in reference has the potential to 
enable the model’s performativity, but on the other, the increase in differentiation makes 
available more strategies and reasons to resist or adjust the model’s recommendations. 
Now, what can be said about the practical implications of these contributions? Does 
awareness of the aporia change practice or not? In what follows, I will attempt to 
provide some more concrete suggestions on the practical implications of adopting an 
aporetic understanding of our valuing practices. As an opening remark, I would suggest 
that it minimally allows for the possibility of changing one’s orientation to one’s valuing 
practices. By saying this, I want to signal that there is a subtle, but very significant 
difference between changing the practice and changing the orientation towards the 
practice. The practice of the modeling of actuarial valuation has, for example, changed 
with the advent of S2 and more generally, with the ascendance of the financial 
economics paradigm. But such a change does not necessarily imply that the orientation 
towards the practice has changed as well. This is because the latter is conditioned by 
the wider ontological horizon on the basis of which the practice itself already makes 
sense. And it seems that the practice of actuarial and financial valuation—the act of 
pricing risk and thus of begetting certainty—remains under the spell of a horizon of 
ontological “neutrality”. By this I mean that the typical reflective orientation of 
modelers is to take the relevant valuation practices as capable of freeing (‘neutralizing’) 
themselves from any material ontological bias in order to produce a value that stands 
transparently present – i.e. transparent and unambiguous all the way through. However, 
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for Heidegger, the very attempt to proceed without an already assumed ontological 
grounding is itself an ontological project which presupposes the separability of 
reflective consciousness from concrete first-order experience, which is embedded in 
language, historical tradition, and culture (Caputo, 1999:54).  From this Heideggerian 
perspective, any practical implication can only have substance to the degree that it is 
accepted that the preconditions under which valuation practices labor, can never be fully 
exposed. As such, these preconditions (to the dismay of many) can never be rectified, 
debugged and thus ‘neutralized’—especially since, for Derrida, such conditions of 
possibilities are always already conditions of impossibilities.  
For regulators, this means that a regulative standard can never become unambiguous 
and free from material paradoxes—even to the point of invalidating the very original 
regulative aspirations. In this way, how the regulative standard is going to play out can 
never be regulated – its performance remains unregulated. This is because for every 
text—including a regulative and technical text—its signifiers neither signify what is 
given from the outside, nor express already internally constituted (i.e. given) standards. 
Rather, every text is always and already caught within a systematic play of signifiers 
and thus is subject to its own blind spots, which always and already preserve the 
possibility of a new reading.  
For practitioners, on the other hand, it means that their models can never be used 
consistently and unambiguously to safely steer their way through uncertainty — the 
success or failure of a model (or of a regulative standard for that matter) is ultimately 
a unique, unrepeatable and thus surprising event.   
As already discussed in the second and third papers, the LTG package of measures that 
is included within the S2 valuation rule-book, recognizes the long-term nature of the 
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insurance business and thus allows insurance liabilities’ valuation to be de-linked from 
market values. Such relief from the requirements of market-consistency, preserves the 
old-established possibility of insurers to manage their business in a counter-cyclical 
way and thus operate as long-term stabilizers of the economic and financial cycle (by 
e.g. fostering lending and investment with long-term perspective).  
If this is so, then, why shouldn’t regulators and practitioners alike not simply take the 
LTG package as a conscious and prudent choice that carefully folded into the 
financialization project what is most desirable of the insurance sector, mainly, its long-
term perspective and possibility for counter-cyclical management, and rather see it as a 
deconstructive effect of the very attempt of fair valuing insurance liabilities?  After all, 
this was a choice thoroughly researched, debated, and eventually accepted by most of 
the participating stakeholders, in an open and democratic negotiation during the S2 
development process. 
A possible answer (if any) is that the autoimmunity view matters, as long as it remains 
disturbing and unwilling of providing any assurances — as long as it sides with the 
original difficulties in life, its breaks and irregularities. It matters, if it allows attention 
to be redirected from, for example, that exceptional day of the LTG agreement that 
supposedly secured the possibility of counter-cyclically managing the insurance 
business, to the everyday, routine working practices through which this package is de-
constituted. In this respect, it makes clear that counter-cyclical management is not the 
result of a package, but the effect of an ongoing autoimmunity process that disturbs and 
destabilizes choices and packages. In this context, counter-cyclicality is an effect of the 
infinite drifting of our packages, agreements and aspirations. It is never possible to seize 
the origin (i.e. the day the LTG package was felicitously constituted) and hold it fast—
as the typical orientation to the practice presupposes. For Heidegger, the origin always 
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recedes, withdraws—for Derrida, it always defers itself (Caputo, 1999:57). Thus, for 
the practitioner, the awareness of such an aporia changes radically the orientation 
towards the practice itself—the orientation becomes the awareness of awareness itself 
(Braver, 2013). Such an orientation transforms the practicing modeler into one that is 
more attentive to the other—or, to the otherness of the other (to what withdraws or 
defers itself). And, in so doing, opens up the possibility to experience the model as an 
uncertain gift that is always and already given; its performance cannot be guaranteed 
neither by its socially constructed nature, nor by its firm roots within the soils of 
financial reality—as a gift, it is simply unprogrammable, uncontrollable and surprising. 
Such orientation thus, opens up the possibility for an experience of thankfulness and 
gratitude towards certain uncertainty that lies beyond the hard complexities of financial 
reality or the soft indeterminacies of societal constructiveness. Such an aporetic 
practitioner might seem to do the same things but that same things would indeed be 
done very differently.  
Hedge fund manager David Einhorn (2008:11-12) suggests that  
“[a] risk manager’s job is to worry about whether the bank is putting itself at 
risk in the unusual times... This... makes value-at-risk relatively... potentially 
catastrophic when its use creates a false sense of security among senior 
managers and watchdogs.”  
How does one make sense of such a comment and practically account for it? One 
possible way is to insist, as Lockwood (2015) does, that such a recognition gestures 
towards alternative practices by focusing on the deficiencies, and specifically the 
counter-performativity effects (“creat[ing] a false sense of security”) of a technical 
measure, such as Value-at-Risk. Thus, it can be accounted for practically by letting the 
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risk management practice be informed by alternative possibilities, such as expert, 
subjective judgements or different measures that have the capacity to mitigate model 
risk (i.e., performative effects).  
However, for reasons already shown, such an interpretation uses performativity as a 
resource. If we ignore performativity as a resource and focus instead on this Derridean 
“pre-performative force” (Derrida & Caputo, 2008:194), i.e., on that prior impossible 
possibility always and already inscribed within our practices, then how can one describe 
and practically account for that prior impossible possibility?  
Let us attempt to do just that. A model will always calculate a possible loss for a risk 
manager. A model is, thus, the manager’s best possibility to say something and plan a 
strategy, i.e., to disambiguate. However, as Einhorn (2008) suggests, the manager’s job 
does not stop there: her job is to worry how what is outside the model (i.e., its 
limitations, exclusions and shortcomings) may equally put her institution at risk. In 
other words, for the manager to reach a decision, he needs to embrace an impossibility: 
not to enhance the model’s capabilities—i.e. further advance the model’s possibilities, 
that is, further sophisticate what the model already includes or further expand it to 
include alternative measures—but read the model in a deconstructive way, that is, as an 
openness to its ‘other’, to what falls short of, to its impossibility. This would mean using 
her model as a representation not of something present (for example, a “real” inherent 
risk), but of something absent; it is not the presence of the “other” that fills the model, 
but its absence. Furthermore: not just of something absent, of that which is always left 
over, that which overflows (Callon, 1998), always slipping out of our conceptual claws, 
but of the interplay of presence and absence, the unsettled, unsettling fluctuation 
between presence and absence—in its mysterious for Heidegger, and undecidable for 
Derrida, form (Caputo, 1987:270;272).  
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Once the risk manager relates via his model to the other as the other, then something 
incalculable comes on the scene (Derrida & Caputo, 2008:17)  ̶  something which cannot 
be reduced to a past pattern, a forward-looking estimation, nor a regulatory standard. 
We call this, precisely, a practical, responsible decision. In the words of Derrida, 
“For a decision to be...responsible, it must, in its proper moment if there is one, 
be both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve the law and also 
destroy it or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, 
at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its 
principle.” (Derrida 1990:961). 
 
5.2. Limitations of the research 
As already discussed in the introduction, the researcher has an extensive professional 
background as an actuarial and financial consultant for a significant amount of time. 
Consequently, a limitation of this research project is that it seems to rely to a 
considerable degree on the experiences of the researcher, since it is this set of 
experiences that allow him to distil his subject matter and accompanying empirical data.  
However, it should be stressed that the point of the research is not to make an empirical 
argument, but an ontological one, i.e., not to advocate for specific empirical changes, 
but to disclose conditions of possibilities that inform actuarial and financial practices of 
managing uncertainty. 
If this is the case, then it is reasonable to wonder if other philosophical orientations 
could yield a more appropriate analysis. In fact, part of the shift from Heidegger (first 
paper) to Derrida (second and third papers) can be attributed to such reasons: Derrida’s 
metaphors of play and undecidability seem more appropriate to describe the 
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performative practices of insurance liabilities’ valuation (second paper) and pricing 
solvency (third paper), than Heidegger’s metaphors of stillness and meditation that 
inform the point of view of the first paper.  
That said, the point of the research is not to juxtapose Heidegger and Derrida, nor, in 
that respect, both of these thinkers with respect to other philosophical orientations. The 
point is rather to open up the possibility of experiencing a “prior” aporia that is inscribed 
within, and thus always and already, informs practices of managing uncertainty: an 
aporia that deflates the disclosed conditions of possibilities into quasi-conditions, as 
long as they are simultaneously conditions of impossibility. In this respect, there is 
simply no amount of philosophical reflection or analysis which could accommodate and 
resolve that. 
5.3. Further research 
It is possible to conceptualize two potential strategic avenues for future research in the 
framework opened up by this thesis. The first one relates to the theoretical approach 
adopted in this thesis; the second, is an empirical direction that is more relevant to the 
specificities of the S2 framework. 
The theoretical approach adopted in this thesis occupies a specific place in terms of the 
performativity debates, and in the Social Studies of Finance literature more generally. 
From the perspective of this thesis, performativity cannot simply be a question of how 
economics or economists shape economy—instead, it cuts deeper and attempts to 
contribute to the question of how economic phenomena emerge and come into being 
(Svetlova, 2016:197). We have seen for example, how new economic phenomena, the 
market-consistent valuation of insurance liabilities and the pricing of solvency risk, 
emerged in and through the new institutional framework of the S2 insurance-related 
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regulatory standards. Conventional economics struggles to provide a compelling 
account of the enactment of such new formal practices and models, as long as it 
downplays the role of language and of the formation of beliefs and expectations of 
market participants (Svetlova, 2016:185). On the other hand, the constructivist position 
tends to overstate the workings of performativity, failing to see that the possibility of 
breakdown is central to the ongoing operation of performativity as such (Butler, 
2010:153). In this respect, the kind of performativity that is proffered in this thesis aims 
to inflate the performative effects of market participants with respect to the conventional 
economist position, and to simultaneously deflate them relative to the constructivist 
position. This is achieved by precisely recognizing its aporetic dimension: 
performativity can only work (as the constructivist position holds) by precisely failing 
to work (as the economic-science position argues).  
As such, a potential avenue for future research is to extend the development of the 
performativity literature towards the notion of an ‘aporetic’ performativity. Such an 
extension may entail the precarious undertaking to disclose how the constructivist and 
the economic-science positions are deeply aporetic—neither oppositional, nor 
complementary. The problem with the constructivist view of performativity is its 
reluctance to ‘criticize’ existing economic formations—constructivism implies that we 
can only take part in making activities that open up new possibilities and think from 
within that form of engagement (Butler, 2010:153). This is why Callon does not hesitate 
to call for the abandonment of ‘the critical position’. After all, this is exactly what is 
considered wrong from this point of view with the conventional economist/scientistic 
position. By concentrating on forming judgments about e.g. capitalism, it fails to 
recognize that there is no one capitalism but multivalent operations of capitalisms 
(Butler, 2010:153). However, the aporetic view of performativity holds a position that 
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is neither uncritical and thus passive (constructivism), nor judgmental and thus active 
(scientism). Instead, it calls for a position that remains critical, yet, cannot turn 
judgmental. It remains critical as long as it accepts the ongoing making of economic 
realities, and only seek to intervene in them to oppose, further, or redirect a particular 
pattern of making (Butler, 2010:153). However, it does not turn judgmental inasmuch 
as its judgments are exercised in a way that do not depend on some sort of a pre-existing 
ground that offers legitimacy. Indeed, as Wittgenstein writes, such judgments disclose 
a telling ground of something that is anything but what we decided (Wittgenstein et al., 
1969). That is, of something that is “other”, which gives by means of taking (eluding) 
away. 
Another avenue of potential future research is to attempt to connect this kind of 
‘aporetic’ performativity with the concepts of illocution and perlocution, as modes of 
producing social facts, as expressed in the relevant performativity literature. While 
illocution refers to the production of reality by means of conventional speech acts, 
perlocution focuses on processes of formation, acceptance, and making believe of 
beliefs (Svetlova, 2016:185). Illocutionary performatives are about new realities 
produced; whereas perlocutionary performatives are about new kinds of effects that take 
hold. MacKenzie clearly notes the limits of the Austinian illocutionary paradigm in the 
economic and financial sphere, since the model only ‘tends’ to explain patterns of 
practices and thus it does not act with the same immediate efficacy that a sovereign does 
(Butler, 2010:151). This is why Butler notes that “most of what is interesting in 
economic and financial performativity belongs to the latter” (2010:153). Indeed, part of 
this thesis has been to support such a claim. For example, although Solvency II enjoys 
the efficacious authority of the sovereign supervisors, its reality and the change in 
practices it introduced did not rest on illocutionary acts, but on a set of perlocutionary 
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performatives—such as the gradual ‘making-perceptible’ (Kramer, 2014; Svetlova, 
2016) that fair value should include extraordinary measures in order to become 
insurance-relevant. However, from the point of view of the ‘aporetic’ performativity, 
what seems even more interesting is the performative power in virtue of which 
deconstruction becomes possible—in other words, the Derridean undeconstructible or 
unconditional. The latter is not just a positive regulative ideal that admits gradual 
empirical approximations in the Kantian sense. It is more of an urgent promise or an 
urgent call to recall a memory that is unable to be placidly complacent with the present 
(Caputo, 2006:123). In that respect, the illocutionary (to a lesser degree) and 
perlocutionary performatives do not simply exhaust themselves in the investigation of 
that set of felicitous conditions that succeeded or failed to materialize—as current 
research seems to be interested in. Rather, their performative power is also deeply 
intertwined with this absolute urgency of ‘here-and-now’, which dictates that the more 
new realities are brought forth (illocution) or new kinds of effects take hold 
(perlocution), the more a gap is created between an infinite promise and what is 
measured and accumulated against this promise (Caputo, 2006:129). In the framework 
of the case studies of this thesis, this implies, for example, that the more insurance 
liabilities succeed to be valued based on a set of felicitous perlocutionary performatives, 
the more a valuation gap is created that defers valuation and urgently demands for a 
new valuation round. Such an aporetic tension can shed some light in the paradox of a 
process that achieves its effects in simultaneously regenerative and accumulative ways 
(Butler, 2010:149).    
A second, more empirical potential promising avenue for future research in the 
framework opened up by this thesis lies in the detailed examination of the development 
of Solvency II. Part of this analysis is carried out in the second and third paper; however, 
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we would like to advocate for a more extensive one which would disclose, in a more 
detailed way, the several stages that were required for the development of the novel set 
of concepts and tools that was finally put into circulation by the implementation of 
Solvency II, and which is now already scheduled for review. 
Such concepts and tools attempt to strike a fine balance between the principles of 
financial economics and the actuarial conceptual framework that accommodates, in a 
more natural way, the insurance business model. What is interesting to study is why 
older forms and versions of such tools were either rejected or further developed, in 
line—or more frequently, out of line—with suggestions from the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), which is the independent advisory 
technical body that assists the European Commission in the design of Solvency II. A 
closely related promising avenue would be to research the implementation issues of 
Solvency II, including the development of internal risk-pricing models that diverge 
from the standard formula that is described in the regulatory text (what is termed as the 
‘S2 model’ within the second and third papers). The research should focus on practices 
of internal modeling that claim to “better” capture the particular risk profile of the 
specific insurer than the standard formula does—the research should attempt to disclose 
how it becomes possible to support such a claim, as well as discuss issues of calibration 
and monitoring of the model. What is also worth researching is how and if the solvency 
indicators produced by both the standard formula and internal models can be used to 
extract meaningful conclusions about the relevant solvency status of numerous insurers 
that operate under equally numerous dissimilar qualitative and quantitative risk profiles 
across the EU, which was one of the central and initial purposes of the whole S2 project.  
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Such a research project would provide the opportunity of further unpacking 
financialization processes and, more importantly, of disclosing both the empirical 
details and the ontological commitments of how “science in action” is carried out. 
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